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Preface 
Our purpose in assembling the pieces prepared for this volume was to 
bring together some of the best researchers and latest research on 
judicial behavior generally centered on the theme of conflict and 
consensus on appellate courts in America. It is our hope that this 
concentrated dose of studies on judicial behavior can illuminate both 
what we know and need to know about how appellate courts function. If 
the cumulative effect of the studies published here accomplishes that 
objective, we will consider this undertaking a success. By focusing on 
three court levels it is also our aim that this book makes a contribution 
to comparative judicial behavior within the American political land-
scape. 
As editors we thank the contributors to this volume for agreeing to 
participate and for their cooperation. The reader should understand that 
it was necessary to impose page lengths on the authors and that were it 
not for this restriction, more elaborate argument or more detailed 
analysis would have been offered by many of the authors. 
We have sought to provide in the Prologue a broader portrait of the 
contents in the context of the research problem of conflict and con-
sensus on appellate courts. In the Epilogue we seek to tie together the 
contributions of the individual chapters to judicial decision-making 
theory, comparative judicial behavior, and implications for future re-
search. 
We are grateful to those who facilitated the creation of special 
panels devoted to judicial conflict and consensus at the annual meet-
ings of the American Political Science Association ( 1982), Southern 
Political Science Association ( 1982), and Midwest Political Science 
Association (1983) at which early versions of the substantive chapters 
were first presented. 
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Prologue 
SHELDON GOLDMAN and 
CHARLES M. LAMB 
Judges who serve on most collegial courts in the United States are 
believed by students of courts to aim for decisional consensus. Indeed, 
evidence suggests a continual quest to reduce conflict through holding 
conferences, circulating draft opinions and memorandums, and con-
ducting private meetings between individual judges or groups of 
judges. 1 On some courts the expectation is that judges will suppress 
dissenting opinions because of the perceived advantages of judicial 
unanimity. A unanimous decision can usually expect a friendlier recep-
tion from other courts, politicians, lawyers, the media, and even the 
general public than a divided one. When judges speak with one voice, it 
suggests that they have reached the "right" decision, which may be 
particularly crucial if it has major implications beyond the immediate 
dispute. It reinforces the judicial myth that there is always an objective 
legal solution which is dictated by the law and principles of legal 
reasoning. The avoidance of overt dissension may be imperative to 
mobilize political and public support behind new or controversial court 
policy and ultimately to obtain compliance. 2 
Yet consensual decision making serves another key function in 
addition to promoting support for and compliance with judicial policy. 
That function is to avoid or minimize conflict among judges with 
different values and attitudes, especially judges serving on the same 
appellate courts. Of course, accommodation, compromise, and cohe-
sion are not always possible on collegial courts. In resolving disputes 
emerging from American society, internal disagreements frequently 
arise over constitutional or statutory questions. As Justice Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes, Jr., said about the Supreme Court, "we are very quiet 
there, but it is the quiet of a storm center. "3 Nor should we expect 
appellate court judges to agree easily in most cases. As Justice Tom C. 
2 Judicial Conflict and Consensus 
Clark once observed: "Differences of opinion must be expected on 
legal questions as on other subjects. . . . The history of progress is 
filled with many pages of disagreement. Why, therefore, . . . expect 
'the most influential men . . . on the bench . . . trained in different 
philosophy and matured in a different climate' to have the same 
thoughts and views? They don't and they won't. "4 Judges thus are often 
required to invest a great deal of time and energy hammering out 
agreements so as to avoid public disagreement. Too much conflict may 
become institutionally dysfunctional. When consenting to unanimous 
decisions, judges may be placing institutional considerations above 
personal preferences. Unanimity thus underscores the individual 
judge's fidelity to the group (the judicial institution) because no judge 
is seen as deviating from group norms. All act as one. 
To understand judicial politics and behavior, therefore, we must 
recognize that conflict accompanies the passionate nature of many 
disputes brought to appellate courts and that such conflict directly 
affects the decision-making process. If a reasonable degree of con-
sensus is not reached through amicable give-and-take, judicial decision 
making can become substantially prolonged and backlogs of cases can 
accumulate as the energies of judges become diverted by the writing of 
concurrences and dissents. Moreover, judges may subsequently de-
velop overt or covert ill will toward the colleagues with whom they 
disagree, which may take such diverse forms as open hostility and 
personal antagonism to forbearance but cloaked disaccord. 5 One real-
ity of judicial decision making is that regardless of the institutional 
factors promoting consensus, conflict is inevitable in some cases that 
are debated behind closed conference doors. Disagreement is typically 
hidden from the public; it is resolved to the extent possible before 
appellate courts publicly announce their decisions. Yet dissent on 
collegial courts provides clear evidence that conflict occurs and is not 
always amenable to resolution. 
Our purpose in this book is to explore the type, frequency, intensity, 
and especially the causes and phenomena related to conflict and 
consensus at the three principal levels of appellate courts in America. 
We hope that the studies presented in this volume will stimulate further 
research on these questions. Part I focuses on the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Part II on the U.S. courts of appeals, and Part III on the state courts of 
last resort. The book is aimed at a diverse audience: students and 
scholars in political science, social psychology, and law. We do not 
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seek to identify and examine conflict and consensus through traditional 
legal analysis of case law.6 Rather, we have brought together twelve 
studies written for this book which focus on judicial behavior from a 
common conceptual perspective. The chapters discuss conflict and 
consensus on American collegial courts and are concerned with de-
scription, theory, and explanation of judicial behavior. 
It is fair to ask why we want to know more about judicial conflict 
and consensus. Let us suggest several reasons at the outset. First, such 
knowledge may promote an understanding of American collegial 
courts as legal policy-making institutions. Appellate courts are legal 
institutions as reflected in, for example, the procedures and reasoning 
processes their members use in making decisions. By refining and 
extending precedent, or by striking out on new paths of doctrine, 
collegial courts function as legal policy makers, whether by interpret-
ing constitutions or statutes. In so doing, appellate judges frequently 
disagree over which precedents should be applied and how, what the 
new legal policy actually means, or the extt'emes to which it may be 
pushed. Judges clash over how the law should be construed, which tells 
us much about how courts function as legal bodies. For example, if 
judges are willing to overrule prior decisions not because they can 
objectively demonstrate that precedents have been eroded or are no 
longer relevant for the category of dispute for which they were orig-
inally designed but based on the judges' own policy preferences in the 
guise of their personal reading of the Constitution or statutes, then the 
enormous emphasis placed on stare decisis as a cornerstone of the legal 
process is clearly shaken. 
Second, appellate courts are political institutions with substantial 
power, and examination of conflict on courts may tell us about a variety 
of ways in which that power is or can be exercised. Appellate courts 
may strike down the actions of other branches of government, and a 
large body of literature suggests that courts have significant impacts on 
the political system, as in questions of civil rights, the rights of persons 
accused of crimes, reapportionment, obscenity, church-state relations, 
and the like. 7 Moreover, as policy makers within small groups, appel-
late judges behave much like politicians, although they are divorced 
from party politics. They attempt to influence the decisions of their 
colleagues through persuasion, negotiation, and bargaining. 8 Opinions 
may often end up being politically negotiated statements of policy. In 
making policy, judges often disagree over how politically charged 
4 Judicial Conflict and Consensus 
issues should be decided and how far a court's policy should extend. 
But like politicians, judges may be willing to bargain for a court policy 
that is generally consistent with, but weaker than, their own views 
rather than refuse to compromise and thus let an important decision go 
in the opposite direction. The study of conflict on courts also suggests 
which issues are most divisive within the political, social, and econom-
ic systems. As Justice Robert H. Jackson has written: "Conflicts which 
have divided the Justices always mirror a conflict which pervades 
society. In fact, it may be said that the Supreme Court conference 
chamber is the forum where each fundamental cause has had its most 
determined and understanding championship. The student of our times 
will nowhere find the deeper conflicts of American political philoso-
phy and economic policy more authentically and intelligently por-
trayed than in the opinions and dissents of the members of the Supreme 
Court."9 
The study of judicial conflict and consensus is important for a third 
reason: it may tell us about the internal operations of courts and give us 
clues as to what occurs behind closed doors. Conflict is easily discerni-
ble in institutions whose decision-making processes are largely open to 
public scrutiny, such as the United States Congress. Secrecy envelops 
the judiciary's deliberative process, however, and rarely do dissenting 
or concurring opinions reveal what actually has taken place in judicial 
chambers or conference rooms. Dissenting opinions instead over-
whelmingly take issue with the final decisions and the logic of the court 
majority. To understand how judges in fact function in a small group, it 
is important to look beyond the consensual image that courts seek to 
advance. 
Fourth, an understanding of conflict and consensus may enhance 
our knowledge of the individual attitudes and values of judges. 10 
Numerous studies relying on cumulative scaling or other analyses of 
judges' votes have suggested the basic civil liberty and economic 
attitudes of judges on the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. courts of 
appeals. 11 By such analysis we gain insight into how judges' attitudes 
and values help to shape specific patterns of conflict and consensus on 
different courts. 
A fifth reason for our interest in conflict and consensus is that such 
studies may improve our understanding of the concept of judicial role, 
that is, how judges perceive they should behave in their official capaci-
ties.12 Two of the most fundamental role conceptions are whether 
judges should be "activists" or should abide by the tenets of re-
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straint. 13 That judges have different role conceptions, however, does 
not necessarily mean that their values and attitudes are equally diver-
gent. Justice Louis D. Brandeis was an advocate of restraint during the 
heyday of the laissez-faire Court in the early 1930s, but he was perhaps 
just as liberal in certain areas of civil liberties as some of the activists of 
the Warren Court. 14 Conflict caused by judges' divergent role con-
ceptions may therefore be quite different from conflict over values and 
attitudes. 
Finally, patterns of judicial conflict and consensus may allow us to 
draw inferences about the exercise of leadership on courts. 15 Important 
decisions are not reached with ease in a small group composed of 
strong-willed individuals. Such decisions require a balance of forceful 
and effective leadership, especially if a court is to speak with one voice 
and to stand as a unit in the aftermath as subsequent litigation seeks to 
clarify the new policy made. Research has illustrated, for instance, the 
phenomenon of social leadership on the U.S. Supreme Court which is 
manifested by a concern with reducing tension within the group and 
promoting harmonious personal relationships. The phenomenon of 
task leadership, on the other hand, is concerned with expediting and 
efficiently performing the function of deciding and handing down 
decisions. When both forms of leadership are effectively performed, 
consensus is often achieved. It has been found that the chief justice is in 
the best position to exercise both forms of leadership. One well-
documented example occurred with Chief Justice Charles Evans 
Hughes. 16 These concepts of social and task leadership have also been 
applied to the roles played by chief justices of state courts of last 
resort. 17 
In short, we are interested in conflict and consensus on appellate 
courts for a variety of reasons, some of which are pursued in the studies 
in this volume. But we underscore that our concern in this book is with 
the behavior of judges, not the logical progression of legal arguments 
proffered by judges to rationalize the policies they make. The studies in 
this volume should be valuable not only for their substantive contribu-
tion to our understanding of the behavioral dimensions of conflict and 
consensus; they should also be of heuristic value and indicate some 
directions future research might profitably take. We now turn to several 
observations concerning the principal approach relied upon in the 
forthcoming chapters: that dealing with the quantitative measurement 
of conflict and consensus as revealed through judges' voting behavior. 
6 Judicial Conflict and Consensus 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS 
Some of the major contributions to the study of judicial conflict and 
consensus have been revealed through the use of small group analy-
sis. IS This approach to examining judicial decision making typically 
involves exploring interpersonal relationships on courts as revealed by 
such data sources as the private papers of deceased judges. Given the 
important findings of small group analysis, why do the chapters in this 
book rely mainly on voting statistics to examine judicial conflict and 
consensus? After all, as Walter F. Murphy argued, because judges vote 
alike does not necessarily mean that "their votes are the result of 
interaction; standing alone, voting records tell very little about the force 
or direction of any interpersonal influence that may exist." 19 
Our response is that the chapters in this volume go beyond ques-
tions of judicial interaction and influence. And even when these topics 
are addressed, one cannot rule out the possibility that if judges vote 
together, they also work together with greater harmony than do judges 
who possess very different values and attitudes. Not only does this 
conclusion accord with common sense, but there is little evidence in the 
literature of judges with similar attitudes and values maintaining con-
flictual relationships as defined in this book. More to the point, how-
ever, is that a major difficulty with sole reliance on traditional small 
group analysis is that its source material and scholarly analysis are 
subjective. Furthermore, there is a fundamental problem with data 
collection in that many judges do not keep detailed notes of the 
deliberations in court conferences or accounts of individual interac-
tions with their colleagues. Even when they do, we cannot assume that 
judges' personal papers constitute full and objective reports of the 
internal dynamics of judicial decision making. 
Other major hurdles are associated with attempting small group 
analysis. Many appellate judges do not donate their personal papers to 
libraries for public inspection. Some who do carefully edit or "launder" 
their papers or restrict access so that confidential behind-the-scenes 
involvements between judges on, or even off, a court are not revealed, 
sometimes for many decades, sometimes never. 20 Moreover, the con-
vention among judges has been that personal papers will not be made 
public until all those with whom they served are no longer on the bench, 
thereby frustrating the analysis of conflict and consensus until long 
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after the life of a particular court. Even when a judge's papers are 
opened to the public, there are practical problems of time and expense 
associated with travel to cities throughout the nation where the papers 
are housed. Although some Supreme Court justices have conveniently 
donated their papers to the Library of Congress, others have not. And if 
one wishes to examine the papers of judges who served on the U.S. 
courts of appeals or state supreme courts, the problem of the lack of a 
central location for research is greatly exacerbated. Interviewing pres-
ent or past judges also has drawbacks. Even if the researcher is granted 
interviews, judges may not be candid in answering questions con-
cerning conflict on their courts. For all these reasons, much can be said 
for careful investigation of conflict and consensus by analysis of 
contemporary voting behavior. 
Empirical examination of judicial conflict and consensus may thus 
provide a valuable supplement to the findings of small group analysis. 
Empirical studies normally assume and have even tested and found that 
differences between judges' attitudes and values are a primary cause of 
sustained disagreement. 21 Dissent informs the public that conflict 
exists on a court, and conflict suggests that legitimate conflicting paths 
to decision were open to the judges. By contrast, judicial consensus 
may in at least some cases indicate the presence of no substantial 
decisional leeway; the law's application may be relatively clear and 
routine. The traditional theory underlying judicial conflict research has 
assumed that concurring votes and opinions are not evidence of major 
conflict, even though concurring judges frequently express in their 
opinions noteworthy reservations about specific aspects of the court 
majority's policy. More recently students of judicial behavior have 
detected latent conflict even in unanimously decided cases. 22 In any 
event, all of this research suggests that, at a minimum, conflict will 
appear in nonrandom voting patterns and that through such studies we 
gain some insight into the dynamics of the small judicial group. 
Consonant with these assumptions, judicial conflict has usually 
been operationally defined in terms of voting disagreement. If judges 
vote on opposite sides of issues in nonunanimous cases, conflict is 
evident. Divided cases tell us that judges "are operating on different 
assumptions, that their inarticulate major premises are dissimilar, that 
their value systems are differently constructed and weighted, that their 
political, economic, and social views contrast in important respects. "23 
Voting agreement by an entire court is usually defined as consensus, 
8 Judicial Conflict and Consensus 
unless one adopts the newer approach of inferring latent conflict in 
certain unanimous decisions on the basis of previous analysis of at-
titudes and values. 
Bloc analysis, usually based on factor analysis or an approxima-
tion such as McQuitty Elementary Factor Analysis,24 has traditionally 
been a principal methodology used to detect conflict and consensus on 
appellate courts. 25 Bloc analysis reveals the extent of voting agreement 
and disagreement among members of collegial courts. It is a technique 
for ordering voting data from matrices that depict relationships in 
judicial voting patterns. C. Herman Pritchett first used the basic princi-
ples of bloc analysis in the 1940s and 1950s to examine voting behavior 
on the Supreme Court. 26 Subsequently, bloc voting has been shown to 
exist on the U.S. courts of appeals27 and state supreme courts. 28 The 
method has been developed by Glendon Schubert29 and John D. 
Sprague. 30 But as is made clear in the following chapters, several other 
statistical methods for analyzing various facets of conflict and con-
sensus are also relevant. 
A substantial amount of quantitative research has been conducted 
on judicial conflict and consensus, and a brief survey of some of that 
literature is appropriate and instructive at this point. In The Roosevelt 
Court, Pritchett discovered that between the 1930 and 1946 terms 
conflict on the U.S. Supreme Court varied from 11 to 64 percent of its 
opinions, with the Court each year between 1943 and 1946 handing 
down more split decisions than unanimous ones. 31 Extending Prit-
chett's findings from the 1946 through the 1962 terms, Schubert 
discovered that an average of 54 percent of all the Court's decisions 
were nonunanimous. 32 Additionally, since 1949 the Harvard Law 
Review has published Supreme Court statistics, and since 1966 in 
particular it has annually reported rates of dissent on the Court for the 
preceding term. These data demonstrate that dissent rates in full 
opinions since the 1965 term have ranged from a high of 81 . 1 percent 
for the 1970 term to a low of 56.1 percent for the 1965 term. 33 Conflict 
on the Supreme Court was therefore clearly prominent during the 1970s 
and usually greater than what Pritchett and Schubert had found for 
earlier terms. 
In striking contrast to the high percentage of Supreme Court cases 
decided nonunanimously, rates of dissent on the U.S. courts of appeals 
typically range from 2 percent or less on some courts to no more than 
about 16 percent on others. Between fiscal years 1962 and 1964, the 
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highest percentage of nonunanimous decisions was 15.5 percent on the 
District of Columbia Circuit followed by 11.5 percent and 11.4 percent 
on the Second and Fifth Circuits respectively. On the other circuits, 
nonunanimous decisions occurred in less than 6 percent of all cases. 34 
In addition, it has been found that rates of dissent on the appeals courts 
tend to change only slightly over time. Compared to fiscal years 
1962-64, between 1965 and 1971 the dissent rate on the District of 
Columbia Circuit dipped to 13.2 percent, while the rate of conflict on 
the Fourth Circuit increased slightly from 5. 9 percent to 7. 6 percent. 35 
Disagreement occurs on most state courts of last resort in less than 
10 percent of all cases, although for a few courts and years it has been 
found at the 40 or 50 percent rate. In 1916, the dissent rate on thirty-one 
of the forty-eight state supreme courts was less than 10 percent, but it 
was as high as 36.5 percent in Nebraska and 34.1 percent in New York. 
By 1941, the dissent rate was below 10 percent in only twenty-three 
states and was above 30 percent in Idaho, New Jersey, and Utah. In 
1966, the dissent rate on the supreme courts of Michigan, New York, 
and Pennsylvania was over 40 percent, and dissent occurred in less than 
10 percent of all cases decided by the supreme courts of twenty-nine 
other states. 36 By 1972, the dissent rate on Michigan's supreme court 
had climbed to 56.2 percent, but it had declined to 29.7 percent in 
Pennsylvania and 38.4 percent in New York. The average dissent rate 
on all state supreme courts was 12.6 percent in 1966, as compared to 
15. 1 percent in 1972.37 As with the U.S. courts of appeals, then, a high 
level of conflict is rare on state supreme courts, and the degree of 
conflict may be stable or unstable longitudinally, depending on the 
particular court and the time period under consideration. 
These statistics raise the obvious question of why conflict is 
typically so much higher on the U.S. Supreme Court than on the other 
major appellate courts. 38 Part of the explanation is that other appellate 
courts tend to siphon off less controversial issues. "Hard cases" and 
"tough questions," which provoke dissent, also are often appealed to 
the Supreme Court regardless of whether a unanimous decision was 
announced by a U.S. court of appeals or a state supreme court. This, of 
course, occurs because the Supreme Court, as the most authoritative 
judicial body in the nation, has considerable control over its appellate 
docket. Since a higher percentage of controversial cases may ultimately 
be selected to appear on the docket of the Supreme Court than normally 
come to other appellate courts, a higher level of dissent on the Supreme 
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Court can be expected. The Supreme Court is also the appellate court 
most likely to overrule precedent involving the federal Constitution or 
federal law, so again one would expect a higher rate of disagreement 
than on other collegial courts. 39 
Some research suggests that consensus on lower appellate courts is 
explained to a large degree by institutional variables. Since the Su-
preme Court always sits en bane, there is a greater statistical chance of 
one of nine Supreme Court justices dissenting than one of three judges, 
as on a typical appeals court panel. 40 Through interviews with appeals 
court judges, five factors have been identified as contributing to con-
sensus as a folkway on those courts: at least a surface adherence to stare 
decisis, the shared value (at least in the abstract) of"renderingjustice," 
the desire to win the respect of other judges and the legal community 
with well-crafted and reasoned written opinions and decisions, the 
shared value of being accommodating during judicial conferences, and 
the desire to maintain amicable personal relations among colleagues. 41 
These factors may be equally important in promoting consensus on 
state supreme courts. For instance, the observance of stare decisis, 
especially when U.S. Supreme Court decisions are applicable, in-
volves role perceptions, and Henry R. Glick has suggested that most 
state supreme court justices view their roles as being "law-interpreters" 
and "pragmatists," not as "law-makers."42 
It is also possible that judges on the U.S. courts of appeals and state 
supreme courts make a greater attempt to disguise or suppress conflict 
than do justices of the Supreme Court. 43 After all, the Supreme Court 
may be more likely to accept appeals and embarrass lower court judges 
by overruling them if a high degree of conflict characterizes the lower 
court record or if a particularly persuasive dissent has been written 
below. Or Supreme Court justices may simply not be willing to wait as 
long, or to try as hard, to reach unanimity in some cases as are judges on 
other courts, especially since Supreme Court justices do not face the 
possibility of being rebuked by a higher court overturning their deci-
sions. These, then, are some likely explanations for the Supreme 
Court's extremely high rate of dissent when compared to other collegial 
courts, although surely other reasons exist. 
Finally, some attention should be devoted here not only to the 
causes but to the effects of judicial conflict and consensus, although the 
following chapters typically focus on causes rather than consequences. 
Consensus on appellate courts primarily seems to have the effect of 
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lubricating the judicial decision-making process and of making courts 
appear to be legal institutions as opposed to political ones. 44 Conflict, 
on the other hand, seems to have more effects. 45 On what may appear to 
be the negative side, dissensus encourages the filing of additional 
appeals,46 increases uncertainty about what the law really means,47 
and requires that a dissenting judge's colleagues in the majority spend 
more time carefully writing majority opinions and responding to the 
dissenters' arguments.48 On the positive side, however, conflict in the 
form of dissents does not necessarily threaten the likelihood of com-
pliance by lower courts,49 it reduces cognitive dissonance,5° and it 
provides a means whereby frustrated judges may voice their personal 
views. 51 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE STUDIES IN THIS BOOK 
Lawrence Baum's 1983 assessment of the field of judicial politics 
concurred with C. Herman Pritchett's suggestion to "let a hundred 
flowers bloom."52 That is a partial goal in this collection of studies, 
although they are all behaviorally oriented with emphasis on judges' 
voting. Most of the studies assess causes and characteristics of conflict 
and its variation over time. The contributors rely on several different 
approaches for examining judicial conflict and consensus in the three 
major levels of American appellate courts. They combine a mixture of 
description, theory, and explanation in macro and microlevel analyses, 
at times in unique ways, to verifY prior research and to provide new 
insights into conflict and consensus on collegial courts. In the Epilogue 
of this volume, the studies are directly related to each other in terms of 
theory, comparative institutional behavior, and lines of future research 
that they suggest. 
David J. Danelski develops a model in Chapter l containing several 
variables that potentially affect Supreme Court conflict and its resolu-
tion. These variables include the values and role expectations of the 
justices, perceptions of issues, different forms of leadership in the 
small group, and personality. Relying on Justice William 0. Douglas's 
docket books for four terms and the private papers of eight justices, 
Danelski demonstrates how conflict and consensus may be shaped and 
altered by these variables from the time of the conference vote to the 
time of the final decision. In discussing task, social, and policy lead-
ership, he also suggests how concurring and dissenting behavior affects 
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the Court as a small group. In Chapter 2, S. Sidney Ulmer conducts a 
macro level exploratory investigation of dissent rates by chief justices of 
the Supreme Court. Finding considerable variation over time in dissent 
rates by the eleven chief justices from John Marshall to Warren Burger, 
Ulmer develops five models to identify variables that may explain such 
behavior. These variables include age at appointment, number of years 
served, prior judicial or legislative experience, external political pres-
sure by Congress on the Court, complexity of cases, frequency of 
appointments, and appointing president. Edward V. Heck's general 
focus in Chapter 3 is the effect of new Supreme Court appointments on 
conflictual and consensual voting patterns; he examines all justices' 
participation rates with the Court majority for each natural court from 
the 1953 to the 1981 terms. Exploring whether a new appointment will 
lead to greater consensus, Heck tests four hypotheses: that the justice 
nearest the Court's center is normally a member of its largest bloc, that 
the chief justice is usually close to the Court's "center of gravity" so he 
can exercise leadership opportunities, that freshmen justices gravitate 
to the Court's center, and that the justice most frequently agreeing with 
the newest Court member will have a high level of consensus with the 
majority. Harold J. Spaeth and Michael F. Altfeld in Chapter 4 conduct 
a microlevel analysis of Justice Felix Frankfurter's years on the Warren 
Court in cases involving the regulation of business and labor. They 
illuminate a clear instance of substantial disparity between a justice's 
purported role conception and his voting and opinion behavior. Addi-
tionally, they shed light on general trends of voting conflict and con-
sensus among the justices of the Warren Court in four subsets of labor 
and business cases. 
The first study in Part II on the United States courts of appeals is by 
Donald R. Songer. Exploring conflict and consensus in all courts of 
appeals from 1953 through 1975 in criminal justice and labor relations 
cases, Songer initially examines longitudinal variations in rates of 
dissent across courts. Then, in an attempt to test hypotheses most often 
used by students of the Supreme Court, the author looks at the effect of 
ten hypothetical factors that generally involve the influence on dissent 
ofthe legal culture, organizational and institutional characteristics, and 
the sociopolitical system. Chapter 6, by Justin J. Green, extends a line 
of research that emerged in the mid-1970s concerning whether low 
dissent rates on the courts of appeals hide disagreement in unanimous 
decisions. His study has three foci. Green first explains the theory 
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behind such research. Second, he discusses recent structural and opera-
tional changes in the courts of appeals that may affect decision making 
in these small groups (for example, the creation of new courts, in-
creases in the number of judges, and changes in court rules and internal 
procedures). Then, to verity prior findings and test whether some of the 
above changes in structure and operations have had an effect, he 
updates his previous work on conflictual voting behavior in unanimous 
appeals court panels by examining all published criminal decisions 
handed down by the courts of appeals during 1980. In Chapter 7, 
Stephen L. Wasby investigates agreement and disgreement in the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit among active-duty as well as 
"extra" court members, such as senior circuit judges, active-duty and 
senior district judges, and visiting judges from outside the circuit. 
Interviews with Ninth Circuit judges provide some insights into dis-
agreement, but emphasis is placed on voting by different combinations 
of three-judge panels from 1970 through 1975. Was by analyzes varia-
tion in disagreement between different categories of judges over the 
six-year period in published and unpublished opinions and relates 
voting by judges in these categories to decisions reversing or affirming 
to determine whether some judges pay greater deference to lower 
courts. By contrast, Charles M. Lamb presents in Chapter 8 a micro-
level analysis of conflict in the D.C. Circuit during Warren Burger's 
tenure (1956--69). The D.C. Circuit was selected because very high 
levels of voting conflict in criminal justice decisions occurred during 
these fourteen years. Principal areas of focus include voting conflict 
when the court reversed rather than affirmed the lower court; the 
relationship between magnitude of voting conflict, time required to 
reach final decisions, and volume of court outputs; the relationship 
between background traits and conflict among individual judges; and 
voting agreement between Burger and his colleagues over time and in 
five major criminal justice issues. 
Part III on state supreme courts is introduced by a macrolevel study 
by Henry R. Glick and George W. Pruet, Jr. They investigate levels and 
causes of dissent in the fifty state supreme courts for selected years 
between 1916 and 1981. Glick and Pruet first seek to determine how 
levels of state supreme court conflict have varied longitudinally. They 
then analyze in greater detail the influence of environmental and 
structural variables on levels of conflict. These variables include states' 
social and economic complexity (for example, urbanization and per-
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centage of private and criminal litigation), political complexity (such as 
state expenditures and two-party competition), and the complexity of 
state court structure (for example, number of judges and presence of 
intermediate appellate courts). Chapter 10, by Victor E. Flango, Craig 
R. Ducat, and R. Neal McKnight, explores the concept of judicial 
leadership through opinion assignment as an aspect of conflict and 
consensus on state supreme courts. Initially the authors discuss the 
different ways in which opinions are assigned in state courts of last 
resort and the theoretical link between opinion assignment and judicial 
leadership. Then, through several approaches, they empirically analyze 
over a number of years majority and minority leadership in the supreme 
courts of Michigan and Pennsylvania, which use rotational and chief 
justice assignment procedures, respectively. By contrast, John A. 
Stookey's study in Chapter 11 seeks to explain through time-series 
analysis the historical evolution of dissent in the Arizona Supreme 
Court. He approaches the task by testing the docket composition 
theory-that changes in conflict are a function of the types of issues 
decided by a court. Using voting data from 1913 through 1976 for the 
Arizona Supreme Court, Stookey examines the hypothesis that level of 
dissent increases as a higher percent of public law cases are decided, as 
opposed to cases involving criminal and private law issues. Sec-
ondarily, the author looks for empirical support in other structural 
variables (such as number of judges and the existence of an intermedi-
ate appellate court) and in the justice composition theory-that dissent 
is a function of ideological, background, and role conception hetero-
geneity among judges on a court. Finally, in Chapter 12, Robert L. 
Dudley examines conflict and consensus from the vantage point of 
agenda setting and coalition building. The focus involves votes on 
access and the merits for the California Supreme Court between early 
1973 and early 1980. Since some California Supreme Court rules and 
procedures for accepting cases for review are similar to those of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, the data provide an opportunity to test some ideas 
developed by students of the nation's highest court. Dudley's investiga-
tion draws on this literature and emphasizes vote distributions in 
petitions for review and cases decided on the merits, the relationship 
between justices' votes to grant review and to reverse the lower court, 
and whether justices vote to hear cases to reverse lower court errors. 
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Causes and Consequences of 
Conflict and Its Resolution 
in the Supreme Court 
DAVID J. DANELSKI 
This study is to a large extent exploratory, but it also reexamines some 
familiar terrain, builds on the work of a number of scholars, and tests as 
well as raises hypotheses. It is a broad attempt to explain judicial 
behavior by considering together two important questions in decision-
making and impact research: what are the causes and what are the 
consequences (particularly the policy consequences) of conflict and its 
resolution in the Supreme Court? 
CAUSES OF CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION 
Conflict in the Supreme Court is disagreement among the justices 
expressed in conference discussions, remarks from the bench, intra-
Court communications, votes, and opinions. From a policy perspec-
tive, votes and opinions in nonunanimous cases are the most important 
indicators of conflict. Voting behavior is usually dichotomous: justices 
vote to affirm or reverse, grant or deny, remand or not remand, and so 
on. Opinion behavior often reflects the extent and intensity of disagree-
ment. Typically the most intense response is writing a dissenting 
opinion. Other responses are joining dissenting opinions, dissenting 
without opinion, writing concurring opinions, joining concurring 
opinions, and concurring without opinion. By contrast, conflict resolu-
tion in the Supreme Court is the achievement of agreement after the 
expression of disagreement. The best example is a unanimous decision 
and opinion after a divided vote in conference. 
Judicial decision-making theory is obviously relevant in explaining 
conflict and its resolution in the Supreme Court. Although the literature 
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on the subject is massive, no single, comprehensive theory of decision 
making has yet emerged. The major variables for such a theory, how-
ever, are generally known. 1 They are portrayed hypothetically in the 
model shown in Figure 1.1. 
The justices' values and role expectations in the model are interact-
ing, multidimensional variables; thus dimensional differences, such as 
differences in intensity, as well as differences in values and role expec-
tations, must be taken into account in explaining conflict in the Court. 2 
Role expectations affect the expression of conflict both directly and 
indirectly. The expectation of acquiescence in majority decisions in 
cases that do not involve important legal principles usually operates 
directly to limit dissent. Expectations of judicial restraint and prece-
dent adherence, however, usually limit dissent indirectly by avoiding 
value conflicts leading to divisions in the Court. Similarly, leadership 
expectations that the chief justice will reconcile differences among 
justices usually limit dissents indirectly. 3 
The justices' perceptions are important variables in the model 
because they interact with both values and role expectations. Percep-
tions of issues determine which values and role expectations operate in 
cases, and high saliency of specific values and role expectations make 
for greater readiness to perceive issues in terms of those values and role 
expectations. Although there is usually considerable perceptual overlap 
as to issues in cases, justices sometimes perceive the same stimuli in 
cases differently, and those differences in perceptions often cause 
conflict. 4 
Leadership--both task and social-usually resolves conflicts, but 
when there is serious competition for task leadership, and social 
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leadership is inadequate to relieve the resulting group tensions, conflict 
tends to increase. 5 Leadership is also important because the values, role 
expectations, and perceptions of persuasive justices weigh more heav-
ily than those of other justices in determining the outcome of cases. 
Thus if there is great disparity in the values or role expectations of 
leading competitors for task leadership, conflict related to these values 
and role expectations is likely to be exacerbated. 6 
Personality affects leadership and role expectations. Justices with 
moderately aggressive or detached personalities are most likely to 
exercise task leadership, and those with moderately compliant or self-
effacing personalities are most likely to exercise social leadership. 7 
Justices who are assertive and also warm, caring, and tactful are most 
likely to exercise both task and social leadership. Furthermore, there is 
evidence that justices with a high sense of self-esteem tend to hold 
activist role expectations and that those with a low sense of self-esteem 
tend to hold restraintist role expectations. 8 
In an effort to explore further and test the above explanation of 
conflict and its resolution in the Supreme Court, the following hypoth-
eses will be considered: (1) Differences in values, role expectations, 
and perceptions cause conflict. (2) Adequacy of task and social lead-
ership affects conflict and its resolution. (3) Personality is related to 
leadership and thus affects conflict and its resolution. 
Data to explore and test the above hypotheses were drawn princi-
pally from three sources: (1) Justice William 0. Douglas's docket 
books for the 1939, 1940, 1942, and 1943 terms, the last two terms of 
Charles Evans Hughes's chief justiceship, and the second and third 
terms of Harlan Fiske Stone's chief justiceship; (2) the Court's official 
reports for the 1939-1944 terms; and (3) the private papers of Hughes, 
Stone, Douglas, Hugo L. Black, Stanley F. Reed, Felix Frankfurter, 
Frank Murphy, and Wiley B. Rutledge. Douglas's docket books, which 
are located at the Library of Congress, contain conference votes, 
opinion assignments, and other official actions taken by the Court. 
Only justices may be present at conferences; thus Douglas personally 
recorded all the conference votes in his docket books. 
Values, Role Expectations, and Perceptions. The principal data for the 
following analysis are thirty-one civil liberties decisions by the Su-
preme Court between February 1943, following Rutledge's appoint-
ment to the Court, and the end of the 1943 term in June 1944 in which at 
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least one justice cast a dissenting or pass vote in conference. The 
analysis proceeded in a series of steps. 
The first step was an attempt to scale the conference votes in the 
thirty-one decisions as shown in Douglas's docket books. The attempt 
failed to disclose unidimensionality; the coefficient of reproducibility 
for the attempted scale was .80. This finding is consistent with the 
model shown in Figure 1.1, which hypothesizes a multi causal explana-
tion of decision making. 
The second step was an attempt to scale the reported votes in the 
same thirty-one decisions. Again the attempt failed to disclose uni-
dimensionality; the coefficient of reproducibility for the attempted 
scale was .86. 
The third step was a content analysis of all opinions in the thirty-one 
decisions for the purpose of separating decisions in which votes ap-
peared to tum on role expectations-activism-restraint or precedent 
adherence-from the rest of the decisions. Only two decisions could be 
classified as containing votes that turned on precedent-adherence ex-
pectations. One was Smith v. Allwright, in which Owen J. Roberts 
argued in dissent that his colleagues had departed from precedent. 9 The 
other was United States v. Saylor, in which Douglas, writing for 
himself, Black, and Reed, argued in dissent that the precedent relied 
upon by the majority did not bind it. 10 Both decisions were eliminated 
from this analysis. 11 Of the twenty-nine remaining decisions, thirteen 
contained votes that appeared to tum on activism-restraint expecta-
tions. These thirteen decisions determined the outcome of twenty-one 
cases. 
The fourth step was an attempt to scale the votes in both the thirteen 
activism-restraint decisions and the sixteen residual decisions. The 
votes in both sets of decisions formed scales with coefficients of 
reproducibility of . 90. The scales are shown in Figures 1. 2 and 1. 3. 12 
They are consistent with the hypothesis that activism-restraint expecta-
tions and values underlie the votes portrayed. 
The fifth step was an analysis of all dissenting opinions in civil 
liberties decisions during the 1941 through 1944 terms. Opinions in 
which dissenting justices articulated expectations of either activism or 
restraint were separated from the rest of the opinions, and the justices 
were given activism-restraint scores: + 1 for each activist dissenting 
opinion and - 1 for each restraintist dissenting opinion. Those scores 
were the basis for the activism-restraint dissenting opinion scale shown 
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Figure 1. 2. Activism-Restraint Voting Scale 
Justices 
Mu Ru Bl Do St Ja Ro Fr Re 
Hirabayashi v. U.S. El 0-9 
Yasui v. U.S. El 0-9 
Falbo v. U.S. + 1-8 
Prince v. Mass. + 1-8 
Yakus v. U.S. + ffJ El ffJ 3-6 
Mortensen v. U.S. + + + + + 5-4 
Murdock v. Penn." + + + + + 5-4 
Jones v. Opelikab + + + + + 5-4 
Martin v. Struthers + + EB + + 5-4 
Follett v. McCormick + + + + + + 6-3 
Ashcraft v. Tenn. + + + + + e + 6-3 
W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette + + + + + + 6-3 
Pollock v. Williams EB EB + + e + + + e 7-2 
Totalsc 11-0 9-2 7-4 7-4 6-5 3-8 3-8 2-9 2-9 
Scale Position II 9 7 7 7 2 0 
Scale Scores 1.00 .64 .27 .27 .27 -.64 -.82 -.82 -1.00 
R=l- 7/xt=.91 S=l-7f~s=.72 
3Eight cases counted as one decision. 
l>rhree cases counted as one decision. 
cAll computations based on nonunanimous reported decisions. 
Key: + =vote consistent with activism expectations 
- =vote consistent with restraint expectations 
0 =vote change; opposite vote in conference 
D = pass vote in conference 
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Figure 1 . 3. Residual Voting Scale 
Justices 
Mu Bl Ru Do Re Ja Ro Fr St 
U.S. v. Laudani e 0-9 
Buchalter v. N.Y. * e 0-8 
U.S. v. Mitchell + 1-8 
U.S. v. Gaskin + e e 1-8 
U.S. v. Lepowitch * + 1-7 
Snowden v. Hughes + + 2-7 
Gallowav v. U.S. + + + e 3-6 
Lyons v ." Okla. + + $ El 3-6 
U.S. v. Dotterweich + + + + 4-5 
Hartzel v. U.S. + + + + + 5-4 
Feldman v. U.S. 
* + + l±l * 3-4 Scheiderman v. U.S. + + + + + * 5-3 
U.S. v. Ballard EE> + + $ + EB e 6-3 
Roberts v. U.S. + $ $ $ $ $ 6-3 
Bartchy v. U.S. + + + + + + + 7-2 
Billings v. Truesdell + + + + + + + + 8-1 
Totals a ll-1 10-4 9-5 8-6 5-9 4-8 4-10 2-12 2-12 
Scale Position 13 10 9 6 5 4 1/2 3 2 
Scale Scores .86 .43 .29 -.14 -.29 -.36 -.57 -.71 -.86 
R = 1 - 9/s1 = . 90 S= 1- 1¥33= .63 
aAII computations based on nonunanimous reported decisions. 
Key: + = vote consistent with civil liberties outcome 
= vote not consistent with civil liberties outcome 
* = nonparticipation 
0 = vote change; opposite vote in conference 
0 = pass vote in conference 
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Table I. I. Dissenting Opinion Analysis in Civil Liberties 
Decisions, I 941-1944 Terms 
Activism-Restraint Dissenting 
27 
Opinions Residual Dissenting Opinions 
Civil Liberties Outcomes 
Justices Activism-Restraint Score Pro-Con Score 
Murphy 3-0 3 10-1 9 
Rutledge 1-0 1.5• 2-0 3• 
Black 1-0 I 7-1 6 
Douglas 1-0 2-1 I 
Stone 1-3 -2 2-4 -2 
Roberts 0-2 -2 2-1 
Jackson 0-3 -3 2-0 2 
Reed 0-5 -5 1-3 -2 
Frankfurter 0-5 -5 2-4 -2 
•Rutledge's score is adjusted because he served only two and a half of the four terms 
covered in the analysis. 
in Table 1 . 1. The justices were then given scores on their commitment 
to civil liberties in the residual decisions: + 1 for each dissenting 
opinion supporting a civil liberties outcome and - I for each dissenting 
opinion opposing a civil liberties outcome. Those scores were the basis 
of the residual dissenting opinion scale shown in Table 1.1. 13 
The sixth step was Spearman rank-correlation analysis of the four 
scales in Figures 1.2 and 1.3 and Table 1.1. The result of the analysis, 
given in Table 1.2, shows that role expectations and values are signifi-
cantly correlated, largely because of the behavior of the four activists-
Murphy, Rutledge, Black, and Douglas-whose votes and dissenting 
opinions in activism-restraint decisions reflected their values in much 
the same way they did in other civil liberties decisions and whose 
general consistency of ranking in relation to each other in the scales 
(Murphy at the top, Douglas at or tied for the fourth position, and 
Rutledge or Black in between) also reflected the levels of their commit-
ment to civil liberties. If those activists had not been on the Court and 
statistical composites of Stone, Jackson, Roberts, Reed, and Frank-
furter had sat in their places, the three weakest relationships in the 
table-AR(V)-R(V), AR(V)-R(DO), and AR(DO)-R(V)-would de-
crease to the point that they would not be significant at the .05 level. 
The remaining three relationships, however, would remain signifi-
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Table 1.2. Spearman Rank-Correlation Analysis of Voting and 









Activism-Restraint Voting Scale (Figure 1.2) 







Activism-Restraint Dissenting Opinion Scale (Table 1.1) 
Residual Dissenting Opinion Scale (Table I . I) 
Significance level (one-tailed test) 
.60 .05 level 
. 78 .01 level 
cant-AR(V)-AR(DO) at the .Ollevel and R(V)-R(DO) and AR (DO)-
R(DO) at the .05 level. 14 These findings are consistent with the 
hypotheses that ( 1) role expectations account at least for the votes of the 
restraintists in the decisions in the activism-restraint voting scale, (2) 
values account for the votes of both activists and restraintists in the 
residual voting scale, and (3) activism-restraint expectations and com-
mitment to civil liberties values are to some extent related. Hence it is 
not surprising that Murphy, an arch-civil libertarian, was also an arch-
activist, for his commitment to civil liberties values overwhelmed any 
commitment he had to judicial restraint. 15 Nor is it surprising that 
Frankfurter, the self-proclaimed spokesman for judicial restraint, more 
than occasionally voted on the basis of his values. 16 Like those of his 
colleagues, Frankfurter's votes indicated in Figure 1.2 are consistent 
with a value explanation just as those indicated in Figure I. I are 
consistent with a role-orientation explanation. Further, the finding that 
activism-restraint expectations and civil liberties value commitments 
are to some extent related suggests that interaction of values and role 
expectations in justices such as Frankfurter may result in restraint 
justifications of votes that tum at least partly on values. In view of that, 
and also because the activists' votes-those of Murphy, Black, 
Rutledge, and Douglas--clearly appear to tum on liberal values, 
Figure 1.1 is perhaps best interpreted as showing that votes tum on the 
interaction of role expectations and values. To a lesser extent that 
interpretation probably applies to Figure 1.2, but because no justice 
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articulated restraint expectations in the decisions portrayed in that 
figure, the conclusion is necessarily speculative. 
The seventh step was an attempt to measure the extent to which 
differences in perceptions cause conflict in the Court. The voting scales 
in Figures 1.2 and 1.3 were used to identify decisions that appeared to 
turn on disparities of perceptions, that is, those that contained two or 
more inconsistent votes. There were three such decisions-Mortensen 
in the activism-restraint voting scale and Dotterweich and Hartzel in 
the residual voting scale. Examination of conference notes and intra-
Court correspondence revealed that justices deciding those cases per-
ceived the issues differently. In Mortensen, conflict appeared to turn 
more on differences in perceptions of the reach of the Mann Act than on 
role expectations. 17 In Dotterweich, the minority perceived a civil 
liberties issue, but the majority did not. Roberts's remarks in the 
conference illustrate the minority's perception. "I take a different 
view," he said. "This is a criminal statute & we should ask the legis-
lature with great definiteness to point out what guilt hinges on." 18 In 
Hartzel, Murphy saw the issue as one of free speech while Stone saw it 
as concerning sufficiency of evidence. 19 Thus in those three cases, 
perceptual differences appear to account for inconsistent votes, and in 
Mortensen and Dotterweich they also appear to account for conflict 
among the justices. 2o 
The eighth and final step in this analysis explored post-conference 
vote changes in relation to the scale patterns in Figures 1.2 and 1.3. 
There are at least three competing hypotheses that might explain the 
vote changes: ( 1) Acquiescence expectations cause justices to change 
their dissenting votes to majority votes. (2) Post-conference activity-
discussions with colleagues and law clerks, writing and circulation of 
opinions, criticisms and comments on opinions-leads to more gener-
ally shared perceptions of issues and thus causes greater agreement. (3) 
Post-conference activity sharpens perceptions of issues in relation to 
the justices' values and role expectations and thus causes them to 
change votes that are inconsistent with their overall voting patterns. 
Vote changes shown in Figures 1.2 and 1.3 support all three hypoth-
eses, but support for the third hypothesis is somewhat greater than for 
the other two. Two of the twenty-eight vote changes (including pass 
votes) support none of the hypotheses, for they are inconsistent dissent-
ing votes. Twenty of the remaining twenty-six vote changes support 
each hypothesis, for they are majority votes that fit scale patterns. The 
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remaining six votes support only the third hypothesis, for they are 
dissenting votes that fit the scale patterns. Thus sharpened perception 
of issues may either increase or decrease conflict. 21 
This eight-step analysis leads to the conclusion that Supreme Court 
decisions tum primarily on the interaction of values and role expecta-
tions. Hence differences in commitments to values and role expecta-
tions often cause conflict, and, to a lesser extent, so do differences in 
perceptions. Conflict resolution then turns, for the most part, on the 
reconciliation of those differences-in short, on leadership. 
Leadership and Personality. Unsuccessful attempts at task leadership 
cause conflict and tension, which, if unrelieved by social leadership 
behavior, negatively affect decision making in the Court. Successful 
task and social leadership attempts, on the other hand, usually result in 
conflict resolution. Thus leadership ability is related to conflict and its 
resolution in the Court. An earlier study based on the justices' papers 
showed that conflict was lowest when task leadership was performed 
primarily by a single member of the Court-Willis Van Devanter in the 
1920s and Hughes in the 1930s-and social leadership was performed 
sufficiently to satisfy the emotional conditions for collegial, produc-
tive, satisfying decision making. William Howard Taft was more than 
adequate as the Court's social leader in the 1920s, and Hughes was at 
least adequate in the role in the 1930s. Stone, however, lacked the 
leadership skills of Taft and Hughes, and soon after Stone was pro-
moted to the chief justiceship, persons who knew him well predicted he 
would have difficulties in leading the Court. In the Stone Court, there 
was competition for task leadership, inadequate social leadership, a 
decline in collegiality, and an increase in conflict. 22 . These findings 
were the result of qualitative analysis of several justices' papers, 
particularly those of Taft, Hughes, and Stone, for docket books record-
ing conference voting behavior for that period were not yet available. 
The present availability of Douglas's docket books permits quantitative 
analysis of leadership in the Hughes and Stone Courts. 
The Douglas docket books contain data that can be used to measure 
leadership in the period between the conference vote and announce-
ment of decisions in open Court. A justice's leadership score can be 
calculated by summing all dissenting and pass votes in conference that 
later became majority votes in cases assigned to that justice for opinion 
and then dividing the sum obtained by the total number of conference 
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Table 1.3. Leadership Scores 
1939 and 1940 Terms 1942 and 1943 Terms 
Justice Score N Score N 
Hughes .91 21 
McReynolds .40 10 
Stone .59 73 .52 31 
Roberts .58 38 .35 46 
Black .88 41 .53 71 
Reed .32 28 .33 36 
Frankfurter .25 64 .14 51 
Douglas .52 63 .46 83 
Murphy .57 21 .47 30 
Jackson .52 54 
Rutledge .50 22 
Leadership score = d + P where d is a dissenting vote and p a pass vote in conference 
N 
that later became a majority vote in a decision assigned to a justice for opinion. N is the total 
number of dissenting and pass votes in conference in all decisions assigned for opinion to that 
justice. 
dissenting and pass votes in those cases. The score thus obtained is 
essentially a measure of task leadership, for usually vote changes turn 
on the persuasiveness of the opinions circulated. The measure, how-
ever, contains some elements of social leadership, for vote changes 
sometimes involve negotiation, expectations of reciprocity, and even 
considerations of friendship. In addition, expectations of acquiescence 
underlie some vote changes. 
Table 1. 3 shows the leadership scores for the Hughes Court during 
the 1939 and 1940 terms and for the Stone Court during the 1942 and 
1943 terms. The scores confirm what is known about Hughes's and 
Black's leadership ability. 23 The leadership scores for the 1942 and 
1943 terms also reflect competition for leadership in the Stone Court. 
Black, however, was a more successful leader during that period than 
his score suggests. During the 1942 and 1943 terms, Frankfurter, Stone, 
and Roberts seldom followed his lead, but Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge, 
Reed, and Jackson often changed their votes to join his opinions. 24 
Black's leadership score for those justices averages slightly more than 
.70, compared with his overall leadership score for the Court of .53. 
His opinion in Roberts v. United States, a case in the 1943 term 
involving the interpretation of the Federal Probation Act, illustrates his 
persuasive powers. 25 In conference the vote was 8-1 , with Murphy 
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casting the sole vote for the criminal defendant. Black, who had been 
assigned to write for the Court, decided soon after he began work on the 
opinion that the majority had erred. Instead of bringing the case back to 
the conference, he circulated an opinion sustaining the opposite result. 
Murphy, having voted that way in conference, of course, immediately 
joined the opinion, as did Douglas, Rutledge, Jackson, and Roberts, 
thus reversing the original conference vote. 26 
Stone's leadership scores for both periods are relatively high, 
which is not surprising, for he was a respected legal craftsman. His 
leadership problems were not in writing persuasive opinions but in 
conference discussion. His presentation of cases as chief justice tended 
to be rambling, and in conference he did not remain above the fray so 
that he might later be in a position to reconcile differences among his 
colleagues. 27 Had he been as effective in conference discussion and 
post-conference negotiation as he was in opinion-writing, he would 
have been a formidable leader of his Court. 
Frankfurter's low leadership scores-the lowest among all justices 
for both periods-also are not surprising. It was not that Frankfurter 
made no attempts to lead. Douglas said Frankfurter was one of the three 
most active proselytizers on the Court, the other two being Black and 
Stone. Douglas went on to write that Frankfurter pushed his views 
"every waking hour. . . . Up and down the halls he went, pleading, 
needling, nudging, probing. He never stopped trying to change the 
votes on a case until the decision came down. "28 Frankfurter sought to 
lead, but he often failed, and, according to H. N. Hirsch, he failed 
because of his narcissistic personality. Frankfurter, Hirsch wrote, had a 
grandiose self-image as a leader, and when some of his colleagues 
rejected his early attempts at leadership, he responded with arrogance 
and vindictiveness, which undermined his later attempts. 29 Other anal-
yses also support the conclusion that Frankfurter's personality stood in 
the way of effective leadership. Alan A. Stone, after noting Frank-
furter's vanity, arrogance, apparent sense of superiority, and conde-
scending attitude toward his colleagues, wrote: "I imagine that, while 
sitting around the conference table week after week, Frankfurter's 
fellow Justices must have sensed his uneven human qualities, his 
awesome intellectual gifts, and his emotional immaturity. Perhaps this 
awareness had something to do with his inability to persuade his 
colleagues. Power in a group of peers is distributed by just such 
intangible human perceptions. "30 
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Stone's lack of success as a social leader in the 1940s also appears 
to have been related to his personality. Adequate proof of this proposi-
tion requires at least a psychobiographical study like Hirsch's of 
Frankfurter. Alpheus T. Mason's biography, however, provides consid-
erable evidence on Stone's personality, which appears to have been 
similar to Taft's but with some flawed edges. Stone was a warm, 
gregarious man who might have been an adequate social leader, but, 
according to Mason and others, he was also a vain, sensitive man whose 
ego was easily bruised, who sometimes responded to criticism sar-
castically, and who did not hide his low opinion of the abilities of some 
of his colleagues. 31 
Just as personality helps to explain leadership failures, it also helps 
to explain leadership successes. A previous study concluded that 
Hughes's moderately detached personality was related to his ability to 
act as both task and social leader, and Black's moderately aggressive 
personality was related to his task leadership in the I 940s. 32 Neither of 
those conclusions, however, was based on intensive psycho-
biographical analysis or quantitative analysis. 
Although quantitative measures of personality are yet to be de-
veloped for justices whose work has passed into history, 33 the effects of 
their personalities on decision making through such mediating vari-
ables as leadership can be measured. Increases in dissent during the 
Stone Court appear to be at least partly attributable to a failure of social 
leadership, which in turn appears related not only to Stone's personality 
but also to the personalities of his colleagues. The dramatic rise of 
dissent during Stone's chief justiceship, when social leadership was 
inadequate, does not prove the latter caused the former, for other 
variables may also have been at work. Because inadequate performance 
of social leadership results in decreased collegiality and satisfaction in 
the Court, it would seem that when those conditions are present, 
acquiescence in majority opinions would decrease and reported dissent 
would increase correspondingly. To test this hypothesis, a basis for 
empirical comparison-a period in which social leadership was at least 
minimally adequate-is necessary. The I 939 and I 940 terms of the 
Hughes Court provide such a basis for measuring effects of inadequate 
social leadership during the Stone Court. For purposes of the test, 
acquiescence was measured by dividing the sum of a justice's dissent-
ing conference votes that later became majority votes by the sum of all 
dissenting conference votes cast by that justice. Acquiescence scores 
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Table 1.4. Acquiescence Scores 
1939 and 1940 Terms 1942 and 1943 Terms 
Justice Score N Score N 
Hughes .22 49 
McReynolds .40 67 
Stone .45 20 .26 42 
Roberts .35 83 .32 103 
Black .32 28 .30 61 
Reed .69 27 .44 63 
Frankfurter .64 II .20 54 
Douglas .32 28 .24 59 
Murphy .42 12 .33 68 
Jackson .30 56 
Rutledge .25 24 
Acquiescence score = ~ where de is a dissenting vote in conference later changed to 
a majority vote and N is the total number of votes in conference for each justice. 
for each period are shown in Table 1.4. Consistent with the hypothesis, 
acquiescence fell from 38 percent in the Hughes Court to 28 percent in 
the Stone Court, reflecting a rate of decrease in acquiescence of slightly 
more than 25 percent. 
The foregoing analysis provides quantitative confirmation of pre-
vious findings concerning the importance of task and social leadership 
in decision making and conflict resolution in the Court. It also shows 
that personality affects both decision making and conflict resolution, 
but the relationship between personality and leadership still requires 
quantitative confirmation. 
CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICT 
AND ITS RESOLUTION 
Conflict in the Supreme Court has both positive and negative con-
sequences. It makes for alertness, clarifies issues, raises alternative 
approaches, and tests the intensity of justices' commitments to given 
positions, but when it gets out of hand-becoming highly emotional 
and antagonistic-decision making tends to be uncollegial, inefficient, 
and unsatisfying. At such times, concurring and dissenting behavior 
tends to escalate, and often the result is public criticism. 34 
Most of the consequences of conflict resolution are positive. Con-
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flict opens emotional wounds; resolution binds them. One result of 
conflict resolution is satisfaction and efficiency in the Court. Another 
result is legitimation of public policy, for greater unity in the Court's 
decisions reinforces the myth of law's certainty. 35 But, as Hughes said, 
conflict resolution at the expense of deeply held convictions or to avoid 
policy issues that require decision leaves conflict smoldering and 
creates future problems in the Court. 36 
Justices prize the right to express their individual positions on 
issues. They see concurring and dissenting behavior as useful in achiev-
ing their policy goals in the Court, and they assume that the publication 
of their individual views will affect the future development of law and 
policy. It is by no means clear that their assumptions are correct, but the 
assumptions, nonetheless, raise important testable hypotheses. 
In addition to the data used in the first part of this study, data were 
collected from the U.S. Reports that had been identified by using 
Shepard's United States Citator. All cases in the 1942 term containing 
concurring opinions two or more pages in length were Shepardized, 
and all cases citing those concurring opinions were analyzed. 
Shepard's United States Citator was also used to determine which 
cases decided during the 1939-1943 terms had been overruled, and 
then the overruling cases were examined to determine the part played by 
the original dissenting opinions in the overrulings. That analysis was 
expanded, and comparable data were collected for all cases overruled 
by the Supreme Court from the 1958 through the 1980 terms. 
Concurring Behavior. Concurring opinions rarely become opinions of 
the Court. For the four terms considered in this study, Douglas's papers 
revealed only one such instance-Dickinson Industrial Site v. Cow-
an-a bankruptcy case in the 1939 term in which Douglas's concurring 
opinion supplanted Reed's opinion for the Court. 37 
Concurring votes and opinions are far more likely to affect the 
content of Court opinions than to supplant them. An example is 
Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, which Stone had assigned to 
himself for opinion. 38 Most of his colleagues praised the opinion he 
had circulated, but Black, troubled by it, wrote Stone: "I regret my 
inability to accept all of your opinion in this case. What troubles me is 
the discussion of 'substantive due process' and the use of the 'unrea-
sonable or arbitrary' criterion to determine procedural due process. 
These features of the opinion have historical implications that I do not 
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wish to see perpetuated. It may be that you could not eliminate those 
statements without too much interference with your train of argument. 
If you cannot, will you please note that I concur in the result and in all of 
the opinion except the statements in Part I with reference to due 
process. "39 Stone made the revisions Black requested. 
Attempts to influence the content of Court opinions are not always 
successful. An illustration is Douglas's attempt to influence Stone's 
opinion for the Court inHirabayashi v. United States. 40 "I am anxious 
to go as far as I can reasonably to meet the views of my associates," 
Stone wrote to Douglas, "but it seems to me that if I accepted your 
suggestions very little structure of my opinion would be left, and that I 
should lose most of my adherents. It seems to me, therefore, that it 
would be wiser for me to stand by the substance of my opinion and for 
you to express your views in your concurring opinion as you have 
already done." Douglas followed Stone's suggestion.41 
It appears that concurring opinions play a small role at best in the 
future development of law and policy. The first step in testing that 
hypothesis was the identification of all concurring opinions two pages 
or more in length delivered during the 1942 term. There were thirteen 
such opinions in eleven cases. 42 A research assistant then Shepardized 
the opinions to determine whether they had been cited in later Supreme 
Court opinions. Seven concurring opinions had never been cited. The 
remaining six had been cited only nine times. In six of the nine 
instances, they had been mentioned only by their own authors and 
always in dissenting or concurring opinions. 43 In the remaining three 
instances, the citations were even less significant. 44 
This analysis suggests two conclusions. First, concurring behavior 
sometimes has significant consequences in the Court's decisional proc-
ess by influencing the content of majority opinions. Second, con-
curring behavior seems to play a small role in the development of law 
and policy. The latter conclusion is necessarily tentative because it is 
based on examination of only thirteen concurring opinions in one Court 
term. 
Dissenting Behavior. One of the most important consequences of 
dissenting behavior in the decisional process is reversal of a conference 
vote prior to final decision. A dramatic example is Martin v. Struthers, 
which involved the constitutionality of an industrial town's anti-door-
bell-ringing ordinance as applied to the Jehovah's Witnesses.45 Failing 
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by a single vote to muster a majority in conference, Stone wrote a 
powerful dissenting opinion in which he said, "The ordinance is a bald 
and unqualified suppression of the communication of ideas." In face of 
that dissenting opinion and one by Murphy, Black, who had been 
assigned to write for the Court, reversed himself, scrapped his opinion, 
and wrote an opinion sustaining the opposite result. 46 
The exact number of reversals resulting from dissenters' persuasive 
efforts is difficult to ascertain, for some reversals occur because opin-
ion-writers change their minds for other reasons; sometimes the opin-
ions "won't write," or, as the justices come to perceive the issues more 
clearly, they realize they cannot support their original positions. Black's 
switch in Roberts v. United States, discussed earlier, is an example of 
the latter. Douglas's docket books indicate seven such reversals in the 
1939 and 1940 terms and ten in the 1942 and 1943 terms. 
Just as concurring votes and opinions sometimes influence the 
content of majority opinions, so do dissenting votes and opinions. The 
papers of the justices are replete with instances of bargaining in which 
the price of acquiescence is change in a majority opinion. 47 But justices 
usually write dissenting opinions with the idea that they will be pub-
lished and someday influence the decision of similar cases and provide 
the basis for overruling the cases in which they wrote the dissenting 
opinions. The justices of the late Hughes and early Stone Courts had 
good reason to believe that their dissenting views might someday be 
vindicated, for between 1939 and 1944 they had overruled twenty-four 
precedents, and future Courts would most likely deal similarly with the 
decisions with which they disagreed. Four cases decided during the 
1939, 1940, 1942, and 1943 terms were later overruled, as were three 
cases decided in the intervening 1941 term. Those seven decisions are 
shown in Table 1.5. 
Except for the Gobi tis overruling, all of the decisions listed in Table 
1.5 stood for more than a generation. And except for More and Gobitis, 
all had been closely divided decisions. The closeness of the vote in five 
of the seven cases suggests that prescient dissenters discern the policy 
direction of the law earlier than their colleagues and thus mark certain 
precedents as candidates for overruling. Nonetheless, a precedent de-
termined by even a single vote is still a precedent and ordinarily will not 
be overruled until a substantial amount of time has passed. 
In the six nonunanimous decisions listed in Table 1.5, dissenting 
opinions had significant consequences for the development of law and 
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Table 1.5. Overruled Cases Decided in the 1939-1943 Terms 
Term Reported Term Terms 
Cases Decided Vote Overruled Valid 
Gobitis v. Minersville School Dist. 1939 8-1 1942 3 
More v. Ill. Central Ry. 1940 9-0 1971 31 
Reitz v. Mealey 1941 5-4 1970 29 
Betts v. Brady 1941 6-3 1962 21 
Goldman v. United States 1941 5-3 1967 26 
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt 1943 5-4 1979 36 
Hazel-Atlas Glass v. Hartford-Empire 1943 5-4 1976 34 
policy. In overruling two cases-Gobitis and Reitz-the Court ex-
plicitly cited the preceding dissenting opinions as the basis for its 
decisions. In overruling three other cases-Betts, Goldman, and Mag-
nolia-the Court relied upon the ideas expressed in the previous 
dissenting opinions. And although the Court overruled Hazel-Atlas on 
other grounds, it mentioned the previous dissent. 
A data base of seven cases is a slender reed upon which to rest even 
a tentative explanation. Thus the data base of overruled decisions was 
expanded in Table 1.6 to include all overrulings for twenty-three 
terms-1958 through 1980. Fifty-seven decisions were overruled dur-
ing that period. Forty-four were divided decisions, and the vast majority 
of them-thirty-were clo<;ely divided, that is, 5-4, 5-3, 5-2, or 6-3 
decisions. Although twelve of the overruled precedents stood for less 
than ten years, the average life of a decision in the group was 19.6 years. 
This suggests that time, changing circumstances, and intervening deci-
sions on related issues erode precedent, and that is to some extent 
correct, for in eight of the forty-one divided cases shown in Table 1.6 in 
which justices wrote dissenting opinions ( 19.5 percent), those were the 
reasons the Court gave in overruling them. But for thirty-one of the 
divided cases with dissenting opinions (75.6 percent), the Court ex-
plicitly cited previous dissenting opinions as the basis for overruling or 
based its overruling on the ideas expressed in the previous dissenting 
opinions (see Tables 1.6 and 1. 7). This finding provides some support 
for the hypothesis that dissenting opinions have important con-
sequences for the development of constitutional and legal policy.48 
Because some justices write more frequently and persuasively in 
dissent than their colleagues, their dissenting opinions have greater 
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Table 1.6. The Consequences of Dissent: Overruling and Overruled 
Decisions, 1958-1980 Terms 
Terms Cat-
Overruling Decision Term Vote Overruled Decision Term Vote Valid egory 
James v. United States Commissioner v. Wilcox 
366 U.S. 213 1960 6-3 327 U.S. 404 1945 7-1 15 c 
Mapp v. Ohio Wolfv. Colorado 
367 U.S. 643 1960 5-4 338 U.S. 25 1948 6-3 12 B 
Construction & General Montgomery Building & 
Laborers' Union v. Curry Construction Trades 
371 U.S. 542 1962 8-1 Council v. Ledbetter 
Erection Co. 
344 U.S. 178 1952 7-2 10 D 
Gideon v. Wainwright Betts v. Brady 
372 u.s. 335 1962 7-1 316 U.S. 455 1941 6-3 21 B 
Fay v. Noia Darr v. Burford 
372 u.s. 391 1962 6-3 339 u.s. 200 1949 5-3 13 B 
Murphy v. Waterfront United States v. Murdock 
Commission of New York 284 U.S. 141 1931 9-0 32 E 
378 U.S. 52 1963 5-4 
Jackson v. Denno Stein v. New York 
378 u.s. 368 1963 5-4 346 U.S. 156 1952 6-3 II A 
Pointer v. Texas West v. Louisiana 
380 U.S. 400 1964 7-2 194 U.S. 258 1903 8-1 61 E 
Swift & Co. v. Wickham Kesler v. Department of 
382 u.s. Ill 1965 6-3 Public Safety 
369 U.S. 153 1961 6-3 4 c 
Harris v. United States Brown v. United States 
382 u.s. 162 1965 5-4 359 u.s. 41 1958 5-4 7 A 
Harper v. Virginia State Breedlove v. Suttles 
Board of Education 302 U.S. 277 1937 9-0 28 E 
383 u.s. 663 1965 6-3 
Miranda v. Arizona Crooker v. California 
384 u.s. 436 1965 5-4 357 U.S. 433 1957 5-4 8 A 
Cicenia v. LaGay 
357 U.S. 504 1957 5-3 8 B 
Spevack v. Klein Cohen v. Hurley 
385 U.S. 511 1966 5-4 366 U.S. 117 1960 5-4 6 A 
Afroyim v. Rusk Perez v. Brownell 
387 u.s. 253 1966 5-4 356 U.S. 44 1957 5-4 9 A 
Camara v. Municipal Frank v. Maryland 
Court of San Francisco 359 U.S. 360 1958 5-4 8 B 
387 u.s. 523 1966 6-3 
Continued on next page 
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Table 1.6, continued 
Terms Cat-
Overruling Decision Term Vote Overruled Decision Term Vote Valid egory 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Garrison v. Louisiana 
Butts 379 u.s. 64 1964 9-0 2 E 
388 U.S. 130 1966 5-4 
Katz v. United States Olmstead v. United States 
389 U.S. 347 1967 7-1 277 U.S. 438 1927 5-4 40 B 
Goldman v. United States 
316 U.S. 129 1941 5-3 26 B 
Marchetti v. United United States v. Kahriger 
States 345 U.S. 22 1952 6-3 15 B 
390 u.s. 39 1967 7-1 
Lewis v. United States 
348 U.S. 419 1954 6-3 13 B 
Peyton v. Rowe McNally v. Hill 
391 U.S. 54 1967 9-0 293U.S.I31 1934 9-0 33 E 
Bruton v. United States Delli Paoli v. United 
391 U.S. 123 1967 6-2 States 
352 U.S. 232 1956 5-4 II A 
Carafas v. LaVallee Parker v. Ellis 
391 U.S. 234 1967 8-0 362 u.s. 574 1959 5-4 8 A 
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Hodges v. United States 
392 U.S. 409 1967 7-2 203 U.S. I 1906 7-2 61 A 
Moore v. Ogilvie MacDougall v. Green 
394 u.s. 814 1968 7-2 335 U.S. 281 1948 6-3 20 B 
Brandenburg v. Ohio Whitney v. California 
395 U.S. 444 1968 9-0 274 U.S. 357 1926 9-0 42 E 
Chime/ v. California Harris v. United States 
395 U.S. 752 1968 7-2 331 U.S. 145 1946 5-4 22 B 
United States v. 
Rabinowitz 
339 u.s. 56 1949 5-3 19 A 
Benton v. Maryland Palko v. Connecticut 
395 U.S. 784 1968 6-3 302 U.S. 319 1937 8-1 31 E 
Boys Markets Inc. v. Sinclair Refining Co. v. 
Retail Clerks Union Atkinson 
398 U.S. 235 1969 6-2 370 U.S. 195 1961 5-3 8 A 
Moragne v. States The Harrisburg 
Marine Lines 119 U.S. 199 1886 9-0 83 E 
398 U.S. 375 1969 8-0 
Blonder-Tongue Triplett v. Lowell 
Laboratories Inc. v. 297 u.s. 638 1935 9-0 35 E 
University of Illinois 
Foundation 
402 U.S. 313 1970 9-0 
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Table 1.6, continued 
Terms Cat-
Overruling Decision Term Vote Overruled Decision Term Vote Valid egory 
Perez v. Campbell Reitz v. Mealey 
402 u.s. 637 1970 5-4 314 u.s. 33 1941 5-4 29 A 
Dunn v. Blumstein Pope v. Williams 
405 U.S. 330 1971 6-1 193 U.S. 621 1903 9-0 68 E 
Andrews v. Louisville & More v. Illinois Central 
Nashville Railroad Co. Railroad Co. 
406 u.s. 320 1971 7-1 312 U.S. 630 1940 9-0 31 E 
Lehnhausen v. Lake Quaker City Cab Co. v. 
Shore Auto Parts Co. Pennsylvania 
410 U.S. 356 1972 9-0 277 U.S. 389 1927 7-2 45 D 
North Dakota State Liggett Co. v. Baldridge 
Board of Pharmacy v. 278 U.S. 105 1928 7-2 45 D 
Snyder's Drug Stores Inc. 
414 u.s. 156 1973 9-0 
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Low v. Austin 
Wages 80 u.s. 29 1871 9-0 104 E 
423 U.S. 276 1975 8-0 
Dove v. United States Durham v. United States 
423 U.S. 325 1975 8-1 401 U.S. 481 1970 5-4 5 B 
National League of Cities Maryland v. Wirtz 
v. Usery 392 U.S. 183 1967 6-2 8 A 
426 u.s. 833 1975 6-3 
International Association International Union, 
of Machinists Aerospace U.A. W. v. Wisconsin 
Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Employment Relations Board 
Commission 336 u.s. 245 1948 5-4 27 D 
427 u.s. 132 1975 6-3 
New Orleans v. Dukes Morey v. Doud 
427 U.S. 297 1975 8-0 354 U.S. 457 1956 6-3 19 A 
Standard Oil Co. v. In re Potts 
United States 166 u.s. 263 1896 9-0 80 E 
429 U.S. 17 1976 8-0 
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. 
Hartford-Empire Co. 
322 U.S. 238 1943 5-4 33 D 
Craig v. Boren Goesaert v. Cleary 
429 u.s. 190 1976 7-2 335 U.S. 464 1948 6-3 28 D 
Oregon ex rei State Land Bonelli Cattle Co. v. 
Board v. Corvallis Sand Arizona 
& Gravel Co. 414 U.S. 313 1973 7-1 3 A 
429 u.s. 363 1976 6-3 
Continued on next page 
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Table 1.6, continued 
Tenns Cat-
Overruling Decision Tenn Vote Overruled Decision Tenn Vote Valid egory 
Complete Auto Transit. Spector Motor Service, 
Inc. v. Brady Inc. v. O'Connor 
430 u.s. 274 1976 9-0 340 U.S. 602 1950 6-3 26 B 
Continental T.V.. Inc. v. United States v. Arnold, 
GTE Sylvania, Inc. Schwinn & Co. 
433 U.S. 36 1976 6-2 388 U.S. 365 1966 7-0 10 E 
Shaffer v. Heitner Pennoyer v. Neff 
433 U.S. 186 1976 7-1 95 U.S. 714 1877 8-1 99 D 
Harris v. Balk 
198 U.S. 215 1904 7-2 72 D 
Department of Revenue v. Puget Sound Stevedoring 
Association of Co. v. Tax Commission 
Washington Stevedoring 302 u.s. 90 1937 9-0 42 E 
Cos. 
435 U.S. 734 1977 8-0 
Joseph v. Carter & Weekes 
Stevedoring Co. 
330 u.s. 422 1946 5-4 33 B 
Monell v. Department of Monroe v. Pape 
Social Services 365 u.s. 167 1960 8-1 17 A 
436 U.S. 658 977 7-2 
Hughes v. Oklahoma Geer v. Connecticut 
441 U.S. 322 1978 7-2 161 U.S. 519 1895 5-2 83 A 
United States v. Salvucci Jones v. United States 
448 U.S. 83 1979 7-2 362 u.s. 257 1959 8-1 20 E 
Thomas v. Washington Magnolia Petroleum Co. 
Gas Light Co. v. Hunt 
448 U.S. 261 1979 7-2 320 U.S. 430 1943 5-4 36 B 
Key for "Category" column: 
A: dissenting opinion explicitly cited as the basis for the overruling decision 
B: ideas expressed in the dissenting opinion clearly used as the basis for the overruling 
decision 
C: decision overruled for reasons not contained in the dissenting opinion 
D: decision overruled because of intervening cases or passage of time cited as a 
justification for the overruling decision 
E: no dissent or no dissenting opinion written in the overruled decision 
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Table 1. 7. Uses of Dissenting Opinions in Overruling Decisions, 
1958-1980 Terms 
43 
N Percent Adjusted Percentage• 
(A) Dissenting opinion as basis of overruling 
decision 16 28.1 39.0 
(B) Ideas in dissenting opinion basis of 
overruling decision 15 26.3 36.6 
(C) Decision overruled for reasons not 
contained in dissenting opinion 2 3.5 4.9 
(D) Decision overruled because of 
intervening cases or erosion of time 8 14.0 19.5 
(E) No dissenting opinion in the decision 
overruled 16 ~ 
Totals 57 100.0 100.0 
•Percentage of total excluding (E) 
consequences for future decision making. In the twenty-three years 
covered in Table 1.6, the dissenting opinions of five justices-Frank-
furter, Douglas, Warren, Black, and Murphy-appeared to be the basis 
of three-fourths of overruled cases in Categories A and B. Influence of 
individual dissenting behavior is clearest in cases in which the Court 
specifically cited a prior dissenting opinion in overruling a precedent. 
In the sixteen overruled cases in Category A, Frankfurter wrote dissent-
ing opinions in five, Douglas in four, and Warren in three. One overrul-
ing case cited both Douglas's and Warren's dissenting opinions in the 
case overruled; thus these three justices appeared to have influenced the 
overruling of eleven of the sixteen cases. No other justice wrote more 
than one dissenting opinion in cases in Category A. The influence of 
individual dissenting behavior on overruling precedents is less clear in 
cases in Category B for two reasons: first, similarity of reasoning in 
dissenting opinions and overruling opinions is the basis for inferring 
influence; second, more than one justice wrote dissenting opinions in 
several of the overruled cases. Nonetheless, it is clear that the dissent-
ing opinions of four justices-Frankfurter, Douglas, Black, and Mur-
phy-provided the rationale for overruling twelve of the fifteen cases in 
Category B. No other justice wrote more than one dissenting opinion in 
that category. 
The phenomenon described above appears to be a form of policy 
leadership. Justices who fail in their attempts at task leadership in the 
decisional process appeal in dissenting opinions, as Hughes once said, 
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"to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day," 
hoping their views will someday become law. 49 All justices do that, but 
Frankfurter and Douglas had an impact on future policy far exceeding 
that of any of their colleagues, for between them they wrote more 
dissenting opinions in cases in Categories A and B than the rest of the 
justices combined. 
This analysis suggests two conclusions. First, dissenting behavior 
sometimes has significant policy consequences prior to decision be-
cause dissenters persuade majority justices to change their votes, and, 
even if they do not, their behavior sometimes influences the content of 
majority opinions. Second, dissenting opinions have significant policy 
consequences for the future development of the law and policy by 
calling attention to questionable precedents and by persuasively argu-
ing that they should be overruled. 
Conflict and its resolution in the Supreme Court is a human process 
that has significant policy consequences. Disagreement over values and 
role expectations is at the core of the conflict, and that disagreement 
exists not just in the Court but in society as well. Activism makes for 
change; restraint makes for stability. For law to live and yet fulfill its 
function of guiding behavior, both change and stability are necessary. 
The debate in the Court over the appropriate am<;mnt of activism and 
restraint occurs in the context of a rational decision-making process in 
which the justices' values and role expectations are central. Those 
values and role expectations cannot be easily changed, but the justices' 
perceptions of issues, which are related to both, can be changed by 
deliberation, discussion, and leadership. Attempts at task and social 
leadership contribute to both conflict and its resolution, and the jus-
tices' personalities either help or hinder them in the process. But 
leadership goes beyond the tasks of decision and maintaining the Court 
as an effective decision-making group. There is also policy leadership, 
which is often reflected in majority opinions, but it can be exercised 
also in dissenting opinions that successfully persuade long after they 
are written and in many cases long after their writers have left the Court. 
Hence conflict is useful in the quest for workable policy just as conflict 
resolution is useful in legitimating such policy. 
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I appreciate the research assistance of Richard A. Nagareda and Rebecca J. 
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2 
Exploring the Dissent 
Patterns of the Chief Justices: 
John Marshall to Warren Burger 
S. SIDNEY ULMER 
Felix Frankfurter once bemoaned the fact that "layman are constantly 
troubled, even as are lawyers . . . about division on the Court." But 
why, he asked, "should anyone expect nine men . . . all to have the 
same thoughts and views. . . . No one expects such harmony . . . 
among physicists, let alone among professors of sociology or history." 1 
According to Frankfurter, the media are largely responsible for such 
concerns in the public. Just as newspapers are more likely to publish 
stories about divorces than about marriages, divisions in the Court-
the conflict among the justices in nonunanimous cases-make head-
lines. 
Conflict within the Supreme Court, however, is distinguishable 
from conflict that is reported to the public. As Frankfurter suggests, the 
justices, in the process of deciding cases, may be expected to bring 
differing perspectives to the legal and factual issues they face. The 
initial disagreements that their different views produce, however, may 
be suppressed by merely changing a dissenting vote to a majority vote 
once the decision is final. 2 If all justices join the majority, no division is 
reported to the public and the value of projecting institutional solidarity 
is served. When, on the other hand, a dissenting justice allows his 
disagreement with his colleagues to be reported, he must do so because 
he believes that public know ledge of the conflict is more important than 
projecting the fiction of consensus. Obviously, all justices now sub-
scribe to the latter view in some cases. 
As for physicists, sociologists, and historians, Frankfurter's analy-
sis is somewhat inapt. Neither the public nor the legal profession gets 
excited when such specialists disagree. Conflict in the Supreme Court, 
however, is said to have readily identifiable consequences3 and, when 
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in dissent, has been variously damned. Frankfurter has remarked on the 
candor of the dissenter-a "luxury" he thought not available to the 
majority justices. 4 Benjamin Cardozo put the point more dramatically 
by describing dissenters as "irresponsible. "5 Oliver Wendell Holmes 
and John Marshall would dissent if the matter was of sufficient impor-
tance, but neither felt comfortable in the role and would sometimes 
apologize for casting a dissenting vote. 6 
Others have expressed the view that dissent diminishes the image 
of monolithic solidarity, which allegedly enhances respect for the Court 
and obedience to its mandates. 7 Danelski has shown that dissenting 
opinions occasionally shape majority opinions. 8 Certainly the expres-
sion of dissent carries implications for the decision-making model 
chosen to explain Court actions. The model adopted by Justice Roberts 
in U.S. v. Butler9 implies objective decision making that leaves no 
room for dissent. Unanimous decisions, by contrast, would be difficult 
to square with the decisional models favored by such disparate parties 
as Richard Nixon and the judicial behavioralists. 10 When there is doubt 
about the Court's objectivity, litigation may be encouraged and losing 
parties may be emboldened to resist complying with Supreme Court 
mandates and precedents. As a consequence, the Court on occasion 
makes concerted efforts to reach unanimity in cases involving impor-
tant social policy making. II 
In this chapter, I adopt a limited focus on conflict in the Court, 
presenting an exploratory analysis conducted at a macro level. My 
purpose is to provide some background relevant to, and to stimulate 
thinking about, the conflict of chief justices with their Courts. There-
fore, I reach no theoretical conclusions but do suggest ideas and 
hypotheses for further investigation. The focus of my interest is the 
dissent behavior of chief justices. It may be assumed that chief justices 
have the same reasons as associate justices for avoiding excessive 
conflict in the Court-to protect the Court qua institution. But they also 
have some unique reasons for discouraging conflict in their Courts and 
avoiding the dissenting position generally in casting their individual 
votes. 
It has been suggested that the magnitude of conflict in the Court is, 
to some extent, a measure of leadership skills exhibited by the chief 
justice. Danelski reports that the low production of the Stone Court was 
associated with a good deal of unbridled and unfriendly conflict among 
the justices. Greater production in the Hughes Court, on the other hand, 
was associated with Hughes's devoted attention to avoiding conflict. 
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A chief justice may have other reasons for avoiding dissent. When 
voting with the majority, a chief decides who shall write the opinion 
"for the Court" and therefore has a particularly good reason for avoiding 
the role of dissenter. The writer of an opinion largely determines the 
grounds of decision, its future use as precedent, and the extent to which 
the public will approve of it. In choosing what to say and how to say it, 
the opinion-writer may contribute to holding or enlarging a majority 
and, in general, to the development of legal rules and social policy. By 
choosing the writer, the chief justice indirectly influences this process 
in a highly significant manner. 
For all these reasons, the preferences of the chief justices might be 
assumed to rank as follows: (1) to have all cases decided unanimously, 
(2) to vote with the majority in all nonunanimous cases, (3) to cast a 
dissenting vote in some nonunanimous cases, or ( 4) to cast a dissenting 
vote in all nonunanimous cases. 
The first choice is impossible, given a collegial court as large as 
nine members and the acceptability accorded the right to dissent. The 
second implies a chief justice without a mind of his own, devoid of a 
philosophy that guides his decision making or lacking confidence in 
interpretation that permits him to disagree with his colleagues. Ob-
viously, this is not to be expected and it is not found. The fourth 
possibility implies a chief justice completely out of touch with the 
development of law and policy in his Court as well as the absence of the 
respect, deference, and acceptance of viewpoint normally accorded the 
most inept chief justice on occasion. Such a possibility is quickly 
dismissed. Thus preference number three is to be expected-the ques-
tion being simply: how often does the chief justice dissent? 
That a chief justice would give up the advantages accruing to him 
when he is in the majority position-as they all do from time to time-
is a phenomenon worthy of study. This chapter asks whether this giving 
up is a variable across Courts for individual chief justices. If significant 
variation is discovered, an exploration of some associated predictors 
will be in order. 
CONFLICT IN THE COURT 
The chief justices examined in this section are all those who have 
completed their service on the Court and cast at least one dissenting 
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Table 2.1. Supreme Courts and Chief Justices Compared by Dissent 
Rate 
II 
N of III 
N of Non unanimous Chief Justice II III III 
Chief Justice Cases• Cases• Dissents I II 
John Marshall 1,187 87 7 .0732 .0058 .0804 
Roger B. Taney 1,708 257 38 .1504 .0222 .1478 
Salmon P. Chase 1,109 140 33 .1262 .0297 .2357 
Morrison R. Waite 2,642 301 45 .1139 .0170 .1495 
Melville W. Fuller 4,866 752 113 .1545 .0232 .1502 
Edward D. White 2,541 313 39 . 1231 .0153 .1246 
William H. Taft 1,708 180 16 .1053 .0093 .0888 
Charles E. Hughes 2,050 347 46 .1692 .0224 .1325 
Harlan F. Stone 704 342 95 .4857 .1349 .2777 
Fred M. Vinson 723 542 90 .7496 .1244 . 1660 
Earl Warren 1,772 1,220 215 .6884 .1213 .1762 
a()pinion cases only, defined as cases accompanied by a written opinion-per curiam or 
signed. An opinion, for purposes of identification, is required to be at least one paragraph in 
length and to express something beyond mere concurring, dissenting, or majority vote. 
vote during their tenure. (Chief Justice Burger's dissent behavior is 
examined briefly later in this chapter.) Since I was unable to find a 
dissenting vote for Chief Justices John Jay, John Rutledge, and Oliver 
Ellsworth, this examination is limited to all chief justices from John 
Marshall through Earl Warren. For these eleven Courts, an overall 
conflict rate has been determined, that is, the number of nonunanimous 
opinion cases decided as a percentage of all opinion cases in which 
chief justices participated. Table 2.1 lists the chief justices in order of 
service. For each Court, the raw data and percentages for level of 
conflict and the dissent rates for each of the eleven chief justices 
individually are given. Column 5 shows that conflict in the Court has 
varied from a low of 7.32 percent to a high of 74.96 percent. A visual 
presentation of the change in rate across eleven Courts is provided in 
Figure 2.1. 
If cases without conflict were viewed as a tentative indicator of 
leadership, administrative skills, or both, a leadership ranking from 
high to low would be as follows: Marshall (92.7 percent), Taft (89.4), 
Waite (88.6), White (87. 7), Chase (87 .3), Taney (84. 9), Fuller (84.5), 
Hughes (83 .1 ), Stone (51.4 ), Warren (31.1 ), and Vinson (25). Yet 
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Figure 2. l . Percentage of Nonunanimous Cases in the U.S. Supreme 
Court, Marshall through Warren 
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without further analysis, these inferences may be misleading. With the 
exception of Hughes, we have little evidence demonstrating that the 
respective chief justices were necessarily the task leaders in their 
Courts. Thus it may be questionable to rank Marshall (who went out of 
his way to stifle dissent) as a more skillful leader than the other chiefs. 
The ranking might be more acceptable if ability to stifle dissent is 
viewed as a component of leadership. 
Other factors that could account for variation in conflict rate would 
include change in the attitudes of the justices toward dissent or express-
ing dissent, the varying complexity of cases being decided, and inter-
personal feuding in the Court. There is no adequate way to measure 
change in attitudes toward dissent or levels of personal conflict across 
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eleven different Courts, although several observations about the Stone 
Court can be offered. 
The Stone Court retained six members of the Hughes Court until its 
final term, when Justice Harold H. Burton was appointed. It is unlikely 
that these six justices dramatically changed their attitudes toward the 
propriety of expressing dissent in the five years of the Stone Court, 
during which time the dissent rate was never less than 35 percent. In the 
years of the Hughes Court, by contrast, the mean rate of conflict was 
16.9 percent and the dissent rate exceeded 35 percent in only one of 
twelve terms. Thus it is improbable that the attitudes of the Stone Court 
justices toward dissent differed markedly from those of earlier justices. 
One might plausibly think that the cases decided by the Supreme 
Court vary in complexity. The more complex (or "hard") the case, the 
smaller the probability that unanimity will be obtained. Dissent is, in 
part, a function of complexity. 12 Greatest conflict occurs when the 
Court decides a case by a 5-4 vote. Thus there should be a correlation 
between 5-4 cases and overall conflict rate. In fact, the Pearson r for 
that relationship is .845 (r2 = .714). This correlation does not rule out 
the leadership hypothesis or other hypothetical explanations. But the 
dissent rate increased in four of the last five Courts examined before 
declining slightly in the Warren Court. Moreover, beginning with the 
Marshall Court, the rate of 5-4 decisions has increased with each 
Court-with two exceptions. The Waite Court shows a lower rate than 
the Chase Court and the Taft Court a lower rate than the White Court. 
Otherwise, each Court has a higher percentage of 5-4 decisions than its 
predecessor. 
All this is consistent with the proposition that the cases have 
become more complex as we have moved through recent Courts. It is 
also consistent with the suggestion by Stephen C. Halpern and Kenneth 
N. Vines that recent Courts have evidenced greater disunity as they have 
increased their influence on the selection of cases for plenary review. 13 
The leadership hypothesis remains an alternative explanation for 
the variation observed in conflict rate. There is no probative evidence, 
however, for the notion that Hughes was a less effective leader than Taft 
and Vinson less effective than Stone. Indeed, Danelski's evidence in 
Chapter 1 points in a contrary direction. One possible working hypoth-
esis, then, is that conflict variation in the Court is, inter alia, a function 
of complexity in cases and interpersonal relations. 
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Figure 2.2. Percentage of Dissenting Votes Cast by Chief Justices, 
Marshall through Warren 
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CHIEF JUSTICES IN DISSENT 
When the chief justice becomes the focus of analysis, the question is 
somewhat different. We wish to know whether the dissent rates for the 
chiefs vary across Courts and, if so, their antecedents. Table 2.1 shows 
that the dissent rate for John Marshall was less than I percent of all 
cases decided. Other chiefs, however, show rates varying from 1 to 13 
percent. The justices differ also in the nonunanimous cases. The 
differences are particularly marked for Marshall and Taft, who dis-
sented in only 8 and 9 percent of the nonunanimous cases decided in 
their Courts. Stone, again, is an exception because he dissented in a 
larger proportion of nonunanimous cases than any other chief justice. 
But the differences here do not begin to match those examined earlier. 
Salmon P. Chase is almost at the level of Stone; and Vinson and Warren 
are at a level that is roughly 60 percent that of Stone. 
Figure 2.2 shows the curve for dissent rates of eleven chief justices 
in all cases in which they participated. It is clear that Stone dissented 
significantly more often than all the chief justices preceding him and at 
a rate comparable to those for Vinson and Warren. When change in 
dissent rate is considered, however, Stone is an aberrational dissenter 
among all chief justices. Nevertheless, there are ups and downs in the 
pattern, indicating that dissent among chief justices is a legitimate 
variable. Our challenge is to account for that variation with one or more 
explanatory factors. 
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My exploratory analysis of this variation uses the alternative model 
approach. 14 Instead of directly stating and testing a theory, four limited 
models are presented, each of which is backed by a particular bit of 
theoretical reasoning. The reasoning in any or all cases is not necessari-
ly profound, but all the models reflect some degree of plausibility and 
therefore cannot be rejected out of hand. Since this is an exploratory 
investigation, the point is to identify concepts and variables that seem 
to have potential as explanatory factors and those that seem to lack such 
potential. Such knowledge can be a useful guide for further research. 
The analysis proceeds by regressing the dissent rate of the chief 
justices on the predictors specified in the four models. If the regression 
coefficients are not significant at the . 05 level for any particular model, 
we can infer that the model holds little promise for future research. A 
contrary finding, however, should lead to further efforts to understand 
why chief justices dissent at varying career rates across Courts. 
Modell. The first model to be tested is experiential. It suggests that the 
greater the man's experience in life or as chief justice, the greater will be 
his ability as chief justice to marshal his majorities-to avoid the 
dissenter's role. 15 The indicators to this criterion are age at appointment 
and years served in the Court as chief justice. The empirical hypothesis 
to be tested is that those who are appointed to the Court at later ages and 
who serve as chief for longer periods of time will have lower dissent 
rates over their careers than those who are younger at appointment and 
those who serve as chief for shorter time spans. The regression equation 
is dissent rate (DR) = a - bX + cY + e, where X is age at 
appointment, Y is years served as chief, and e is the error term. With this 
equation, DR was found to equal -3.88 + .182X + .141Y. For this 
equation, the regression coefficients are not significant at .05, the sign 
of the age coefficient is contrary to that specified in the model, the 
adjusted R2 is .113, 16 and F is significant at .40. These results suggest 
that dissent rate is not a function of experience in life or as chief justice. 
Model2. The second model is also experiential, but it is less general 
than Model I . Model 2 suggests that experience in official decision-
making roles before coming to the Court equips a chief justice to deal 
more effectively with his colleagues once he gets there. I suggest that 
prior service on a bench or in a legislative body is pertinent, 17 though 
certainly not inclusive. If bench service is represented by X and legis-
lative service by Y, DR = a + bX + cY + e. Calculating the 
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appropriate values, we get DR = .295 + 3.81X - .419Y + e. None 
of these coefficients is significant at .05, the sign for legislative service 
is misspecified, the adjusted R2 is .045, and F is significant at .54. 
Thus the regression results are not consistent with the hypothesis either 
when the predictors are used singly or jointly. In short, dissent rate is 
not explained by prior decisional experience as a judge or legislator. 
Mode/3. A third model may be taken from the literature dealing with 
the realignment of political power or electoral realignments in the 
period 1800-1968. According to Richard Funston, there have been 
four realignment periods and five stable periods in this time span. 18 It 
has been hypothesized, though not established, that the Supreme Court 
is more likely to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional-that is, to 
exercise greater power--during realignment periods than during stable 
periods. If this is true, one might expect chief justices to exert greater 
control over their Courts during stable periods. This hypothesis follows 
from Stuart S. Nagel's observation that high dissent in the Supreme 
Court correlates with frequency of congressional attack on the Court 
through the introduction of bills tending to curb the Court. 19 In a stable 
period, congressional pressure would constitute a more viable threat to 
a high-dissenting Court, thereby making it easier for a chief justice'to 
get unanimity or larger majorities. 
Model 3 assumes that DR = a + bX + e, where X is the dummy 
variable: realignment/nonrealignment period. The regression equation 
is DR = .699 + .029X + e. Although the signs are, for the first time, 
as specified and adjusted R2 is .298, the coefficient for the dummy 
variable is not significant at .05 and F is significant at .28. Thus 
variation in chief justices' dissent rate cannot be attributed to variation 
in congressional pressure on the Court. 
Model4. Model4 is a limited environmental disruption model. Politi-
cal scientists have demonstrated that the internal environment of the 
Court can cause changes in the voting patterns of the justices. 2o The 
internal development of the "counter dissent" in the early 1940s is a 
case in point. Hugo Black's attack on Frankfurter in F.P.C. v. Hope 
Natural Gas Co. 21 illustrates a practice still widely followed-the use 
of the dissent or a concurrence, not to appeal to the brooding spirit of 
the law but as an attack on the intelligence, knowledge, analytical 
skills, or good faith of one or more other justices. (For a recent example, 
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one need only examine William H. Rehnquist's dissent in United Steel-
workers v. Weber.)22 The feuding between Black and Frankfurter 
frequently caught up the other justices and clearly affected voting blocs 
in the Court. 
The Court's working environment may also be affected by external 
events. One need only recall how the power structure in the Court was 
dramatically modified by Franklin D. Roosevelt's attempt to "pack" the 
Court in 1937, or the changes in voting alignments associated with 
appointments to the Court at various times. 23 The idiosyncratic per-
spectives of individual justices or groups of justices may affect the 
success of the chief justice in marshaling his Court and avoiding the 
dissenting position. Changes in the idiosyncratic profile of the Court 
should be correlated with changes in the chief justice's dissent rate. It 
should make a difference whether a chief justice presides over a Court 
that is never called on to integrate a new member into the group and a 
Court frequently called to such a task. Similarly, it should matter 
whether all appointments to a given Court are made by the same 
president or several presidents. Appointments by several presidents 
open the possibility for enhancing idiosyncratic variation across ap-
pointees. Other things being equal, the more varied the number of 
chemists adding to a brew, the greater the uncertainty about the ultimate 
product-and the greater challenge to the brew master to maintain 
consistent quality standards. Consequently, we may expect some 
positive relationship between the number of presidents appointing 
justices to each Court and the dissent rates of the chief justices. 
I suggested earlier that the ability of the chief justice to marshal his 
majorities in the face of turnover is influenced by the complexity of the 
cases in a given time period. It should be easier for the chief to integrate 
new members with differing ideological profiles into the Court when 
the cases are less rather than more complex. Thus the combination of 
complexity and turnover in the Court should predict the dissent rates of 
the chief justices over time. 
To construct an indicator to complexity of cases, I first removed all 
cases in which chief justices dissented. I then calculated the conflict 
rate for the Court from the remaining cases. This measure was used to 
indicate case complexity. For turnover, I used an index that combines 
the average number of appointing presidents per term per Court and the 
average number of appointments to the Court per term per Court. The 
formula for the index is v'fXT where I is appointing presidents and 
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Table 2.2. Predictors of Chief Justices' Dissent Rates 
Number of Number of N of Non-
Chief Years of Appointments Appointing N of unanimous 
Justice Service to Court Presidents Cases Cases 
Marshall 34 10 5 1,180 80 
Taney 28 14 8 1,670 219 
Chase 8 4 1,076 107 
Waite 14 6 4 2,597 256 
Fuller 22 II 5 4,753 639 
White 10 7 2 2,502 274 
Taft 8 4 2 1,692 164 
Hughes II 7 2 2,004 301 
Stone 5 4 2 609 247 
Vinson 7 2 I 633 452 
Warren 16 8 3 1,557 1,005 
J is appointments of justices. This index assigns the highest value when 
the contribution of each component is equal and the lowest value when 
the contributions are maximally disparate. Because there is no a priori 
reason to think one component more important than the other, this 
index is considered a reasonable means of measuring the combined 
effects of the two turnover components. 
Table 2.2 contains the data necessary for constructing measures on 
the predictors. As the table shows, the number of appointments varied 
from two (the Vinson Court) to fourteen (the Taney Court). Similarly, 
the number of appointing presidents has fluctuated from one (the 
Vinson and Chase Courts) to eight (the Taney Court). The empirical 
equation to be tested is DR = a + bX + c Y + e where X is complexity 
of cases and Y is turnover. The regression coefficient for complexity is 
. 202 and that for turnover is . 14 7. The signs are as specified, ad jus ted 
R2 is .938, both coefficients are significant at .01, and F is significant 
at .0001. 
Although this result may appear impressive, it was derived via 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. A Durbin-Watson analysis for 
autocorrelation produced a coefficient of 2. 807 indicating the presence 
of autocorrelation in the residuals. 24 Thus the OLS results could be 
contaminated by the interdependence of contiguous measures on the 
predictors. One possible consequence of such contamination is to 
overstate the ability of the predictor variables to account for variation in 
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dissent rate across chief justices. An analysis of a correlogram and the 
partial autocorrelation coefficients for the regression indicated that the 
residuals were characterized by an autoregressive process of order 
one. 25 Consequently, the coefficients for the model were reestimated 
specifYing an autoregressive process and using the pseudogeneralized 
least squared (GLS) estimation technique of the Statistical Analysis 
System. 26 
The reestimated coefficients, .206 and .166 respectively, differ 
little from the original coefficients. The signs are in the predicted 
direction, complexity is significant at .0001 and turnover at .003, and 
adjusted R2 is . 97. The goodness of fit for the reestimated model may 
be seen in Table 2.3, in which the observed and predicted values from 
the model are arrayed. As can be seen from this table, the residuals are 
randomly distributed with an approximate mean of zero. This means 
that the series is free of serial dependency, trend, and drift. 27 
I infer that Model 4 shows sufficient promise to warrant further 
investigation. Further testing under various controlled conditions 
would be a logical next step in searching for the antecedents of variation 
in chief justices' dissent rates. 
To this point, I have omitted Chief Justice Burger because he has 
yet to complete his tenure. Nevertheless, one may be curious to know 
how well Model 4 would predict Burger's dissent rate for the first 
twelve years of his service on the Court, the 1969-80 terms inclusive. 28 
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In that time span, Burger dissented at a rate of 13.6 percent. The rate 
predicted by Model4 is 9.43. Thus the model underpredicts Burger by 
about 31 percent. This is not to say that the model has no predictive 
capacity in Burger's case. Clearly it does, even though it was developed 
using chief justices other than Burger. But we might wonder why the 
model was less successful with Burger than with the earlier chief 
justices. It may be that Burger's first twelve terms were atypical and that 
upon completion of his years as chief, the model will do as well with 
him as with the other Court leaders. It may also indicate that complexity 
of cases and turnover are having a greater impact on Burger than on 
earlier chiefs. The correct explanation, however, can be found only after 
additional research. 
Mode/5. The results with Model4 suggest that if one were to incorpo-
rate Chief Justice Burger in the predictive model, some adjustments 
would be necessary. Using the same eleven chief justices, I have tried 
one possible adjustment-replacing the term t with the lagged term t -
1. Dissent rate in this model = a + bXt-l + cYt-l + et. The argument 
here is that dissent rate is affected by the levels of complexity and 
turnover reached in the periods preceding the period of dissent, that is, 
that the disruption associated with such factors in one period carry over 
and cause a response in a later period. The regression equation for this 
model is DR = -2.15 + .I75Xt-l + .118Yt-l + et or 10.04. This 
prediction is a little better than that provided by Model4, but this model 
is significant neither for Burger nor for the other eleven chief justices. 
Clearly the dissent response to complexity and turnover is not a lagged 
response. 
In this chapter, I have suggested that dissent by a chief justice of the 
Supreme Court is an important event. It brings conflict in the Court to 
the attention of various publics, some of whom may seek to punish the 
Court or exploit Court conflict for personal or political reasons. 29 From 
the standpoint of a chief justice, to dissent is to relinquish control over 
opinion assignments, thereby reducing his influence on the develop-
ment of law and social policy at the national level. Since a chief justice 
would not likely relinquish such prerogatives lightly, one is encouraged 
to seek an explanation for such behavior. 
This investigation has determined that dissent cases in the Supreme 
Court as a percentage of total cases with full opinions varied apprecia-
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bly in the period 1801-1969. Until the Stone era, such cases con-
stituted 7 to 17 percent of all opinion cases. In the Stone, Vinson, and 
Warren Courts, however, conflict occurred in 49 to 75 percent of total 
opinion cases. The Stone Court was found to be unique when change in 
conflict rate was examined. I have suggested that Supreme Court cases 
and interpersonal relations in the Court became more complex begin-
ning with the Stone period. 30 Such an explanation cannot account 
totally for the great increase in dissent cases in the Stone era. Earlier 
inferences regarding Stone's leadership abilities may continue to have 
some validity. But to the extent that such inferences are based on dissent 
levels across all Courts, the leadership hypothesis is affected because 
by that criterion Stone was more effective than Vinson and Warren. 
Given these facts, I have suggested the hypothetical explanation that 
over the long term Court conflict measures case complexity. Although it 
is still possible to view conflict in the Court as an indicator of weak 
leadership skills possessed by a particular chief justice (as has tradi-
tionally been done with Stone), such an approach is not productive over 
the long term. It is perhaps more reasonable to view variation in 
conflict as an indicator of case complexity because it accords with the 
notion that the judicial system functions best when dissent in the Court 
is caused by "hard cases." 
This examination of dissent by chief justices has determined that 
dissent rate across eleven Courts is a legitimate variable, with levels of 
dissent voting reaching only 1 percent for John Marshall but surpassing 
13 percent for Chief Justice Stone. The largest jump in dissent rate also 
came in the Stone era. The mean rate for chief justices before Stone was 
1. 9 percent, but for Stone through Warren, the mean rate was 12.5 
percent. 
In seeking explanations for these variations across Courts, five 
different models have been explored. The first two incorporated at-
tributes of the chief justices, and the third took into consideration the 
influence on the Court of part of its external environment. Models 4 and 
5 focused on conflict and turnover in the Court and the problems 
associated with integrating new justices into ongoing groups. 
Analysis of Models 1 through 3 produced no significant reasons for 
rejecting the null hypotheses. These models provided no ground for 
believing that chief justices' dissent rates are significantly influenced 
by age at time of appointment, number of years served, prior judicial or 
legislative service, or pressure on the Court via variation in stable and 
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unstable configurations of political power. But in exploring the rela-
tionships between case complexity/turnover and dissent rates of chief 
justices, significant results were obtained. As promised earlier, I 
reached no theoretical conclusions in this chapter. Nevertheless, the 
investigative work suggests the general hypothesis that the career levels 
of dissent reached by chief justices of the U.S. Supreme Court are 
significantly influenced by the complexity of the cases decided by the 
Court, the frequency of appointments to the Court, and the presidents 
making these appointments. 
An application of the prediction equation from Model 4 to the first 
twelve terms of the Burger Court did not substantially weaken support 
for the model. Using Model4 to forecast Chief Justice Burger's dissent 
rate, however, gave a result 31 percent below the actual rate. Possible 
reasons for the error have been suggested, to wit: Burger's tenure is 
incomplete and may be atypical, and Burger may be affected more by 
case complexity and turnover than earlier justices. 31 
Finally, it should be repeated that the effort here is strictly explora-
tory. Other more sophisticated models may be developed. This study 
has not exhausted the many considerations that could, theoretically, 
affect a chief justice's dissent rate. For example, a model limited to the 
high-dissent justices, Stone through Burger, might incorporate dif-
ferent predictors than those used here or require the addition of vari-
ables not employed in this chapter. Breakdowns of the data on a basis 
other than completed terms of chief justices may also provide addition-
al insights. The inclination of a chief justice to dissent might depend on 
the identity of the senior associate justice in a majority that does not 
include the chief, 32 for that justice would become the opinion assignor 
in the case. Or it might depend on the identity of the justice who seems 
likely to get the opinion assignment from the senior justice in the 
majority. It might also be affected by the subject matter of the case and 
the chief's emotional or other interest in the matter, by how the chief 
justice views his role, or by his attitude toward dissent or the impor-
tance of unanimity in the Court. But these matters are beyond the scope 
of the present chapter and must be left for elucidation to future research. 
For the present, given the unique factors that should discourage chief 
justices from dissenting, it is significant that the chiefs seem affected 
substantially in their dissent voting by some of the causes of dissent 
voting in the Court. Future attempts to improve our understanding of 
the processes operating to produce chief justices' dissents cannot afford 
to ignore such a consideration. 33 
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Changing Voting Patterns 
in the Warren and 
Burger Courts 
EDWARD V. HECK 
The United States Supreme Court is continually being asked to resolve 
some of the most significant and controversial political problems facing 
the nation. The issues raised in the cases accepted for review are-
almost by definition-those not resolved elsewhere in the political 
system. At any given time the Court consists of individuals far more 
diverse in background and attitudes than the stereotype of the Court as a 
body of "nine old men" suggests. Only on rare occasions is the Court 
dominated by the appointees of a single president. Most justices have 
taken strong stands on the significant questions of the day, either before 
their appointment or in opinions written after accession to the highest 
court. It is therefore hardly surprising that political scientists studying 
the Court have tended to focus more on conflict than on consensus. 1 
The most visible form of conflict on the Supreme Court is, of 
course, dissent, the public expression of disagreement with the deci-
sion of the majority. Scholars who have traced overall dissent rates in 
the Court over time have found that the frequency of dissent has 
increased in the twentieth century. Stephen C. Halpern and Kenneth N. 
Vines documented a sharp rise in the percentage of cases evoking 
dissent after the passage of the 1925 Judges' BilJ.2 Similarly, S. Sidney 
Ulmer, in Chapter 2 of this book, reports illuminating data on the 
dissent rate during the tenure of each chief justice from Marshall to 
Burger. Never from Marshall to Hughes did the overall conflict rate, 
defined as the percentage of nonunanimous cases, exceed 17 percent. 
In the Stone Court, the conflict rate leaped to 48.6 percent, climbing to 
75 percent in the Vinson years and 68.8 percent during the tenure of 
Chief Justice Earl Warren. The level of conflict has remained high in 
the Burger era. 
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In addition to tracing changing dissent rates over time, scholars 
have sought to identify the causes or correlates of dissent. In a thorough 
inventory of proffered explanations, Steven A. Peterson has cate-
gorized propositions about the causes of dissent under four headings: 
legal culture, the court as an organization, the sociopolitical system, 
and the individual judges. Many of the posited causes of dissent have 
been tested only indirectly at best. Yet some progress appears to have 
been made in identifying factors bearing on an individual judge's 
tendency to dissent. Although proposed explanations have run the 
gamut from role orientations to psychological needs, the evidence 
seems generally to support the conclusion that high dissent rates are a 
function of disagreement with the policy views dominant in the Court 
in a given period. 3 
If dissent is an indicator of ideological conflict between an individ-
ual justice and the Court collectively, voting with the majority indicates 
agreement with the shifting alliance of justices who constitute the 
Court's majority decision coalition. Consensus, rather than conflict, 
comes to the forefront if we shift our focus from individual dissent rates 
to the opposite side of the coin-majority participation rates. Perhaps 
more significant than the frequent dissenter is the justice most often in 
the majority, the Court's "center of gravity. "4 Although voting with the 
majority does not necessarily indicate task leadership within the Court, 
an extremely high majority participation rate does suggest an ide-
ological position characteristic of the Court as a whole. 5 It is of 
particular interest that changes in individual justices' majority par-
ticipation rates may point to significant shifts in the overall policy 
direction of the Court. 6 
In this chapter, therefore, I will examine data on the majority 
participation rates of individual justices for each natural court of the 
Warren and Burger eras through the retirement of Justice Potter Stewart 
in July 1981. The analysis proceeds at two levels. At the purely 
descriptive level, the data presented here extend earlier studies of 
overall patterns of dissent through the first dozen terms of the Burger 
Court and show in detail how majority participation rates have shifted 
as the membership of the Court has changed. This descriptive treatment 
also offers an opportunity to consider more generally the relationship 
between voting patterns and the appointment process. At the second 
level, the goal is to use the data on voting patterns in the modem 
Supreme Court to examine theoretical propositions about conflict and 
consensus, with emphasis on the impact of freshman justices, the place 
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of the chief justice in the Court's voting alignments, and the effect of 
bloc structure on majority participation rates. 
An investigation of the impact of freshman justices is appropriate 
because the appointment of new justices may be a force for change in 
the Court's voting patterns. The literature on "freshman effects" is 
extensive and somewhat controversial. 7 It is clear that many freshman 
justices-at least in the Warren and Burger Courts-joined identifiable 
voting blocs during their first natural court. 8 Such a newcomer might 
well be expected to have a significant impact on patterns of consensus 
and conflict. Thus it seems reasonable to hypothesize that the center of 
gravity will normally be occupied by a sitting justice who is closely 
allied with the newest member of the Court (H 1 ). Moreover, a justice 
whose rates of agreement with a series of new justices are high should 
maintain his position at the Court's center of gravity over several 
natural courts (H2). 
History offers little clear guidance about the place of the chief 
justice in the Court's voting patterns. A chief justice who aggressively 
and successfully pursued consensus in his Court and rarely dissented 
(Marshall or Taft, for example) might well emerge as the center of 
gravity of his Court. 9 On the other hand, a chief imbued with enthusi-
asm for debate and expression of individual views, such as Stone, 
would naturally be a frequent dissenter. IO Ulmer's data in Chapter 2 of 
this volume show substantial variation in frequency of dissent among 
chief justices from Marshall to Warren. Ulmer's effort to explain this 
variation clearly suggests that the dissent rate of the chief justice is in 
large part a function of the dissent rate for the Court as a whole. Left 
unanswered is the question of whether the chief justice will dissent 
more or less frequently than associate justices with whom he serves. A 
modest hypothesis, consistent with the proposition that a chief justice 
would not wish to squander leadership opportunities by frequent dis-
sent, is that the chief justice will generally be close to the center of 
gravity of the Court he heads (H3). 
A final hypothesis concerns the bloc structure of the Court. Bloc 
analysis, a staple tool of students of judicial behavior for decades, 
remains a useful means of summarizing the interagreement rates of 
groups of justices. In this chapter bloc analysis is used as a secondary 
tool for examining the relationship between majority participation 
scores and the bloc structure of natural courts. The justice most fre-
quently in the majority should normally be one who has formed close 
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voting alliances with several other justices. On a Court with large, 
cohesive blocs, he would most likely be a member of the largest bloc. 
Thus I hypothesize that the justice most frequently in the majority will 
normally be a member of the largest bloc on the Court (H4). 
The data on which this analysis rests include votes on all cases 
decided on the merits with full opinion (unanimous as well as non-
unanimous), plus per curiam decisions evoking dissent on the merits. 11 
When several cases were decided with a single opinion, each case has 
been counted separately. The period covered is the twenty-eight years 
between the appointment of Chief Justice Warren in 1953 and the 
retirement of Justice Stewart in 1981. The period is divided into eleven 
natural courts, each of which embraces the tenure of a unique group of 
nine justices initiated by the seating of at least one new member. The 
voting data are summarized in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 in the form of 
percentages of the majority participation of each justice in each natural 
court. Interagreement rates for each pair of justices in each natural court 
have also been calculated and are reported in the text when they bear 
directly on the analysis. Summary data on the bloc structure of each 
natural court are also incorporated into each table. 12 
THE EARLY WARREN COURT 
Table 3.1 reports majority participation rates for the early Warren Court 
years ( 1953-62). Each of the five natural courts of this period began 
with the appointment of a new justice by President Dwight Eisenhower. 
The table reveals that Justice Clark occupied the Court's center of 
gravity for most of this period, with Chief Justice Warren generally 
recording the second highest majority participation score. Among the 
remaining justices some intriguing shifts took place as the Court's 
membership changed, but no definitive pattern emerged. 
The voting patterns of the 1953-55 Court were shaped by the close 
alliance between Justice Tom Clark and the newly appointed chief 
justice. A moderate on both civil liberties and economic liberalism 
issues in this period, Clark agreed with Warren in just over 95 percent 
of the cases in which both justices participated, the highest interagree-
ment rate for any pair of justices in this Court. 13 Warren, Clark, and 
Burton formed a three-member bloc with an average interagreement 
score of just under 90 percent. Occupying the center of gravity were 
Clark with only ten dissents and the chief justice with twelve. Frank-
Table 3.1. Majority Participation Rates, 1953-1962 (Early Warren Court) 
1953-55 1955-56 1956-57 1957-58 1958-62 
Justice Percent (Ranking) Percent (Ranking) Percent (Ranking) Percent (Ranking) Percent (Ranking) 
Clark 94.8(1) 94.4(1) 91.7(1) 77.3(3) 86.8(1) 
Warren 93.7(2) 92.3(2) 86.0(2) 78.9(2) 79.3(4) 
Frankfurter 92.1(3) 80.3(8) 64.0(9) 73.9(5) 73.9(7) 
Minton 87.2(4.5) 87.9(4) 
Jackson 87.2(4.5) 
Burton 86.2(6) 81.4(6) 80.0(4) 70.5(8) 
Reed 84.5(7) 80.8(7) 78.6(5) 
Black 79.2(8) 88.7(3) 72.3(7) 73.2(7) 72.2(8) 
Douglas 72.1(9) 82.4(5) 66.0(8) 69.9(9) 63.1(9) 
Harlan -- 77.8(9) 75.5(6) 73.5(6) 76.2(5) 
Brennan -- -- 84.1(3) 89.1(1) 84.7(3) 
Whittaker -- -- -- 76.8(4) 74~7(6) 
Stewart -- -- -- -- 85.3(2) 
Court cohesion 78.8 77.6 66.2 64.5 66.9 
Sprague criterion 89.4 88.8 83.6 82.2 83.4 
Size of largest bloc 3 3 2 3 3 
(Members) (Warren, (Black, (Reed, Clark)• (Warren, (Brennan, 
Clark, Warren, Black, Warren, 
Burton) Clark) Douglas) Black) 
•Most cohesive pair. 
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furter and Warren's interagreement rate was 86.9 percent, and Frank-
furter's majority participation score of 92.1 percent ranked third. Black 
and Douglas, the only justices whose dissent rates were in excess of 20 
percent, remained isolated from their more conservative brethren, 
including the new chief justice. 
The appointment of Justice John Marshall Harlan in March 1955 
initiated the second natural court of the Warren era. Voting most often 
with Frankfurter and Burton, Harlan immediately became the Court's 
most frequent dissenter. Far more significant than Harlan's appoint-
ment in shaping patterns of consensus and conflict in 1955-56 was the 
shifting posture of Chief Justice Warren. Earlier quantitative studies 
have amply demonstrated Warren's gradual movement toward the liber-
al wing of the Court during his first three terms. 14 More recent studies 
based on the private papers of the justices have revealed that the close 
cooperation between Warren and Justice Frankfurter that had marked 
their joint pursuit of unanimity in the Brown decision soon gave way to 
mutual distrust and hostility. 15 As the estrangement of Warren and 
Frankfurter deepened, their interagreement rate dipped to 7 4. 9 percent. 
Meanwhile, the Warren-Black interagreement score surged to 94.4 
percent. Although Warren began to move away from Clark's position on 
civil liberties issues in this period, overall he agreed with the Texan on 
more than 90 percent of the Court's votes. The trio of Clark, Warren, 
and Black formed a cohesive bloc, and these three were the justices 
most frequently in the majority. 16 Frankfurter's forty-seven dissents 
testify to his increasing dissatisfaction with Warren and the Court's 
overall direction. 
Voting patterns in the brief period between the recess appointment 
of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., in October 1956 and the seating of 
Justice Charles E. Whittaker the following March remained broadly 
similar to those of 1955-56, though care must be taken not to make too 
much of these figures because only fifty-two cases were decided during 
these months. Clark and Warren again recorded the highest majority 
participation scores, with newcomer Brennan voting with the majority 
in 84 percent of the cases. The overall Court cohesion score dropped to 
66 percent, but no three-member blocs formed in this Court. The three 
most cohesive pairs-Reed and Clark, Warren and Black, and Warren 
and Brennan-did, however, include the justices most frequently in the 
majority. 
The fourth natural court of the Warren years, covering the year and 
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a half between Whittaker's appointment and the retirement of Justice 
Burton in October 1958, was marked by the emergence of a cohesive 
bloc consisting of Warren, Black, and Douglas. On the fringes of this 
bloc was Brennan, who was somewhat less likely than his senior 
colleagues to take civil libertarian or prounion positions. 17 As the 
moderate liberal who sometimes voted on the conservative side, Bren-
nan was with the majority more often than any other justice (89. 1 
percent of the cases). A distant second was the chief justice, followed 
by Clark and Whittaker. 
The appointment of Justice Stewart in 1958 initiated a period of 
membership stability that continued until the retirement of Justice 
Whittaker in April 1962. Despite some landmark decisions this Court 
was by no means dominated by the liberals. Rather, the 1958-62 Court 
was splintered into warring factions, with no group able consistently to 
attract the decisive votes of the centrist judges. In this situation, Justice 
Clark regained his old position at the Court's center of gravity, despite 
fifty-six dissenting votes and a majority participation score of only 86.8 
percent on a Court more noted for conflict than consensus. Ranked 
second was the newly appointed Justice Stewart, a "swing voter," 
whose tilt toward the conservative justices produced many 5-4 votes 
against civil liberties claims. Even though Brennan, Warren, and Black 
formed a cohesive bloc, frequent dissents in civil liberties cases ac-
count for these justices' lower majority participation rates. 
Taken as a whole, the data for the early Warren Court years seem to 
offer at least modest support for my hypotheses about the place of the 
chief justice in the Court's voting patterns (H3) and the relationship 
between bloc structure and majority participation scores (H4). Clearly, 
the chief justice was never far out of the mainstream in this period, yet 
Warren's generally high majority participation scores reflect as much 
his own search for a coherent judicial philosophy as any quality 
inherent in the office of chief justice. Justice Clark was a member of the 
largest bloc (or most cohesive pair) in the three of the four natural 
courts in which he occupied the center of gravity. Moreover, Chief 
Justice Warren's high majority participation scores appear to be in part 
a function of close alliances with other justices. Still, it cannot be 
denied that the relationship between bloc membership and voting with 
the majority is tenuous and subject to a wide variety of conditions 
unique to each natural court. In the 1958-62 Court, for example, Clark 
was the justice most frequently in the majority even though he was a 
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member of no cohesive bloc. Rather, he was a swing voter, frequently 
joining Warren, Black, and Douglas in support of the economic under-
dog but voting with such colleagues as Harlan and Frankfurter in 
opposition to civil liberties claims. Because the data in Table 3.1 are 
based on all cases, it is possible for a justice to emerge as the Court's 
center of gravity simply because he lacked a consistent ideology 
encompassing both civil liberties and economic regulation issues. 18 
Finally, expectations about the impact of newly appointed justices 
(H1 and H2) do not seem to be borne out by the experience of the early 
Warren years. Only the alliance between Clark and the newly appointed 
Chief Justice Warren in 1953-55 is a clear example of the effect of a 
new appointment on patterns of conflict and consensus. Nor did Clark 
or any other justice maintain a dominant position over several Courts by 
allying with a series of newly appointed justices. 
To understand patterns of conflict and consensus in the early 
Warren Court, it is necessary to consider the nature of appointments to 
the Court during the Eisenhower years. The Eisenhower Court lacks a 
clear identity (in contrast to the Roosevelt Court) because Eisenhower 
did not seek consistently to shape the Court by filling vacancies with 
individuals reflecting a common position on the salient issues of the 
day. Instead, he appointed five justices with diverse views who did not 
vote as a bloc. The center of gravity, therefore, went almost by default to 
a holdover justice with moderate views. Whereas Eisenhower's five 
appointments had little impact, President John F. Kennedy's two ap-
pointments in a single year brought about a remarkable change in the 
Court's voting patterns. 
THE LATE WARREN COURT 
The contrast between the voting patterns of the early Warren Court and 
those of the late Warren Court is striking. With the appointments of 
Justices Arthur Goldberg, Abe Fortas, and Thurgood Marshall by 
Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, a cohesive liberal bloc 
came to dominate Supreme Court decision making. The Court's center 
of gravity shifted markedly-from Clark to Brennan. Forming close 
alliances with the chief justice and each of the new appointees of this 
period, Justice Brennan remained the justice most frequently in the 
majority until 1969, when the liberal bloc was shattered by the retire-
ment of Warren and the resignation under fire of Justice Fortas. The 
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Table 3.2. Majority Participation Rates, 1962-1969 (Late Warren 
Court) 
1962-65 1965-67 1967-69 
Justice Percent (Ranking) Percent (Ranking) Percent (Ranking) 
Brennan 97.1(1) 92.2(1) 98.4(1) 
Warren 94.1(2) 88.7(2) 94.1 (3) 
Goldberg 89.0(3) 
White 86.0(4) 84. 7(3) 80.3(6) 
Douglas 83.5(5) 76.4(7) 75.4(7) 
Black 81.1(6) 81.0(6) 68.4(8) 
Clark 76.9(7) 83.6(4) 
Stewart 76.0(8) 70.0(8) 82.5(5) 
Harlan 56.3(9) 58.8(9) 67 .8(9) 
Fortas 81.7(5) 92.4(4) 
Marshall 96.4(2) 
Court cohesion 72.0 69.5 73.0 
Sprague criterion 86.0 84.7 86.5 
Size of largest bloc 3 3 4 
(Members) (Warren, (Brennan, (Marshall, 
Brennan Warren, Brennan, 
Goldberg) Fortas) Warren, 
Fortas) 
1962 to 1969 period was truty the "heyday of Warren Court liber-
alism." 19 
The opportunity to reorient the Court fell to President Kennedy as a 
result of the disability retirement of Justice Whittaker in April 1962, 
followed in short order by the stroke that forced Justice Frankfurter off 
the bench for the final months of the 1961-62 term and led to his 
retirement the following August. To replace these conservative stal-
warts, Kennedy selected two members of his executive branch team, 
Deputy Attorney General Byron White and Secretary of Labor Arthur 
Goldberg. 20 The impact of these appointments may be brought into 
sharp focus by comparing majority participation scores for 1958-62 
(Table 3.1) with those of 1962-65 (Table 3.2). Brennan, who had filed 
66 dissents in the earlier period, cast only 15 dissenting votes in 
1962-65, voting with the majority in just over 97 percent of the cases. 
Close behind was Warren, followed by newcomers Goldberg and 
White. Douglas attained his highest majority participation score of the 
Warren-Burger eras (83.5 percent). No longer the center of gravity on a 
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reconstituted Court, Clark dissented more frequently than any justice 
except Stewart and Harlan. Completely isolated from the new majority 
in both civil liberties and economic regulation cases, Harlan expressed 
disagreement with the result in more than 40 percent of the cases of this 
period, casting 222 dissenting votes. 
Data on interagreement rates for each pair of justices in the 
1962-65 Court indicate that Brennan's place as the justice most fre-
quently in the majority was secured by a combination of his alliances 
with the two freshman justices and his position within the largest bloc. 
No sitting justice had a higher rate of agreement with the newcomers 
than Brennan, who voted with Goldberg in 89 percent of the Court's 
cases and with White 84.2 percent of the time. Moreover, Brennan was 
part of a cohesive bloc with Warren and Goldberg, and both Douglas 
and Black were on the fringes of this bloc. The dominance of these 
justices is clearly reflected in the many landmark civil liberties deci-
sions of these years. 
This natural court ended when Goldberg acceded to President 
Johnson's urgent request that he resign from the Court to accept the post 
of U.N. ambassador. To fill Goldberg's place, Johnson selected Abe 
Fortas. Although Fortas was somewhat more inclined to dissent than his 
predecessor, patterns of consensus and conflict in the 1965-67 Court 
were generally similar to those of 1962-65. Brennan and Warren 
retained the top two spots on the majority participation chart, but their 
positions did not prevail as frequently as during Goldberg's brief tenure. 
With twenty-three dissents, Brennan's majority participation score fell 
to 92.2 percent, and Warren dissented thirty-three times in two terms. 
As in the previous natural court, Brennan and Warren allied with a 
freshman justice to form a three-member bloc to which Douglas was 
marginally attached. By 1965-67, however, Black stood outside the 
bloc structure, voting with his erstwhile allies on such issues as First 
and Fifth Amendment claims but siding with the conservatives in cases 
involving appeals by civil rights demonstrators or Fourth Amendment 
claims. With Black's support, the liberals prevailed in such pathbreak-
ing decisions as Miranda v. Arizona. 21 Still, Black's increasingly 
frequent defections occasionally left the foursome of Douglas, Warren, 
Brennan, and Fortas one vote shy of a majority, notably in cases arising 
from civil rights demonstrations. 
In the fall of 1967, however, the liberals' position was strengthened 
by Clark's retirement and President Johnson's selection of Thurgood 
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Marshall as his replacement. Voting with Fortas, Warren, and Brennan 
in more than 90 percent of the Court's cases, Justice Marshall became 
the fourth member of the most cohesive bloc of the Warren Court years. 
With Marshall as his staunchest ally (95. 2 percent interagreement rate), 
Brennan was on the winning side in all but six cases decided by the 
1967-69 Court, recording an almost incredible majority participation 
rate of98.4 percent. Close on his heels was Marshall, followed by bloc 
partners Warren and Fortas. Although Justice Douglas was a reliable 
ally of the Brennan-Marshall-Warren-Fortas bloc in decisions favoring 
civil liberties claims, he dissented in approximately one-fourth of the 
Court's cases, including a number of civil liberties cases in which the 
majority was unwilling to go as far as he preferred. By 1967-69 Black 
had moved far enough away from his former allies to file 119 dissents, 
only 2 fewer than Harlan. 
Overall, the data reported in Table 3.2 clearly portray patterns of 
consensus and conflict in the last seven and a half years of the Warren 
Court and provide even stronger support for each of my hypotheses than 
do the early Warren Court data. What stands out is the extent to which 
voting patterns in this period reflect the dominance of a subgroup of 
justices centered around Brennan and Warren. Particularly striking is 
the record of Justice Brennan, who filed only forty-four dissents be-
tween 1962 and 1969, for an overall majority participation score of 
96.8 percent. Among the factors that account for his position must be 
counted his close ties with the chief justice and with a series of 
freshman colleagues-Goldberg, Fortas, and Marshall. In each Court 
the subgroup including Brennan and Warren generally needed only one 
or two additional votes to prevail. Even when the bloc split, Brennan 
was usually with the_ majority. 22 
As hypothesized, the center of gravity in each natural court was 
occupied by a justice closely allied with a new member of the Court 
(H 1 ), who maintained his position through alliances with a series of 
freshman justices (H2). Moreover, the chief justice was never far out of 
the mainstream (H3), and the justice at the center of gravity and his 
allies were invariably members of the largest bloc (H4). 
As with the early Warren Court years, explanations for these 
patterns of conflict and consensus are associated with the appointment 
process. With vacancies to fill on a fractionalized Court, Kennedy was 
able to tip the balance by appointing White and Goldberg to fill the 
seats of Whittaker and Frankfurter. President Johnson assured con-
Changing Voting Patterns 79 
tinuation of the trend with his selection of Fortas and solidified the 
dominance of the liberal bloc with the appointment of Marshall. 
By 1968, of course, the Warren Court's posture had become a 
campaign issue for Republican presidential nominee Richard Nixon, 
who pledged to appoint justices who would support the "peace forces" 
rather than the "criminal forces. "23 Within a few months of Nixon's 
election, the retirement of Warren and the resignation of Fortas, both 
key members of the liberal bloc, provided the new president with a 
golden opportunity to fulfill his campaign pledge. 
THE BURGER COURT 
In seeking to appoint Supreme Court justices who shared his views, 
Nixon behaved like most earlier presidents, though he was perhaps 
more explicit than any president since Roosevelt about the policy goals 
he sought to promote through his Supreme Court appointments. In 
sharp contrast to Roosevelt, Nixon's opportunities came early in his 
presidency. Within three years of his inauguration Nixon had appointed 
four justices including the chief. Although the opposition of the Senate 
and later the American Bar Association prevented Nixon from filling 
three of the vacancies with the appointees he had originally preferred, 
Warren E. Burger, Harry A. Blackmun, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and 
William H. Rehnquist were all on record as generally sympathetic to 
the president's law and order approach. 24 
Table 3.3 reports data on majority participation rates for the first 
dozen years of the Burger Court. The 1969-72 period includes all cases 
argued or decided by the Burger Court between Chief Justice Burger's 
appointment in the summer of 1969 and the seating of Justices Powell 
and Rehnquist in January 1972. Through most of the 1969-70 term 
Burger headed a Court of eight justices while the Senate debated and 
rejected in tum Nixon's nominations of Clement Haynsworth and G. 
Harrold Carswell. The Court returned to full strength for the 1970-71 
term following Senate approval of Harry A. Blackmun to fill Fortas's 
seat but was reduced to seven members when Justices Harlan and Black 
retired as the 1971-72 term was about to begin. The cases decided by 
the remaining justices in this term are included in the 1969-72 data. 
The 1972-75 period includes all cases argued and decided between the 
seating of Powell and Rehnquist as freshman justices and the retirement 
of Justice Douglas in October 1975. The 1975-81 Court, with Stevens 
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Table 3. 3. Majority Participation Rates, 1969-1981 (Burger Court) 
1969-72 1972-75 1975-81 
Justice Percent (Ranking) Percent (Ranking) Percent (Ranking) 
White 87.0(1) 86. 7(3) 86.5(2) 
Stewart 86.8(2) 82.6(5) 83.8(5) 
Marshall 85.1(3) 69.3(7) 67.4(8) 
Blackmun 83.1(4) 88.8(2) 85.5(4) 
Brennan 81.5(5) 67.2(8) 67.1(9) 
Harlan 80.9(6) 
Burger 77.6(7) 84.8(4) 86.2(3) 
Black 71.3(8) 
Douglas 65.6(9) 55.2(9) 
Powell 89.7(1) 89.9(1) 
Rehnquist 79. 7(6) 77.8(6) 
Stevens 77.1(7) 
Court cohesion 69.6 67.7 68.4 
Sprague criterion 84.8 83.9 84.2 
Size of largest bloc 2 3 3 
(Members) (Burger, Blackmun)• (Powell, (Powell, 
Burger, Burger, 
Blackmun) Rehnquist) 
•Most cohesive pair. 
as the freshman justice, covers nearly six full terms through the retire-
ment of Justice Stewart. 
Majority participation scores for 1969-72 indicate that with his 
first two appointments Nixon was able to alter substantially the voting 
patterns that had prevailed in the late Warren Court. Brennan's majority 
participation rate dropped from 98.4 to 81.5 percent, fifth highest of 
the justices. In his place as the Court's center of gravity was Justice 
White, followed closely by Stewart. Although Marshall clung to third 
place, his majority participation percentage dropped substantially. Yet 
the Nixon appointees were not a dominant force within the Court. 
Through the first two and a half years of the Burger Court, the new chief 
justice was among the Court's three most frequent dissenters with a 
majority participation score of 77.6 percent. This transitional Court can 
be more accurately characterized as the Stewart-White Court than as a 
Nixon Court. 25 
The relationship between bloc structure and majority participation 
rates is substantially less apparent in this period than in the late Warren 
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Court. Only the two pairs of Brennan-Marshall (87. 8 percent inter-
agreement rate) and Burger-Blackmun (94.6 percent) qualify as blocs. 
Stewart and White occupied the center of gravity in this Court because 
one or both of them often held the balance of power between the liberal 
Warren Court holdovers (Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall) and the 
Nixon appointees. Both White and Stewart frequently voted with the 
two newcomers. White was on the fringe of the Burger-Blackmun bloc, 
allying with the new associate justice in 83.9 percent of the cases in 
which both participated, and Stewart was Burger's closest ally other 
than Blackmun. Thus the 1969-72 data provide some support for the 
"freshman justice" hypothesis, though the link between majority par-
ticipation rate and a voting alliance with new members of the Court is 
much weaker than in the late Warren Court. 
With the appointments of Justices Powell and Rehnquist, the bal-
ance of power shifted more clearly toward the Nixon appointees. Nixon 
appointees Powell and Blackmun achieved the highest rates of majority 
participation during 1972-75. Justice White dropped to third, and 
Chief Justice Burger moved up from seventh to fourth. The liberal 
holdovers became the Court's three most frequent dissenters. Justice 
Brennan, who had dissented only 44 times between 1962 and 1969, 
cast 206 dissenting votes in the 1972-75 period, and his majority 
participation score dropped to 67.2 percent. Completely outside the 
mainstream in his last years on the Court, Douglas dissented in nearly 
45 percent of the cases in which he participated. 
Interagreement data for this period unambiguously support the 
hypothesis that the justices at or close to the Court's center of gravity 
should be members of the largest bloc. Three Nixon appointees 
(Powell, Burger, and Blackmun) formed a cohesive bloc, with both 
White and Rehnquist on the bloc's fringes. In fact, each Nixon appoint-
ee voted with each other Nixon appointee in at least 80 percent of the 
cases during this period. 26 Although this bloc was not as cohesive as the 
Brennan-Warren-Marshall-Fortas bloc in the last two years of the 
Warren Court, the tendency of the Nixon justices to vote together made 
the newcomers a powerful force within the Court. 
With some minor variations, the patterns established in 1972-75 
prevailed throughout the six years of stable membership initiated by the 
appointment of Justice John Paul Stevens in 1975. Powell remained at 
the Court's center of gravity, voting with the majority in just under 90 
percent of the cases decided in the 1975-81 period. Clustered behind 
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Powell were White, Burger, and Blackmun. Showing no hesitancy to 
dissent in his early years on the Court, Justice Stevens quickly staked 
out an idiosyncratic position, dissenting in approximately 23 percent of 
the cases in which he participated. With the departure of Douglas, 
Marshall fell to eighth place, and Brennan had the lowest rate of 
participation in the majority, dissenting in almost one-third of the cases 
decided in this six-year period. 
Although the bloc structure of the 1975-81 Court bore some 
resemblance to that of 1972-75, the ties holding the Nixon appointees 
together loosened noticeably. The onetime "Minnesota Twins" dis-
agreed in more than one-fifth of the cases in this period, an agreement 
rate substantially below their 88.3 percent figure for 1972-75. As 
Blackmun and Rehnquist began moving in opposite directions, their 
agreement rate dropped to 71.4 percent. Still, Powell, Rehnquist, and 
Burger formed a cohesive bloc, and both White and Stewart frequently 
aligned with Burger and Powell. Brennan and Marshall voted together 
in 91.3 percent of the cases and still remained largely isolated from the 
rest of the Court. 
The changes observed in the Burger Court years, as in the late 
Warren Court period, suggest once again the importance of the appoint-
ment process as a factor influencing patterns of conflict and consensus. 
With his first two appointments, Nixon was able to shift the balance of 
power away from Brennan and Marshall. After four appointments the 
Court's complexion had changed sufficiently to convert Brennan and 
Marshall into dissenters more likely to express opposition to the 
Court's decisions than such earlier dissenting pairs as Holmes and 
Brandeis or even Black and Douglas. At the same time, the Nixon 
experience may suggest the limits of presidential influence on the 
Court. Although the Nixon appointees voted together frequently 
enough to reorient the Court, they disagreed among themselves often 
enough to ensure that they could not dominate the Court as thoroughly 
as had Brennan and his allies in the late Warren Court. The indepen-
dence of the Nixon appointees when the future of the Nixon presidency 
was at stake is, of course, well known. 27 Moreover, the gradual 
emergence of divergent views among the Nixon four suggests that even 
justices who generally share the views of a president when appointed 
may in time move in different directions as the Court confronts new 
issues. 
The data for the Burger years supply further support for my 
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hypotheses about the place of the chief justice in patterns of conflict 
and consensus (H3) and about the relationship between bloc structure 
and majority voting (H4), though the evidence is not without its 
ambiguities. After a brief period of frequent dissent, Burger has moved 
back into the Court's mainstream. Powell, the justice most frequently in 
the majority since his appointment in 1972, has invariably been a 
member of the largest bloc on the Court. The data offer only the most 
limited support, however, for my freshman justice hypothesis. 
What conclusions can be drawn from this survey of Supreme Court 
voting patterns over a twenty-eight-year period? At the descriptive 
level, the most significant point is that the major outlines of conflict 
and consensus did change significantly during these years. Changes in 
majority participation rates over time clearly tracked changes in the 
Court's direction. Following Justice Brennan's majority participation 
scores over a quarter of a century highlights the Court's shifts from 
moderate conservatism through liberalism to a new conservatism that 
left Brennan isolated from the Court's mainstream. In general, these 
changes may be traced to the appointment process, lending support to 
the proposition that the Court, in time, reflects in a general way the 
policy preferences of the same dominant national coalition that prevails 
at the presidential level. 28 
Moreover, the data analyzed in this chapter tend to support the 
hypotheses about general patterns of conflict and consensus set out 
above, though not without ambiguity. A preponderance of the evidence 
clearly supports the hypothesis that the justice at the center of gravity 
should normally be a member of the largest bloc on the Court (H4). 
Justice Clark through much of the early Warren Court, Justice Brennan 
in the late Warren Court, and Justice Powell since his appointment in 
1972 were able to maintain their dominant positions because they had 
close allies within the Court. It seems safe to conclude that when there 
is a large, cohesive bloc within the Court, the justice most frequently in 
the majority will be a member of the largest bloc. Of course, the caveat 
that there is not always a large, cohesive bloc within the Court must be 
entered, a condition that sometimes allows a "swing voter" associated 
with no bloc on a divided Court (Clark in 1958-62 or White in 
1969-72) to occupy the Court's center of gravity. The experience of the 
Warren and Burger years also supports the expectation that the chief 
justice is not likely to be far outside the Court's mainstream (H3), 
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though Burger did dissent frequently before other Nixon appointees 
joined him on the bench. 
As for the place of the freshman justice in patterns of conflict and 
consensus, it seems safe to say only that it depends on the circum-
stances. On occasion, a freshman justice may emerge as the Court's 
center of gravity. If several new justices form a voting bloc (as did the 
Nixon appointees) or use their votes to strengthen an existing bloc (as in 
the cases of Goldberg, Fortas, and Marshall), the impact of the new 
justices may be substantial. In other circumstances, however, the 
influence of a freshman on patterns of consensus and conflict may be 
negligible. Overall, the hypothesis that the justice most frequently in 
the majority will generally be an ally of a freshman justice (H 1) must be 
rejected. Evidence that a justice can maintain his position at the center 
of gravity by allying with a series of new colleagues (H2) appears to be 
limited to the unique circumstances of the late Warren Court. 
This chapter's close focus on the Supreme Court over a twenty-
eight-year period provides students of the judicial process with a 
detailed description of patterns of conflict and consensus that high-
lights the importance of the appointment process as a factor affecting 
majority participation and dissent. It is clear that the validity of the 
generalizations emerging from this investigation must ultimately rest 
on further confirmation in research on earlier periods and on future 
Courts. 
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Felix Frankfurter, Judicial 
Activism, and Voting Conflict 
on the Warren Court 
HAROLD J. SPAETH and 
MICHAEL E ALTFELD 
Given Felix Frankfurter's reputation for judicial restraint, this chapter 
analyzes decisions amenable to resolution on the basis of restraint. In 
so doing it sheds considerable light on the conflict between Frank-
furter's supposed role conception and reality gleaned from an examina-
tion of his opinion behavior and also from patterns of voting conflict 
and consensus among Warren Court justices generally. Specifically, we 
examine Frankfurter's voting behavior and opinions on state action and 
federal agency cases regulatory of business and labor decided during 
his tenure on the Warren Court, 1953-61. 1 Cases are grouped into four 
subsets: state regulation of labor, state regulation of business, cases 
involving the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and federal 
administrative agencies regulatory of business. Because earlier re-
search demonstrated that Frankfurter's restraint was thoroughly subor-
dinated to his substantive attitudes toward business and labor, 2 we are 
especially interested in how Frankfurter accommodated his reputation 
for restraint via his opinions when he assumed an activist posture. 
Although no assumption is made that attitudes toward business and 
labor motivated the justices' behavior in the cases analyzed, it is 
prudent, given previous studies, 3 to allow for the possibility that these 
attitudes may at least partially explain patterns of conflict and con-
sensus during these Warren Court years. 
STATE REGULATION OF LABOR 
Twelve formally decided nonunanimous cases concerned state regula-
tion of labor unions. Except for Douglas, Black, and Warren, the 
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Table 4.1. State Labor Cases: Percentages of Interagreement in Split 
Decisions 
Dou Blk War Bm Clk Har Bur Min Ree Stw Frk Wht 
Douglas 
Black 80 
Warren 82 78 
Brennan 14 40 17 
Clark 33 20 27 86 
Harlan 29 20 0 83 100 
Burton 22 14 33 100 100 100 
Minton 40 20 60 100 100b 100 
Reed 40 20 60 100 100b 100 100 
Stewart 50a oa oa 5Qa 1ooa 100b 
Frankfurter 18 0 18 83 91 100 89 80 80 10Qa 
Whittaker 17 0 0 67 83 80 100 100 100 
Average 39 27 34 60 76 74 76 75 75 63a 69 61 
Percentage 
of time in 
majority 33 20 27 86 100 100 100 100 100 100 91 83 
Indices of interagreement 
Dou-Blk-War = .80 
Rest of justices = . 92 
a = 2 cases 
b = 1 case 
justices were rarely in voting conflict with one another. The result was a 
sharply bifurcated Court, as Table 4. 1 shows. Whereas Glendon 
Schubert considers an index of interagreement of . 70 to be high, 4 here 
Douglas-Black-Warren are at .80 and the other nine participating 
justices are at .92. Six justices voted with the majority without fail: 
Clark, Burton, Harlan, Minton, Reed, and Stewart. Three split from the 
majority only once: Frankfurter, Brennan, and Whittaker. By contrast, 
Douglas, Warren, and Black agreed with the majority on only four, 
three, and two occasions, respectively. In other words, of twenty-seven 
dissents, twenty-four were cast by Douglas, Black, and Warren (eight 
apiece). Frankfurter was obviously in greatest voting conflict with 
these three justices. The likely reason for the unusually sharp division 
on the Court is that eleven of the twelve state labor cases involved 
federal preemption of state court jurisdiction to resolve unfair labor 
practices. These cases form an unusually good cumulative scale (R = 
.987). Only Douglas, Black, and Warren proved to be prounion. 
A second feature of the cases involving state regulation of labor is 
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Table 4.2. Votes on State Regulation of Labor Unions 
Justice Prostate Antis tate Percentage of Support 
Whittaker 6 0 100 
Stewart 2 0 100 
Frankfurter 10 91 
Harlan 6 I 86 
Burton 7 2 78 
Clark 9 3 75 
Brennan 5 2 71 
Reed 3 2 60 
Minton 3 2 60 
Black 9 10 
Warren 10 9 
Douglas I II 8 
Jackson 0 0 
that in every case a prostate vote was concomitantly antiunion and vice 
versa. Accordingly, one may argue, equally persuasively, that attitudes 
toward state regulation, rather than those toward labor unions, moti-
vated the justices' voting in this set of cases. As shall be seen, this 
argument collapses when we analyze the other three sets of cases. But 
when the justices' votes are arrayed in a pro- and antistate fashion in 
Table 4.2, the pattern supports considerations of federalism except for 
Douglas, Black, and Warren. 
In these cases, Frankfurter's votes accorded with his reputation for 
restraint, and only Whittaker and Stewart exceeded his proportion of 
prostate votes. Inasmuch as Frankfurter did not write in the case in 
which he voted antistate--Capital Service v. NLRB (1954)-his five 
opinions in this set of cases all support considerations of federalism. 5 It 
is noteworthy that Frankfurter assigned the Court opinion in six of these 
twelve cases. At no time during his Warren Court tenure was Frank-
furter more than third in seniority regarding opinion assignment. War-
ren, Black, and Reed outranked him. Frankfurter disproportionately 
assigned three of these six cases to himself. By comparison, neither 
Warren nor Black self-assigned. Reed retained one of his two, assigning 
the other to Frankfurter. 
STATE REGULATION OF BUSINESS 
Unlike the state labor cases, those involving state regulation of busi-
ness make up a more structurally complex set exhibiting less conflict 
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Table 4.3. State Business Cases: Percentages of Interagreement in 
Split Decisions 
Dou Blk War Clk Bm Min Ree Bur Wht Stw Jac Frk Har 
Douglas 
Black 61 
Warren 59 78 
Clark 58 73 88 
Brennan 67 71 90 100 
Minton 25 75 64 67 
Reed 18 55 50 55 82 
Burton 30 30 47 55 25 75 82 
Whittaker 42 26 42 47 47 88 
Stewart 36 36 64 73 73 89 
Jackson 33 17 20 33 67 50 67 
Frankfurter 36 45 50 55 57 67 55 55 53 73 100 
Harlan 32 50 59 59 62 ()a !00• 67 37 55 73 
Average 41 51 59 64 66 58 61 56 52 62 48 60 53 
Percentage 
of time in 
majority 48 70 84 91 100 92 82 60 47 73 67 64 59 
Indices of interagreement 
Dou-Blk-War-Clk-Bm = .75 
Min-Ree-Bur = .80 
Bur-Wht-Stw-Jac-Frk-Har = .69 
•=lease 
on the Warren Court. Although seventeen of the thirty-three cases 
concerned state taxation, the remainder involved a congeries of non tax 
state activities. Five of the cases also concerned the federal regulatory 
commissions. Nor was a prostate vote invariably antibusiness. In five 
cases, a prostate vote supported business. Table 4.3 indicates that the 
Court was not as bifurcated as it was in the labor cases, and the 
interagreement ratios are not as high and low as earlier. The Court 
upheld the states in nineteen of the thirty-three decisions and eighteen 
times when the state's regulation was antibusiness. The Court's pro-/ 
anti-business proclivity overrode a pro-/anti-state orientation. Two-
thirds of the thirty-three cases produced an antibusiness result: the 
eighteen antibusiness regulation decisions that the Court upheld, plus 
the four probusiness decisions reversed. The likelihood that this pattern 
occurred by chance is one in ten. 6 
As Table 4.3 shows, the justices divided themselves into three 
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distinguishable blocs. The liberal grouping of Douglas, Black, and 
Warren expands to five with the addition of Brennan and Clark. 
Opposite them was a six-member bloc that, on the basis of findings in 
the sources cited in note 3, we will label conservative, while Minton, 
Reed, and Burton formed a centrist group. Although the interagreement 
indices are lower than in the labor cases, only the six-member conser-
vative group falls below Schubert's specification of "high," and then 
only by a single percentage point. There was markedly less voting 
conflict in the state business cases than in the labor cases. The lack of 
exceptionally high interagreement ratios also evidences a lack of polar-
ization. Whereas fifty-one of the fifty-nine cells in Table 4.1 reveal an 
interagreement ratio (.33 or ).75, in Table 4.3 only twenty of sixty-
seven do so. The undoubted reason is that the state business cases 
addressed a vastly broader range of issues than did the labor cases. 
Unlike the labor cases, in which six of the twelve participating 
justices always voted in the majority, only Brennan did so here, fol-
lowed by Minton and Clark at 92 and 91 percent respectively. At the 
other extreme, Douglas again was with the majority less than half the 
time (48 percent), along with Whittaker (47 percent). Frankfurter fell 
from 91 percent in labor cases to 64 percent here. Warren and Black, 
who, along with Douglas, were part of the majority in less than half the 
labor cases, stand at 84 and 70 percent here. Douglas dissented most 
often, seventeen times, and voted in dissent with every justice except 
Brennan, who was always in the majority. Frankfurter dissented twelve 
times, most often with Harlan (six) and Whittaker (five). Black and 
Whittaker rank next in frequency of dissent (ten each), followed by 
Harlan (nine) and Burton (eight). Whereas the justices averaged 2.25 
dissents per labor case (twenty-seven in twelve cases, of which Doug-
las, Black, and Warren cast twenty-four dissenting votes), the propor-
tion in the state business cases is 2.5 (eighty-two dissents in thirty-three 
decisions). As in Table 4.1, Frankfurter again conflicted most often 
with Douglas, Black, and Warren, and his rate of agreement with 
Brennan, Burton, Clark, Stewart, and Whittaker also declined consider-
ably. 
Evidence of what we surmised as explaining the interagreement in 
Table 4.1 is substantiated by the pattern of pro- and antistate votes 
shown in Table 4.4. If, for example, one compares the percentage of 
prostate votes that a justice cast in the labor cases (Table 4.2) with that 
in the business cases, an interesting grouping emerges. Of the five most 
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prostate justices in the labor cases, only Harlan was prostate in business 
cases. Deference clearly is a sometime thing. Even more graphic is the 
switch manifested by Douglas, Warren, and Black. Douglas, who 
supported state regulation of labor at a rate of only 8 percent, increased 
his support to 61 percent in cases involving state regulation of business. 
Warren went from 9 to 69 percent and Black from 10 to 70 percent 
prostate. Indeed, only three justices deferred to the states with more 
than half their votes in both the labor and business cases: Harlan, 
Brennan, and Clark. Brennan's proportion of support, 71 percent, is 
identical between the two sets, while Clark's support deviates by only 
eight points. Harlan, by contrast, falls from 86 percent prostate in labor 
cases to 59 percent in business cases. The remaining nine justices show 
an average variance of fifty-four points in their support of state action. 
Obviously, something is at work here. If it were considerations of 
federalism, a markedly less drastic shift in the justices' ratios of pro-
and antistate votes would appear in Tables 4.2 and 4.4. Because in all 
but five cases a prostate vote was concomitantly antibusiness, the likely 
explanation is that the justices-with the possible exceptions of 
Harlan, Brennan, and Clark-subordinated any states' rights senti-
ments to their substantive attitudes toward business. If the votes are 
scored as pro- and antibusiness, rather than pro- and antistate, the 
following antibusiness percentages result: Brennan, 81; Black, 79; 
Clark, 73; Warren, 69; and Douglas, 64. By comparison, Whittaker 
voted probusiness 74 percent of the time, followed by Frankfurter with 
64, Stewart, 55, and Harlan, 50 percent. Compatibly with the findings 
in the sources referred to in note 3, the former group is identified as 
liberal toward economic regulation generally, while the latter is conser-
vative. Accordingly, the justices were divided in cases involving state 
regulation of business not so much by their attitudes toward federalism 
as toward business per se. 
Frankfurter wrote fifteen opinions in the thirty-three state business 
regulation cases. Among the other justices, only Douglas wrote as 
frequently. Frankfurter, interestingly, had no reticence about authoring 
an opinion when it accompanied an antistate vote. Although he wrote 
opinions for only 43 percent of his antistate votes, as opposed to half of 
his prostate votes, he wrote nine antistate opinions as opposed to six 
prostate. A marked difference also exists between Frankfurter's pro-
and antis tate opinions. Of his six prostate opinions, two were opinions 
of the Court, three were special concurrences, and only one was a 
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Table 4.4. Votes on State Regulation of Business 
Justice Prostate Anti state Percentage of Support 
Brennan 15 6 71 
Black 23 10 70 
Warren 22 10 69 
Clark 22 II 67 
Douglas 20 13 61 
Harlan 13 9 59 
Stewart 5 6 45 
Frankfurter 13 20 39 
Reed 3 8 27 
Minton 3 9 25 
Burton 5 15 25 
Jackson 5 17 
Whittaker 3 16 16 
dissent. But when Frankfurter coupled an antistate vote with an opin-
ion, only one was that of the Court, one a regular concurrence, and 
seven dissents. 7 
One may assume that when a justice has a reputation for judicial 
restraint, he will take pains to explain his posture when he votes 
antistate because such a vote represents a departure from his supposed 
philosophical position. Frankfurter's efforts to explain his antistate 
dissents would seem consistent with this view. But Frankfurter's be-
havior is also exactly what we would expect from an individual who 
was, in reality, restraintist only insofar as it favored his policy prefer-
ences yet valued his legal reputation as an advocate of restraint. There-
fore, Frankfurter would take great pains not to explain the conflict 
between his role conception and his antis tate votes but rather would try 
to explain them away. An examination of Frankfurter's antistate opin-
ions should indicate which of the foregoing assumptions is correct. 
Frankfurter's opinion for the Court in Kake v. Egan (1962), holding 
that Alaska could regulate commercial fishing of nonreservation Indi-
ans, appears to be pro- rather than antistate. But a stay of execution of 
the state court's decision was extended until the end of the salmon 
fishing season. The majority's posture was antistate only because 
Douglas dissented from the stay of execution. Accordingly, to indict 
Frankfurter for an anti state opinion here would be caviling. We hold the 
same view with regard to his concurrence in Phillips Petroleum v. 
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Wisconsin (1954) and his dissents in Marin County v. U.S. (1958) and 
Utah PSC v. U.S. (1958). All three involved action by federal regula-
tory commissions as well as by the states. As is typical of such cases, a 
restraintist justice cannot pay obeisance to both, and Frankfurter chose 
to defer to the agencies rather than the states. One may read Frank-
furter's concurrence in Phillips Petroleum as deferring less to the 
expertise of the Federal Power Commission than to the nationalistic 
language of the interstate commerce clause, but again we will not cavil. 
These four opinions, although more or less antistate, arguably do not 
besmirch Frankfurter's reputation for restraint. 
We cannot say the same for Frankfurter's other five antistate 
dissents. In Braniff Airways v. Nebraska Board ( 1954 ), he complained 
that interstate commerce was burdened by state taxation and that the 
nexus between the taxed object (airplanes) and the taxing state was so 
tenuous as to constitute "an obvious inroad" on the commerce clause. 8 
In his second antistate dissent, International Harvester v. Goodrich 
( 1956), at issue was the constitutionality of a New York statute that 
granted highway tax liens priority over the security interests of condi-
tional vendors of trucks operated by motor carriers. Frankfurter held 
that the due process clause barred New York from according priority to 
liens arising prior to the conditional sale of the trucks to the carrier. 
Frankfurter's remaining antistate dissents all occurred in cases that 
received front-page coverage. Detroit v. Murray Corp. (1958) was one 
of three companion cases that concerned state taxation of federal 
property. The majority held that federal property used or leased by 
private persons loses its immunity from state taxation. Frankfurter, 
wrapping himself in the mantle of McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), 
insisted that in Murray the state "professedly and directly" levied "an 
ad valorem property tax on what is indubitably government property. "9 
Although Frankfurter joined with Burton and Harlan in Whittaker's 
dissent, none joined him. 
Northwestern States Portland Cement v. Minnesota ( 1959) upheld 
net income taxes on that portion of an out-of-state corporation's busi-
ness earned from and fairly apportioned to business activities in the 
taxing state even though the taxed activities resulted from interstate 
operations. In this case, the cement company shipped 48 percent of its 
product from Iowa to Minnesota and sold it there. The company 
maintained only a small sales office in the latter state. Frankfurter, in 
dissent, vigorously argued that the tax violated the commerce clause. 
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The nationalistic tenor of his opinion was coupled with a measure of 
restraintist rhetoric, however. The states' apportionment formulas, he 
observed, will "present far-reaching problems of accommodating feder-
al-state fiscal policy. But a determination of who is to get how much out 
of the common fund can hardly be made wisely and smoothly through 
the adjudicatory process. In fact, relying on the courts to solve these 
problems only aggravates the difficulties and retards proper legislative 
solution. " 10 Again, neither of the other dissenters, Whittaker and 
Stewart, joined Frankfurter's opinion, although Frankfurter joined the 
former's. 
Frankfurter sounded an unabashedly nationalistic refrain in Young-
stown Sheet & Tube v. Bowers ( 1959), the last of his anti state dissents. 
The Court ruled that the import-export clause did not bar a state from 
taxing imported raw materials stored within the state for immediate use. 
Frankfurter, joined by Harlan, cited chapter and verse in support of the 
thesis that "guided by the experience of the evils generated by the 
parochialism of the new States, the wise men at the Philadelphia 
Convention took measures to make of the expansive United States a 
free trade area and to withdraw from the States the selfish exercise of 
power over foreign trade, both import and export. " 11 Unlike North-
western States, Frankfurter made no effort to couple his anti state 
sentiments with assertions of judicial incompetence. 
Given Frankfurter's legacy of votes and opinions in state business 
regulation cases, how is it possible to characterize him as an advocate 
of judicial restraint? Was his behavior here deviant from his overall 
posture? Perhaps. Analysis of his record in the sets of cases still to be 
analyzed should answer this question. Alternatively, is it possible that 
Frankfurter's apologists have disregarded his dissenting opinions? Oth-
ers have not. Anthony Lewis, for example, in an analysis of North-
western States and Youngstown, contrasted Frankfurter's dissents in 
these cases, which Lewis described as "fervent," with Paul Freund's 
characterization of the majority as having "shown a marked degree of 
self-restraint." 12 Although Frankfurter displayed deference to the states 
in the labor cases, this deference was equally antilabor. In the state 
business regulation cases, Frankfurter's deference disappeared, but his 
economic conservatism remained. This probusiness bias, as noted, was 
manifest in his votes. Yet perhaps of even greater significance is that 
when Frankfurter wrote an antistate opinion in these cases, eight of the 
nine produced a probusiness result. The sole exception was his regular 
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concurrence in Phillips Petroleum. 13 All seven of his antistate dissent-
ing opinions accompanied a probusiness vote. Clearly, then, the only 
label that accurately fits Frankfurter's voting and opinion behavior in 
the state cases regulatory of business and labor is that of economic 
conservative. 
We tum now to the other aspect of judicial restraint to be consid-
ered: decisions of the federal regulatory commissions. As in the state 
cases, we divide them between those regulating labor and those reg-
ulating business. 
FEDERAL AGENCY LABOR REGULATION 
During Frankfurter's tenure on the Warren Court, it nonunanimously 
decided twenty-three cases involving the NLRB: nine in which the 
NLRB was prounion and fourteen in which it was antiunion. The Court 
upheld the NLRB thirteen times, although its prounion orientation 
overrode its support of the NLRB. Of the twenty-three cases, seventeen 
produced a prounion result. Eight of nine prounion NLRB decisions 
were upheld, and nine of fourteen antiunion decisions were reversed. 
This distribution, when arranged in a 2 x 2 table, is statistically 
significant. 14 
Patterns of conflict and consensus previously displayed in the state 
action cases (Tables 4.1 and 4.3) remain recognizable in Table 4.5. 
Douglas, Black, and Warren continued to form the core of the liberal 
bloc, with Brennan often joining them. In the NLRB cases, however, 
Stewart replaced Clark as the fifth member of the liberal bloc. Totally 
unlike the state business cases, an eight-member liberal-moderate bloc 
appeared here. Not only was this bloc markedly larger than the others 
indicated in Table 4.5, its interagreement index is ten points higher than 
the other three blocs. The conservative bloc shrank to three justices-
Harlan, Frankfurter, and Whittaker-from the six in the state business 
cases. 
There was somewhat more judicial conflict than in the state busi-
ness cases because of the behavior of Douglas and Black, on the one 
hand, and that of Harlan, Frankfurter, and Whittaker, on the other. Yet 
there was less polarization than in the state labor cases. Whereas 86 
percent of the cells in Table 4.1 show an interagreement ratio (.33 or 
).75, here only 42 percent do so. This ratio, however, exceeds 30 
percent in the state business set. The proportion of the time each justice 
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Table 4.5. NLRB Cases: Percentages of Interagreement in Split 
Decisions 
97 
Dou Blk War Bm Stw Clk Ree Min Jac Bur Har Frk Wht 
Douglas 
Black 83 
Warren 70 78 
Brennan 56 69 81 
Stewart 64 82 91 91 
Clark 39 48 70 69 64 
Reed 57 57 100 86 
Minton 33 33 83 67 83 
Jackson 0 33 100 100 100 100 
Burton 42 42 75 100 75 100 83 100 
Harlan 32 42 53 81 73 58 0 50 50 
Frankfurter II 21 37 58 57 58 43 67 67 58 87 
Whittaker 7 20 33 40 40 73 60 53 91 
Average 41 51 73 72 69 67 70 67 75a 71 52 54 43 
Percentage 
of time in 
majority 61 70 91 94 91 78 100 83 100 92 63 47 47 
Indices of interagreement 
Dou-Blk-War = .77 
Dou-Blk-War-Bm-Stw = .77 
War-Bm-Stw-Clk-Ree-Min-Jac-Bur = .87 
Har-Frk-Wht = .77 
a = 3 cases. 
voted with the majority provides further evidence of polarization. The 
six who voted in the majority more than 91 percent of the time provided 
45 percent of all votes for the majority position in NLRB cases. Only 
three justices supported . the majority at this high a level in the state 
business set, and they cast only 30 percent of all votes for the majority. 
At the other extreme, Whittaker and Frankfurter voted with the 
majority less than half the time (47 percent). Whittaker's 47 percent is 
the same as in state business cases. Frankfurter, by contrast, fell from 64 
percent and again was in greatest voting conflict with Douglas, Black, 
and Warren. Douglas, although proportionately third least supportive 
of the majority, nonetheless rose to 61 percent. 
Whereas Douglas dissented most frequently in the state action sets 
(although Black and Warren tied him in the labor cases), Frankfurter 
achieved that distinction in the NLRB cases with ten. Douglas followed 
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Table 4.6. Votes on the Pro-/ and Antiunion Decisions of the NLRB 
NLRB Percentage NLRB Percentage 
Justice Prounion of Support Justice Antiunion of Support 
Warren 9-0 100 Burton 5-0 100 
Reed 5-0 100 Reed 2-0 100 
Stewart 2-0 100 Minton 2-0 100 
Jackson 1-0 100 Jackson 2-0 100 
Black 8-1 89 Whittaker 10-2 83 . 
Burton 6-1 86 Frankfurter 8-2 80 
Douglas 7-2 78 Clark 8-6 57 
Brennan 3-1 75 Harlan 5-7 42 
Minton 3-1 75 Brennan 4-8 33 
Clark 6-3 67 Warren 4-10 29 
Frankfurter 3-6 33 Stewart 2-7 22 
Whittaker 1-2 33 Douglas 1-13 7 
Harlan 1-6 14 Black 0-14 0 
with nine, Whittaker eight, and Harlan and Black seven. Each justice 
except Warren dissented at least once with Frankfurter. Harlan did so 
most frequently, and each of his seven dissenting votes occurred in a 
case in which Frankfurter also dissented. Douglas, by comparison, had 
the company of only Black (six times) and Warren (twice), in addition 
to one Frankfurter vote, when he dissented in the NLRB cases. Overall, 
however, the number of dissents declined from the 2.5 per case in the 
state business set to 2.26 here (fifty-two in twenty-three decisions), only 
1 percent above that of the state labor cases. 
Table 4.6 strongly supports the implication that justices vote on the 
basis of their pro- and antiunion attitudes rather than their degree of 
deference to the NLRB. Of the thirteen justices, only Jackson, Reed, 
Burton, Minton, and Clark supported the NLRB more than half the 
time regardless of whether the NLRB was pro- or antiunion. All but 
Clark gave unstinting support. Collectively, twenty-six of their twenty-
eight votes upheld the agency (93 percent). Clark, by comparison, 
upheld the NLRB 67 percent of the time when it was prounion and 57 
percent when it was antiunion. Among these five justices, only Clark 
deferred to the states with more than half his votes in the state action 
sets (see Tables 4.2 and 4.4). Jackson did not participate in any of the 
state labor cases. Burton, Minton, and Reed supported state regulation 
of business at respective proportions of only 25, 25, and 27 percent. If a 
judicial activist is defined as one who fails to support state or federal 
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regulatory agencies with at least half his votes even when the decisions 
are controlled for by liberal and conservative outcome, Harlan took an 
activist position toward the NLRB in the cases decided during Frank-
furter's tenure on the Court. No other justice displayed such behavior in 
the state action cases. 
The remaining seven justices displayed the pattern of voting that 
dominated behavior in the state action cases (see Tables 4.2 and 4.4): 
deference to the states when they regulated business but not when they 
regulated labor, or vice versa. These seven show an average variance of 
64 points between the pro- and antiunion portions of Table 4.6. Black is 
most extreme at 89 points. Stewart follows at 78; then Douglas and 
Warren at 71, Whittaker, 50, Frankfurter, 47, and Brennan, 42. In the 
state action sets, Brennan, Clark, and Harlan upheld the states in their 
regulation of both labor and business. 
Evidence that the justices' substantive attitudes toward labor, 
rather than deference to the NLRB, motivated their voting behavior 
may be had by rescoring the votes in Table 4.6 on a pro- and antiunion 
basis and comparing them with the bloc alignments given in Table 4.5. 
The Douglas-Black-Warren bloc voted prounion 61 of 69 times (88 
percent); with the addition of Brennan and Stewart, the ratio becomes 
81 of 97 (84 percent). The eight-member liberal-moderate bloc voted 
prounion 66 of 101 times (65 percent), while the Whittaker-Frank-
furter-Harlan bloc did so in only 16 of their 53 votes (30 percent). 
Furthermore, the twenty-three NLRB cases form a marginally accept-
able cumulative scale (R = . 949; MMR = . 707). The scale is consid-
ered only marginally acceptable because Clark cast 5 of the 8 
computable nonscale votes. 15 Accordingly, we conclude that the jus-
tices voted as they did primarily because of their substantive economic 
attitudes toward labor unions. This explanation, based on the individual 
justices' degree of economic liberalism or conservatism, comports 
with the findings presented in both of the state action sets. 
Frankfurter wrote more frequently than any of his colleagues in the 
NLRB decisions: thirteen opinions in nineteen participations (68 per-
cent), which is markedly greater than his 45 percent in each of the state 
action sets. Eight of Frankfurter's opinions were dissents, one a regular 
concurrence, and four opinions of the Court, the latter of which Frank-
furter self-assigned. Apart from these four cases, Warren assigned the 
Court's opinion in eighteen; the remaining case was decided per 
curiam. Frankfurter's greed in retaining the Court's opinion for himself 
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at every opportunity is perhaps explained by Warren's failure to assign 
any of the NLRB cases to him. Frankfurter, however, was part of the 
majority opinion coalition in only five cases in which Warren made the 
assignment. If unanimous decisions are added, Frankfurter received 
more than his fair share: three of eighteen. 
Similar to his behavior in the state business cases, Frankfurter had 
no hesitance to author anti-NLRB opinions. Indeed, he accompanied 
each of his eight anti-NLRB votes with an opinion. When he voted to 
uphold the NLRB, he wrote an opinion in only five of his eleven votes. 
Moreover, six of his eight anti-NLRB opinions were dissents, and the 
NLRB was prounion in most of these cases. Frankfurter's other two 
anti-NLRB opinions were those of the Court. Frankfurter's opinions 
supportive of the NLRB included two opinions of the Court, two 
dissents, and one regular concurrence. In each of Frankfurter's support-
ive opinions, the NLRB was antiunion. The observation made regard-
ing the character of Frankfurter's opinions in the state business regula-
tion set applies no less to the NLRB cases: if a justice warrants his 
reputation for restraint, he will write as often as possible when his vote 
opposes agency action. When he votes for the agency, written opinion is 
unnecessary. As in state regulation of business, Frankfurter flaunted 
these considerations. Not only were his eight dissents double the 
number written by any other justice, but six of them opposed the 
NLRB's action. 
Frankfurter was able to conceal his lack of deference in the first of 
his two anti-NLRB opinions of the Court. NLRB v. Avondale Mills was 
decided together with NLRB v. Steelworkers ( 1958). We count them 
separately only because Warren concurred in the latter but dissented in 
the former. The cases concerned the validity of employer-imposed no-
solicitation rules. In Steelworkers, the Court upheld the NLRB 's dis-
missal of alleged unfair labor practices against the employer, but in 
Avondale Mills it denied enforcement of an NLRB order. Hence the 
partial cloaking effect in Frankfurter's majority opinion, even though 
Black, Douglas, and Warren thought that the NLRB had sufficiently 
supported both its decisions. Frankfurter's second anti-NLRB majority 
opinion involved a cease-and-desist order barring a union from engag-
ing in a secondary boycott. Frankfurter held that the NLRB improperly 
applied the pertinent provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. 
Although Frankfurter did not explicitly say so, the result rejects defer-
ence, notwithstanding his acknowledgement that the distinction be-
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tween legitimate primary activity and prohibited secondary activity 
"does not present a glaringly bright line" and that the board "has more 
or less felt its way during the fourteen years it has had to apply" the 
provision at issue. 16 
We now turn to Frankfurter's six anti-NLRB dissenting opinions. 
In Mastro Plastics v. NLRB (1956), Frankfurter, joined by Harlan and 
Minton, held that the NLRB 's construction of a provision of the Taft-
Hartley Act conflicted with its plain meaning. Although Taft-Hartley 
"must be considered as an organic whole," no "controlling considera-
tions preclude giving the ordinary meaning to what Congress has 
written" here. Accordingly, "we need not agree with a legislative 
judgment in order to obey a legislative command. It is enough for us 
that Congress did not legislate idly, but did intend the . . . provision to 
have an effect." 17 With these words, Frankfurter cloaked his lack of 
deference to the board with the higher duty of deference to Congress. 
Similarly, in NLRB v. Borg-Warner (1958), although Frankfurter's 
dissent did not explicate the basis for his lack of deference to the 
NLRB, the unstated rationale appears to be the same: he chose to defer 
to Congress rather than the board when they behave incompatibly. 
In NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing ( 1956), Frankfurter was joined by 
Harlan and Clark in faulting the NLRB on different grounds: for 
"mak[ing] a rule of law out of one item-even if a weighty item-of the 
evidence." Instead, the board should have considered "the totality of the 
conduct." Its failure to do so left the NLRB 's "judgment without 
reasonable foundation." 18 There was no mincing of words here. The 
board was simply wrong. 
No justice joined Frankfurter's dissent in NLRB v. Lion Oil ( 1957). 
Whereas the majority reversed the court of appeals, thereby affirming 
the NLRB 's decision, Frankfurter skillfully juxtaposed the disagree-
ment between the appellate court and the board to conceal his opposi-
tion to the latter. He noted that the NLRB did not raise the respondent 
employer's alternative defense in its arguments before the Supreme 
Court; neither was it "clear from the record that respondent urged this 
objection before the Board." If the latter was the situation, the alter-
native defense may not be "open for judicial consideration." Nev-
ertheless, "it is not for this Court in the first instance to construe this 
contract." Rather, "it is for the Court of Appeals to judge whether the 
record as a whole supports the Board's findings of unfair labor prac-
tices."19 Harlan joined Frankfurter's dissent in NLRB v. Walton Man-
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ufacturing ( 1962), the last of his dissents opposing a prounion ruling of 
the NLRB. The refrain accords with that of Lion Oil: "I do not think the 
Court of Appeals applied an erroneous standard of review or grossly 
misapplied the correct standard, and . . . it is not for this Court to 'pass 
on the Board's conclusions in the first instance or to make an indepen-
dent review of the review by the Court of Appeals. 20 
The Pontius Pilate posture adopted by Frankfurter in Lion Oil and 
Walton Manufacturing also manifested itself in his only dissenting 
opinion that objected to an antiunion decision of the NLRB: NLRB v. 
Electrical Workers (1953). Frankfurter argued that courts of appeals 
have primary responsibility for enforcing NLRB orders. The appellate 
court "found that the Board employed an improper standard as the basis 
for its decision" and "does not travel beyond its proper bounds in asking 
the Board for greater explicitness in light of the correct legal standards 
for judgment."21 This and other of Frankfurter's anti-NLRB opinions 
indicate a deviousness not present in his antistate business regulation 
opinions. There his lack of restraint appeared starkly naked. Here he 
was able to use deference to Congress and the courts of appeals to offset 
his lack of deference to the NLRB. The substantive reason for Frank-
furter's anti-NLRB votes, however, was the same as for his opposition 
to state business regulation: economic conservatism. 
FEDERAL AGENCY BUSINESS REGULATION 
The remaining set of data involves agency cases regulatory of business. 
We again divide these decisions into those in which the regulatory 
commission was antibusiness (twenty-eight) and those in which the 
agency was probusiness (nineteen). These agencies were upheld in 
thirty-one of forty-seven of the Court's nonunanimous decisions (66 
percent), but the Court's antibusiness orientation slightly overrode its 
support for the agencies: thirty-two of the decisions produced an 
antibusiness result (68 percent). When the agencies were antibusiness, 
the Court sustained their rulings in twenty-two of twenty-eight cases (79 
percent); when they were probusiness, the Court upheld only nine of 
nineteen (47 percent). This distribution, when arrayed in a 2 x 2 table, 
slightly exceeds a probability of .05 (x2 = 3.62 with 1 degree of 
freedom). 
Patterns of conflict and consensus displayed in the state labor, state 
business, and NLRB cases (Tables 4.1, 4.3, and 4.5) remain recogniz-
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Table 4. 7. Federal Agency Business Cases: Percentages of 
Interagreement in Split Decisions 
Dou Blk War Clk Bm Min Ree Bur Stw Har 
Douglas 
Black 73 
Warren 66 91 
Clark 64 80 89 
Brennan 66 76 86 86 
Minton 53 85 73 71 
Reed 60 77 80 79 79 
Burton 30 48 52 69 44 73 60 
Stewart 29 47 47 44 65 
Harlan 13 26 35 46 45 38 22 75 65 
Frankfurter 15 33 45 51 48 47 47 70 71 88 
Whittaker 14 32 36 44 46 89 59 82 
Average 44 61 64 66 62 65 63 61 53 48 
Percentage of 
time in 
majority 57 78 87 91 97 73 87 63 65 50 
Indices of interagreement 
Dou-Bik-War-Cik-Bm = .78 
Dou-Bik-War-Cik-Bm-Min-Ree = .75 
Blk-War-Cik-Bm-Min-Ree = .81 
Blk-War-Cik-Bm = .85 
Blk-War-Cik = .87 
Min-Ree-Bur = .71 
Bur-Stw-Har-Frk-Wht = .74 
Har-Frk-Wht = .80 






able in Table 4. 7. A solid five-member liberal bloc existed, four of 
whose members served throughout Frankfurter's tenure on the Warren 
Court. When Minton and Reed are added, each of whom participated in 
only fifteen of the forty-seven decisions, the liberal bloc's interagree-
ment index drops only from .78 to .75. Greater cohesion occurred 
when Douglas is excluded (. 81) and still more when Minton and Reed 
are partitioned out (.85). Nonetheless, unlike the dominant bloc in the 
NLRB decisions, which excluded the Court's two most economically 
liberal members, Douglas and Black, here the liberals dominated. The 
only cost to them was the rightward movement of Burton and Stewart to 
the Whittaker-Frankfurter-Harlan bloc. 
Even though the seven most liberal justices whose positions are 
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shown in Table 4. 7 confronted the five most conservative, polarization 
was less than in the other sets, with the possible exception of state 
business regulation. Only twenty-two of fifty-nine cells (37 percent) 
contain ratios (.33 or ).75. The comparable proportion for state labor 
and NLRB was 86 and 42 percent, respectively. State business pro-
duced a 30 percent proportion. But unlike state business, only two 
justices participated with the majority more than 90 percent of the time 
(Brennan and Clark). This pair cast 24 percent of the majority votes ( 69 
of 286), while the three justices who voted with the majority in the state 
business cases more than 90 percent of the time (Brennan and Clark 
again, joined by Minton) cast 30 percent of the majority votes there. 
Moreover, no justice failed to participate in the majority with less than 
half of his votes, whereas in the other three data sets at least two justices 
fell below 50 percent. 
Dissenting most frequently, thereby reflecting conflict, were 
Douglas, Frankfurter, and Harlan, each with 20 dissents. Indeed, this 
trio accounted for over half the dissents cast in the agency business 
cases (60 of 117). Markedly more than in other sets, except for the 
highly skewed state labor cases, bloc members largely dissented only 
with their fellow bloc members. Thus Frankfurter never dissented when 
Douglas, Black, Warren, Brennan, or Reed did so. Dissents, overall, 
averaged 2. 5 per case, equal to that in the state business cases and above 
the 2.25 contained in the two labor sets. 
The pattern of votes continues to indicate that the justices' econom-
ic policy preferences rather than tenets of activism or restraint explain 
their behavior. Excluding Jackson with his single participation, only 
five of the twelve justices whose votes are shown in Table 4.8 supported 
the agencies regardless of whether they were pro- or antibusiness. Four 
of the five are the same ones who supported the NLRB with more than 
half their votes when the NLRB was prounion as well as antiunion: 
Burton, Reed, Minton, and Clark. Brennan joined them in the agency 
business cases. Yet unlike the NLRB cases, in which this group's 
support for the agency was high regardless of whether the NLRB was 
pro- or antiunion, here it was much more equivocal. Thus Clark, 
Minton, Burton, and Brennan varied at least 23 points in support when 
the agencies were probusiness from their percentage of support when 
the agencies were antibusiness. The seven remaining justices occupy 
the poles of the interagreement matrix (Table 4. 7) and show an average 
variance of 58 points between the pro- and antibusiness portions of 
Table 4.8. 
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Table 4.8. Votes on Pro- and Antibusiness Decisions of the Federal 
Agencies Regulatory of Business 
Agency Percentage Agency Percentage 
Justice Probusiness of Support Justice Antibusiness of Support 
Frankfurter 17-2 89 Black 24-2 92 
Harlan 15-2 88 Minton 9-1 90 
Burton 10-2 83 Warren 25-3 89 
Stewart 5-1 83 Brennan 14-2 88 
Whittaker 9-3 75 Clark 23-4 85 
Minton 3-2 60 Douglas 21-7 75 
Brennan 7-6 54 Reed 6-3 67 
Reed 3-3 50 Burton 9-6 60 
Clark 9-9 50 Stewart 4-7 36 
Warren 6-13 32 Frankfurter 10-18 36 
Black 4-15 21 Harlan 8-15 35 
Douglas 2-17 II Whittaker 2-14 13 
Jackson 0-0 Jackson 0-1 0 
When the votes in Table 4.8 are scored for the justices' pro- and 
antibusiness leanings, further evidence emerges that these men 
marched to the beat of their attitudes toward business, rather than those 
pertaining to agency expertise. Douglas, Black, and Warren collec-
tively cast 83 percent of their votes in an antibusiness direction (115 of 
139). If the votes of Brennan and Clark are added, the proportion is 78 
percent (167 of 213). At the conservative extreme, Frankfurter, Whit-
taker, and Harlan collectively voted probusiness with 88 of their 115 
votes (77 percent). The addition of Burton and Stewart raises the total to 
116 of 159 votes (73 percent). Efforts to construct a cumulative scale 
produced a coefficient of reproducibility of only .924. Apparently the 
variety of situational contexts in which the federal commissions regu-
late business precluded formation of a more acceptable scale. Nonethe-
less, Black, Douglas, Warren, Brennan, and Clark ranked most 
antibusiness, and Whittaker, Harlan, Frankfurter, Burton, and Stewart 
demonstrated the most probusiness attitudes. 
A count of opinions shows that Douglas, Frankfurter, and Harlan 
wrote most frequently in these agency business cases. As in all but the 
federal labor cases, Frankfurter disproportionately wrote in dissent. 
Whereas 53 percent of his state business opinions were dissents, as 
were 63 percent of his NLRB opinions, here 76 percent were dissents 
(thirteen of seventeen). He wrote two opinions of the Court, one of 
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which he self-assigned. 22 Unlike the other sets, in which he typically 
self-assigned, Frankfurter assigned four of five to others. 
Compatibly with his behavior in the state business and NLRB 
decisions, Frankfurter had no qualms about writing when he voted in 
derogation of judicial restraint. In the twenty cases in which he voted 
against the agency, he wrote in ten. Conversely, he wrote in only seven 
of the twenty-seven cases in which he supported the agency's action. 
The pattern of Frankfurter's opinions clearly reveals the dominance of 
his economic conservatism. Eight of his ten antiagency opinions oc-
curred when the agency's actions were antibusiness; when he wrote 
upholding the agency, the agency's decisions were invariably pro-
business. Moreover, seven of his antiagency opinions appeared as 
dissents. One anti agency decision appeared as an opinion of the Court 
and two appeared as regular concurrences, in both of which the agency 
had been probusiness. 
In Frankfurter's antiagency opinion of the Court, St. Joe Paper Co. 
v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. (1954), the authority of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to initiate a merger, rather 
than the affected carriers, was at issue. Frankfurter stated that the 
pertinent provision of the Bankruptcy Act incorporated by reference the 
Interstate Commerce Act, which meant that the reorganization must be 
initiated by the merging railroads themselves: "One carrier cannot be 
railroaded [pun intended?] by the Commission into an undesired 
merger with another carrier. "23 The dissenters argued that the case did 
not involve a forced ("cram down") merger at all, inasmuch as none 
could occur without a vote of the debtor railroad's shareholders. 
Frankfurter displaced his rush-to-judgment activism of St. Joe 
Paper with an effort to eat his restraintist cake and have it too in his 
antibusiness antiagency concurrence in Secretary of Agriculture v. 
U.S. (1956). The majority opinion, which Frankfurter joined, held that 
the ICC's order relieving railroads of liability for stated percentages of 
damages suffered by eggs during shipment lacked substantial evidence 
to support it. Frankfurter's concurrence, which none of the majority 
joined, stated that "this Court must stay its hands" when the commis-
sion documents the bases for its orders and that such bases require only 
"such substantiality of proof as is appropriate to the subject matter. "24 
Frankfurter's other concurrence, Phillips Petroleum v. Wisconsin 
(1954 ), which was also antibusiness, was discussed earlier in connec-
tion with his opinion behavior in the state business regulation cases. 
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Because a vote in this case could not simultaneously defer to both the 
state and the federal regulatory commission, an advocate of restraint 
must of necessity overrule one or the other. But Frankfurter managed to 
come as close as possible to deferring to neither the state nor the FPC. 
He emphasized that the type of natural gas sales involved was not 
constitutionally subject to state regulation and overruled the FPC, 
which had held that it had no jurisdiction over the rates in question. 
Frankfurter's rationale conflicted with the plain-meaning rule he used 
to justify his position in Mastro Plastics v. NLRB. Instead, the section 
of the Natural Gas Act which was at issue "is not to be construed on its 
face. It comes to us with an authoritative gloss. We must construe it as 
though Congress had, in words, added to the present text some such 
language as . . . 'the basic purpose of the legislation is to occupy the 
field in which the States may not act.' "25 
Frankfurter's other antiagency opinions all appeared as pro-
business dissents. In SEC v. Drexel & Co. (1955), Burton joined 
Frankfurter in holding that the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) lacked jurisdiction to set fees payable by a parent company in a 
reorganization plan proposed by a subsidiary. The subsidiary's plan 
required the parent to initiate certain proceedings, which were consoli-
dated with the subsidiary's reorganization plan. "But," noted Frank-
furter, "Congress particularized. It did not vest this fee-fixing authority 
of the Commission in a comprehensive provision. It dealt with the 
problem distributively. It was explicit in relating the power to fix fees to 
the particular proceeding." Even though Congress was "duly mindful 
of the abuses of excessive fees in the conduct of inter-company affairs" 
and "effectively equipped the Commission with power to regulate fees 
in the various proceedings which required approval by the Commis-
sion," the act "is a reticulated statute, not a hodgepodge. "26 
In General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky (1956), Burton again joined 
Frankfurter's dissent. The SEC and a shareholder had opposed a 
petition for arrangement of debts under the Bankruptcy Act. The three 
federal courts that heard the matter all upheld the SEC's motion, but 
Frankfurter asserted that the district court, in exercising discretion, 
"was guided by inappropriate standards," which left its discretion 
"without a supporting basis." Why? Because the "usually careful 
district judge" used "a loose generality" rather than "the ratio deciden-
di" of the controlling case. 27 
As in the two preceding cases, only one justice other than Frank-
108 The U.S. Supreme Court 
furter dissented in U.S. v. Storer Broadcasting (1956). Here, however, 
that justice-Harlan-wrote his own opinion. At issue were Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) rules limiting. the number of 
television stations a broadcaster could own. Because Storer had reached 
but not exceeded the limit, Frankfurter held that the broadcaster was not 
an aggrieved party and thus the FCC rules did not apply. Although 
Frankfurter admitted that the case "raises issues on which judges not 
unnaturally divide," nonetheless "procedural and jurisdictional limita-
tions on judicial action by the federal courts are not playthings of 
lawyers nor obstructions on the road of justice." Rather, "they are 
means designed to keep the courts within appropriate limits. "28 Here, 
then, Frankfurter concealed his Jack of deference to the agency by 
referring to the limited decision-making competency of the courts, and 
in contrast to his other antiagency opinions, he arguably did exercise 
restraint. 
As in the preceding case, only Frankfurter and Harlan dissented in 
Denver & Rio Grande Western v. Union Pacific ( 1956), and again each 
wrote separately. The ICC had established through routes for specified 
commodities. Frankfurter viewed the ICC's action as lacking sufficient 
support because the justifications it provided "collide with congres-
sional policy." The ICC's failure to justify its order "by findings that 
support it and by evidence that supports the findings" warrants remand 
to the agency "for clarification and reconsideration" since it is "not our 
duty to find reasons to support the Commission's order. "29 Although 
Frankfurter's willingness to remand to the ICC is more restraint-
oriented than is outright reversal, it does not equate with unequivocal 
affirmance-which is what the majority ordered. 
Any belief, even the most Pollyannaish, that Frankfurter regularly 
exercised restraint should not have survived his opinion in FHA v. The 
Darlington ( 1958). If Frankfurter believed in restraint, he would have 
recognized that silence in this case might have left the gold much Jess 
tarnished. He did, after all, join Harlan's dissent, as did Whittaker. But 
he could not keep his pen in its inkwell. The result was a ringing 
declaration of unconstitutionality, notwithstanding the "very weighty 
presumption of constitutionality that I deem it essential to attribute to 
any Act of Congress." The reason: "the unavoidable application of the 
. . . Act to the Darlington mortgage did substantially impair the 
'vested rights' of respondent. "30 The majority exercised restraint not 
only toward congressional legislation but also toward the dissenters. 
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Douglas's majority opinion could have twisted the knife. Instead he 
merely concluded that "invocation of the Due Process Clause to protect 
the rights asserted here would make the ghost of Lochner v. New York 
walk again. "31 
Frankfurter's remaining pair of antiagency dissents were one-
paragraph words of emphasis to his concurrence in Harlan's dissents in 
Sunray Mid-Continent Oil v. FPC (1960) and Sun Oil v. FPC ( 1960). 
Frankfurter's objection was the one he most frequently used: the agen-
cy's failure to support its decision with reasons therefor. 
Our analysis of patterns of conflict and consensus in non-
unanimous state action and agency cases regulatory of business and 
labor decided during the eight years Felix Frankfurter served on the 
Warren Court shows that the individual justices' substantive economic 
attitudes dominated their behavior32 and that those of like mind acted 
together in conflict with their ideological opponents. As an economic 
conservative, Frankfurter associated most frequently with his fellow 
conservatives in opposition to the liberals and had no reluctance to 
write when his vote opposed agency and state action. Although he 
wrote relatively as often when he voted to uphold the states and 
agencies as when he opposed them (twenty-four versus twenty-six 
times), his twenty-four restraintist opinions applied to only 40 percent 
of his sixty restraintist votes. His twenty-six activist opinions, by 
comparison, applied to 52 percent of his fifty activist votes. Moreover, 
the bulk of his antistate and antiagency opinions appeared as dissents: 
twenty of twenty-six (77 percent). Only ten of his twenty-four prostate 
and proagency opinions appeared as such ( 42 percent). 
As noted, such behavior is exactly what would be expected from a 
genuine spokesman for restraint who believes it necessary to explain 
his activist votes. It is also, however, exactly what would be expected 
from a justice who values his reputation as an advocate of restraint yet, 
in fact, practices restraint only when the state or agency action in 
question favors his personal policy preferences. The analysis of Frank-
furter's votes, along with those of the other justices, clearly shows that 
the latter interpretation of Frankfurter's opinion behavior is by far the 
more correct one-that activism and restraint are means to substantive 
ends rather than palliatives that mute discord and enhance accord. 
Indeed, Frankfurter's voting behavior was far less restraintist than that 
of Minton, Reed, and Clark, all of whom supported NLRB and agency 
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decisions regulatory of business at least half the time regardless of 
whether such decisions were pro- or antiunion or business. Further-
more, that most of Frankfurter's activist votes were in dissent indicates 
that the majority of the justices, in each case, was willing to take a 
position of restraint, whether verbalized or not, which Frankfurter, the 
putative restraintist, was not. 
All this, of course, leaves the question why Frankfurter has retained 
a reputation as an advocate of restraint. Several hypotheses, amenable 
to future research, suggest themselves in answer. First, Frankfurter's 
attachment to restraint antedated his service on the Court, which 
suggests that though Frankfurter verbalized restraint during the 1920s 
and 1930s, he changed his tune after his appointment to the Court in 
1939. Second, Frankfurter grew conservative and more activist with 
age. This hypothesis flies in the face of empirical analyses of his 
service on the Stone and Vinson Courts. 33 Third, the cases selected for 
analysis do not span the waterfront of decisions in which restraint is 
properly operative. Technically, this is true. Previous research has 
identified fifty-two cases that were formally decided during the first 
eight terms of the Warren Court. 34 The bulk of these cases involved the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the doctrine of comity, venue, and 
diversity of citizenship. Frankfurter did indeed exercise restraint in 
these areas, but these cases bear little relationship to any underlying 
consideration other than the propriety of the Supreme Court's resolu-
tion of the controversy. Furthermore, among these sets only the comity 
cases connect as closely with the heart of restraint as cases involving 
economic state action and administrative agency activity. That Frank-
furter voted in a restrained fashion in the judicial power universe does 
not gainsay his activism in the cases we have analyzed. 
A fourth hypothesis would involve Frankfurter's reputation for 
restraint based on his opinions for the Court. Our analysis provides 
some support for this allegation. Including his judgment of the Court, 
Frankfurter wrote ten majority opinions upholding the states and feder-
al regulatory commissions, as opposed to three that did not. Yet if an 
exclusive focus on majority opinions explains Frankfurter's reputation, 
what does this say about the scholarship of those who have so sharply 
limited their focus? No matter how strongly one advocates restraint, 
that a reputable scholar would identity a justice with his own personal 
policy preferences based solely on majority opinions passes credulity. 35 
Another hypothesis would be that after his appointment to the Court, 
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Frankfurter could no more claim to be an advocate of restraint than any 
of his colleagues. As ArthurS. Miller has pointed out: "All judges are 
'result-oriented'; so, too, are all commentators upon the work of the 
judiciary. "36 That some analysts dress Frankfurter in the mantle of 
judicial restraint is their problem, not Frankfurter's. His propensity to 
write in dissent against the states and federal regulatory commissions 
supports this hypothesis, especially when his opinion-writing is cou-
pled with his staunchly probusiness and antilabor voting record. Frank-
furter deferred no more blindly than any of his colleagues. When a 
result of which a justice approves can be rationalized by invocation of 
restraint, the justice will do so-a Douglas, Black, or Warren no less 
than a Frankfurter, Harlan, or Whittaker. But when restraint does not fit 
the desired result, the cloak remains in the closet in preference to those 
that better conceal the nakedness of the justice's policy preferences. 37 
A final hypothesis suggests that Frankfurter's reputation for re-
straint results from his pre-Court reputation, which he maintained 
during his justiceship by peppering his opinions with references thereto 
at every opportunity. In short, Frankfurter was typecast when he took his 
seat on the Court; accordingly, observers in general, and votaries in 
particular, recognized only the pepper of Frankfurter's restraint while 
remaining senseless to the salt of his activism. Our analysis of the 
contents of Frankfurter's activist opinions indicates the use of restraint 
rhetoric to cloak his activism; however, by no means did he do so with 
any regularity. Whether, in fact, Frankfurter relied on canons of restraint 
to justify his votes with greater frequency than did his colleagues 
requires content analysis of the justices' opinions-an enterprise far 
beyond the scope of this work. Two points may be noted in this regard, 
however. First, during Frankfurter's tenure on the Court most state and 
federal agency business regulation reviewed by the Court was econom-
ically liberal, even though the comparable labor regulation appears not 
to have been. But because business regulation occurred more often than 
that involving labor unions, it is plausible that restraint could be used 
more readily by liberal justices than by those who were economic 
conservatives, such as Frankfurter. Second, as detailed, Frankfurter had 
no compunction about voting in an activist fashion and coupling these 
votes with dissenting opinions. 
Whatever the explanation, our analysis of Frankfurter's record 
reveals him to be nothing more nor less than a stalwart economic 
conservative who used judicial restraint and activism with equal facili-
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ty. When restraint supported his and his conservative colleagues' policy 
preferences, he used it; when it did not, activism suited him just as well. 
These conclusions, in short, clearly emerge both from our examination 
of conflictual and consensual voting patterns and from our survey of 
Frankfurter's opinion behavior. 
As for future research, Felix Frankfurter's failure to abide by the 
canons of restraint necessarily did violence to the role his votaries 
ascribed to him. But whether this discrepancy between his alleged role 
and his actual behavior acerbated conflict with his colleagues remains 
an unanswered question. So also does consideration of whether ac-
tivism or restraint needs necessarily provoke conflict. An examination 
of their use by justices on other Courts or an analysis of activism and 
restraint by justices such as Clark, Reed, and Minton, whose voting 
behavior manifested greater restraint than that of their colleagues, may 
provide an answer. 
We wish to thank ArthurS. Miller, Professor Emeritus of Law, George Wash-
ington University, and Stuart H. Teger, Esq., of Detroit, for their suggestions and 
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Factors Affecting Variation 
in Rates of Dissent in the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals 
DONALD R. SONGER 
Nonunanimous decisions of collegial courts have been a frequent focus 
of research in political science for more than three decades. The public 
expression of dissent has been taken as an objective indicator that 
legitimate decisional alternatives were open to the judges. Decisions 
with dissent have therefore been viewed as appropriate data with which 
to test the influence of judicial attitudes, values, and role orientations 
on case outcomes. The level of dissent has also frequently been used as 
an objective indicator of the extent of conflict and consensus in a court. 
Although unanimous decisions are not necessarily devoid of internal 
conflict nor lacking in legitimate decisional alternatives, most be-
havioral research on the courts has confined its analysis to decisions 
containing dissent. I 
This chapter explores conflict and consensus in the United States 
courts of appeals. A first step will be to describe the variations in the 
level of dissent among circuits, changes in the rate of dissent over time, 
and differences in the rate of dissent between two major issue areas. 
After describing the extent of variation, several hypotheses concerning 
factors that often are believed to affect the level of dissent will be 
examined. No attempt is made to explore factors related to the tendency 
of individual judges to dissent. 
The data consist of 6,618 cases with full opinions (including per 
curiams) published in the Federal Reporter for the years 1953 through 
1975. A random sample consisting of 150 criminal cases and 150 labor 
relations cases per year was selected. 2 For years in which fewer than 150 
labor cases were published with full opinions, all labor cases were 
included. The cases used in analysis are part of a larger data set 
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Table 5 .1. Changes in Dissent Rate in Two Issue Areas, 
1953-1975 
Percentage of Nonunanimous Decisions 
Year Criminal Labor Relations 
1953 8.7 6.7 
1954 7.5 7.2 
1955 3.8 4.9 
1956 9.3 10.7 
1957 7.3 6.4 
1958 8.0 11.1 
1959 8.0 9.1 
1960 4.7 10.5 
1961 7.3 6.9 
1962 6.7 6.3 
1963 6.1 7.8 
1964 6.0 8.8 
1965 8.7 10.0 
1966 4.7 8.0 
1967 4.7 12.0 
1968 8.7 5.0 
1969 5.5 7.4 
1970 9.5 11.5 
1971 6.7 13.7 
1972 3.3 8.5 
1973 4.0 7.0 
1974 8.7 7.3 
1975 13.4 2.7 
Mean 7.0 8.3 
Standard deviation 2.28 2.45 
collected for a study on judicial impact which is still in progress. 
Although the particular twenty-three-year period selected was deter-
mined by the needs of the impact analysis, the existence of data 
covering such an extended period made it possible in the present study 
to explore changes over time in dissent in the courts of appeals. 
VARIATION IN RATES OF DISSENT 
To begin the description of dissent in the United States courts of 
appeals, the rate of dissent has been computed separately for each issue 
area in each of the twenty-three years of the period subjected to analysis. 
The data are presented in Table 5 .1. Throughout the period from 1953 
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Table 5.2. Dissent Rates by Circuit in Two Issue Areas 
Percentage of Nonunanimous Decisions 
Circuit Criminal Labor Relations 
I 6. I 2.4 
2 6.8 11.6 
3 7.0 7.8 
4 6.9 12. I 
5 5.6 6.9 
6 7.7 8.8 
7 6.8 10.4 
8 3.1 3.9 
9 5.7 5.4 
10 2.7 5.4 
DC 21.1 16.9 
Mean 7.2 8.3 
Standard deviation 4.6 4.0 
to 1975 the dissent rate has remained low compared to that of the 
Supreme Court for the same period. Moreover, differences between the 
two issue areas are modest. The mean dissent rate for criminal cases 
was found to be 7.0 percent and that for labor relations cases was 8.3 
percent. Within each issue area, however, there was substantial fluctua-
tion over time. The dissent rate for criminal cases reached a high of 13.4 
percent in 1975 and a low of 3.3 percent in 1972. The dissent rate for 
labor relations cases varied from 13.7 percent in 1971 to 2. 7 percent in 
1975. 
There has, however, been no consistent linear trend over time. This 
absence of a secular trend is in striking contrast to the findings of a 
considerable growth in the level of dissent for state supreme courts 
reported in Chapter 9 of this volume by Henry R. Glick and George W. 
Pruet, Jr. 
Substantial variation in the rate of dissent also exists among the 
eleven circuits of the courts of appeals, as shown in Table 5.2. The 
pattern of variation among the circuits over the twenty-three-year 
period is noticeably different for the two issue areas. For criminal 
appeals, the District of Columbia Circuit stands in marked contrast to 
all the other circuits. Its 21 . 1 percent rate of dissent was nearly three 
times that of the Sixth Circuit, which had the second highest level of 
dissent (7. 7 percent). 
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In contrast, there was considerably more variation throughout all 
the circuits for labor relations cases. Although the District of Columbia 
still exhibited the highest rate of dissent (16.9 percent), three other 
circuits (the second, fourth, and seventh) had dissent rates above 10 
percent. The difference between the patterns in the two issue areas is 
highlighted by observation of the effect of the District of Columbia 
Circuit on the standard deviation for each. When all eleven circuits are 
included in the analysis, variation as measured by the standard devia-
tion is higher for criminal cases than for labor cases ( 4. 6 as compared to 
4.0). When only the ten numbered circuits are compared, however, the 
standard deviation for criminal cases drops dramatically to 1.6 and the 
standard deviation for labor cases declines only modestly to 3 .1. 
FACTORS AFFECTING DISSENT 
Over the years an extensive literature on American appellate courts has 
provided many explanations of the causes of dissent and factors related 
to its incidence. In his recent summary of this literature, Steven A. 
Peterson has identified twenty separate propositions relating to the 
causes of dissent, but he suggests that very few have been convincingly 
confirmed. 3 Because a disproportionate share of the tests of these 
propositions is limited to the Supreme Court, explorations of the causes 
of dissent in other bodies is needed. 
In an attempt to meet this need identified by Peterson, ten general 
hypotheses were tested with the data from the courts of appeals. 
Organization of the discussion of these hypotheses follows three cate-
gories suggested by Peterson: the influence on dissent of the legal 
culture, organizational and institutional factors, and the sociopolitical 
system. When possible, each hypothesis was stated in a manner con-
gruent with Peterson's propositional inventory, although he does not 
always state his hypotheses in a manner that is easily tested. Each of the 
hypotheses was tested separately for the sample of criminal cases and 
labor cases. For several of the general hypotheses, two or more methods 
of operationalization were employed so that a total of thirty-four sepa-
rate tests of the causes of dissent are presented. 
LEGAL CULTURE AS AN INFLUENCE OF DISSENT 
Although the traditionalists' assumption that judicial outcomes could 
be explained almost entirely by a proper understanding of precedent 
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and other legal influences has long since been discredited by the 
research of legal realists and behavioralists, few would go so far as to 
say that legal considerations are irrelevant to judicial decisions. 
Richard J. Richardson and Kenneth N. Vines argue that the behavior of 
lower federal courts can best be conceptualized as the result of pres-
sures emanating from two sources, which they identify as the "legal 
subculture" and the "democratic subculture." The legal subculture 
includes rules and norms governing the judicial process and the be-
havior of judicial actors. Important examples would be the expectation 
that judges remain insulated from political pressures and interests and 
that great weight be accorded legal precedent in judicial decision 
making. 4 Peterson reports that a number of researchers have concluded 
that legal factors relating to the nature of the cases and decisions are 
related to the occurrence of dissent. 5 
Hypothesis 1: Difficult questions of law produce more dissent. Since 
the courts of appeals lack the control of their dockets possessed by 
many supreme courts, they handle a large volume of routine litigation. 
J. Woodford Howard views the magnitude of the routine litigation in the 
courts of appeals as a major factor in depressing dissent. 6 Similarly, 
Joel B. Grossman and RichardS. Wells argue and Stephen C. Halpern 
and Kenneth Vines present findings that the Judiciary Act of 1925, 
which enlarged the Supreme Court's discretionary jurisdiction, was an 
important reason for the increasing dissent in the Court. Peterson 
reports that although there has been no definitive test of this proposi-
tion, some indirect support for it may be found in statements by the 
justices. 7 
An empirical test of this hypothesis is complicated by the absence 
of any way to determine unambiguously which cases "objectively" 
contain more "difficult questions of law." In light of this problem, 
several categories of cases were examined which might reasonably be 
suspected of containing a greater proportion of cases with complex 
legal questions than other cases. If "tough questions of law" do produce 
more dissent, one could expect the rate of dissent in these categories to 
be significantly higher than in cases not in the category. 
Attention first centered on the effects of the Criminal Justice Act of 
1964. A significant reform embodied in this legislation was the provi-
sion for the first time of free counsel to indigent defendants on their first 
appeal from the conviction of any felony. Such a reform might reason-
ably be expected to increase the number of frivolous criminal appeals to 
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the courts of appeals because indigent defendants would often have 
nothing to lose from appeal. Hypothesis 1 would then lead to the 
prediction that the rate of dissent on criminal appeals would be higher 
before than after 1964. 
The data employed in this first test provide no support for the 
hypothesis. No significant differences were found between the rate of 
dissent for criminal appeals in the periods before and after 1964. In fact, 
there is a very slight difference in the opposite direction (7. 19 percent 
for the later period compared to 7.02 percent for the pre-1964 cases). 
The results are essentially unaffected if only the period immediately 
before and after 1964 (using either a two- or four-year interval) is 
examined. One may therefore safely conclude that the 1964 Criminal 
Justice Act had no effect on the dissent rate for criminal appeals. 
The history of a case subsequent to decision by the courts of 
appeals may provide additional indicators of the difficulty of the legal 
questions involved. Although several factors probably enter into any 
calculation over the decision of whether to seek appellate review, it is 
reasonable to assume that one important consideration is the evaluation 
by the potential appellant's attorneys of the merits of their legal argu-
ment. If they believe the appeals court decision turned on a close or 
difficult question of law, they are more likely to be encouraged to seek 
Supreme Court review than if they believe their position lacks substan-
tial legal merit. If the first hypothesis is valid, it would therefore be 
expected that the rate of dissent would be substantially higher in cases 
in which the losing party sought Supreme Court review than in cases in 
which no review was sought. 
A similar logic would suggest a further test. Within the subset of 
cases in which review was sought, it might be reasoned that the 
Supreme Court would be more likely to accept for review those cases 
presenting difficult questions of law. Therefore, a higher rate of dissent 
would be expected in cases accepted for review than in those in which 
review was denied. The data to test these propositions are presented in 
Table 5.3. 
When each of these two methods is applied separately to labor 
relations and criminal appeals, four tests of Hypothesis 1 are obtained. 
In all four of the tests, the results are in the predicted direction. Rates of 
dissent are higher for cases in which Supreme Court review was sought 
than for those in which no review was sought, and decisions actually 
reviewed by the Supreme Court had more dissent in the courts of 
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Table 5. 3. Dissent Rates for Cases Classified according to History 
after Court of Appeals Decision 
Criminal Labor 
Supreme Court Appeals Court Vote Dissent Appeals Court Vote Dissent 
Review Sought Unanimous Divided Rate Unanimous Divided Rate 
No 1,906 126 6.2% 2,337 174 6.9% 
Yes 1,299 115 8.1% 574 91 13.7% 
xz= 4.71, p ( .05 xZ = 32.42, p ( .001 
gamma= .14 gamma= .36 
Supreme Court 
Review 
Denied 1,240 92 6.9% 533 80 13.1% 
Granted 59 23 28.0% 41 II 21.2% 
xz = 32.44, p ( .001 x2 = 2.86, ns 
gamma= .68 
appeals than those denied review. In three of the four tests the dif-
ferences reach generally accepted levels of statistical significance. 
There is considerable variation among the four tests in the magnitude of 
the effects with the difference between criminal cases granted and 
denied review exhibiting the strongest relationship (gamma = .68). 
Although these results provide moderately strong support for the 
hypothesis that dissent is more likely in cases containing difficult legal 
questions, one caveat is in order. Previous studies have shown that the 
Supreme Court is more likely to review cases whose decisions involved 
dissent below. 8 Moreover, it is possible that the decision to seek review 
is encouraged by the presence of dissent regardless of the nature of the 
legal issues involved. Caution should be used in interpreting the tests of 
Hypothesis 1 because of the possibility that the indicators of difficult 
questions employed may not be truly independent. 
Hypothesis 2: Overturning precedent is associated with increased 
dissent. This second hypothesis is closely related to the first. A case 
involving the straightforward application of clear precedent is likely to 
be considered an "easy" question of law, which will result in a con-
sensual decision. In contrast, to overturn established precedent, given 
the weight the legal culture places on the importance of stare decisis, 
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would seem to create a difficult problem for judges. 9 To date, this 
hypothesis has not been tested for judges on the courts of appeals, 
though there is some support in studies of Supreme Court voting. For 
example, Howard Ball concludes from a study of cases in which the 
Supreme Court overturned precedent that supporters of the earlier 
decisions were most likely to dissent. Similarly, John R. Schmidhauser 
concludes that the typical dissenter "has been a tenacious advocate of 
traditional legal doctrines which were being abandoned during his 
tenure." 10 
It would appear to be impossible to test the application of this 
hypothesis to the courts of appeals with the method scholars have 
applied to the Supreme Court. Judges of the courts of appeals will 
rarely admit to overturning Supreme Court precedent directly. Applica-
tion of many precedents to specific fact situations that are not identical 
to the facts of the precedent-setting case, however, often contains some 
ambiguity. Judges who wish to reach a result contrary to that implied by 
the precedent may do so by distinguishing the case at hand from the 
apparent precedent. 
Given the difficulty of classifying decisions according to whether 
they were consistent in a legal sense with Supreme Court precedent, 
decisions were instead classified according to whether they were con-
sistent with the current decisional trends of the Supreme Court. To 
determine these trends, all criminal cases with full opinions in the 
twenty-three-year period studied were classified according to whether 
they were pro- or antidefendant. The percentage of prodefendant deci-
sions for each year was then calculated. An appeals court decision was 
classified as consistent with the decisional trend of the Supreme Court 
if the direction of the decision was the same as the majority of decisions 
of the Supreme Court. In a similar manner, all labor relations cases 
were classified as being pro- or antimanagement. 11 
The operationalized hypothesis tested was that the rate of dissent 
would be higher for decisions in which the outcome was contrary to the 
decisional trends of the Supreme Court. The findings, however, pro-
vided no support for the hypothesis. In each period, the dissent rate in 
labor relations cases was higher when the court of appeals made a 
promanagement decision regardless of the decisional trend of the 
Supreme Court. For criminal cases, the dissent rate was consistently 
higher for prodefendant decisions regardless of the decisional trends of 
the Supreme Court. 
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These results may have been affected by the high proportion of 
consensual decisions involving clear-cut precedent. I have shown else-
where that unanimous affirmances by the courts of appeals are likely to 
be such cases and that a significant proportion of reversals contain a 
choice situation that permits judicial preferences to determine the 
outcome. 12 The analysis was therefore repeated with only those deci-
sions in which the courts of appeals reversed the district court or the 
NLRB. The results were the same: no support was found for the 
hypothesis. 
ORGANIZATIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS 
Peterson argues that in the courts, as in other bodies, decision making 
is constrained by the organization's structure and norms. 13 It is there-
fore probable that organizational factors affect dissent. 
Hypothesis 3: The greater the workload, the less the dissent. Howard 
reports that the judges he interviewed from three circuits of the courts of 
appeals regarded heavy caseloads as the chief depressant of dissent. 
Writing dissenting opinions is a time-consuming process that is likely 
to interfere with other tasks for a judge struggling to keep up with a 
heavy caseload. Consequently, Kenneth C. Haas argues that heavy 
caseloads produce pressure to reach accommodations that will preserve 
unanimity. 14 
To test this hypothesis the number of cases filed per judge was 
computed for each circuit for each of the twenty-three years in the 
period analyzed. 15 The hypothesis was then tested by examining the 
relationship between the dissent rate for each year and the mean 
caseload per judge for the same year. The Pearson product-moment 
correlation between the dissent rate and the mean caseload per year was 
computed separately for each issue area. For criminal cases the correla-
tion was r = . 23. For labor relations cases the correlation was r = . 20. 
Neither of these values for r approaches traditional standards of statis-
tical significance. Therefore it may be concluded that increases in the 
case load of appeals court judges over time do not appear to have had a 
significant impact on the dissent rate. 16 
The increase in the caseload per judge over the period studied has 
been dramatic. During the 1950s the mean case load fluctuated between 
50 and 57, but starting in 1962 it increased every year in an almost 
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linear manner until it reached 172 filings per judge in 1975. But during 
this time, the dissent rate experienced only minor, apparently random, 
fluctuations. 
Workload was equally ineffective in explaining variation in dissent 
rate between the circuits. In each of the four time periods used in the 
analysis, the average caseload per judge for the circuit had no statis-
tically significant relationship to variation in dissent rate per circuit. It 
therefore appears safe to reject the notion advanced by the appeals court 
judges themselves that heavy workloads are a major depressant of 
dissent. 
Hypothesis 4: The greater the diversity of background characteristics 
among judges on a court, the higher will be the dissent rate. A number 
of studies have investigated the thesis suggested by John W. Patterson 
and Gregory J. Rathjen that a court consisting of members with similar 
backgrounds may be expected to produce less internal conflict than one 
composed of members from different backgrounds. 17 No consensus 
exists, however, on which characteristics are most important in this 
regard. The analysis below tests this hypothesis by examining the 
effects of heterogeneity of party affiliation, ideology, and the presence 
or absence of a district court judge on the panel. Separate tests were 
conducted for each of the two issue areas. 
Two studies of state supreme courts have concluded that courts with 
diverse party memberships have higher rates of dissent than those 
composed solely of members of the same party. Dean Jaros and Bradley 
C. Canon found a correlation of r = .20 between party heterogeneity 
and frequency of dissent. In contrast, Patterson and Rathjen, using a 
slightly different methodology, found party heterogeneity, with a cor-
relation of r = .46, to be more strongly related to dissent rate than any 
of the other nine variables tested. 18 
Examining ideological heterogeneity, Burton M. Atkins found that 
every member of the District of Columbia Circuit was more likely to 
dissent when placed on a panel with members of a different voting bloc 
than when all three panel members were of the same bloc. 19 Although 
Atkins did not directly examine the dissent rate of panels, his findings 
for individual behavior are consistent with the hypothesis being ex-
plored. 
There is little support in the literature, however, for the proposition 
that increasing the heterogeneity of an appeals court panel by including 
a district judge sitting by designation produces more dissent. Justin J. 
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Table 5.4. Diversity in Panel Composition and Rate of Dissent 
Labor Cases Criminal Cases 
Appeals Court Vote Appeals Court Vote 
Panel Dissent Dissent 
Composition Unanimous Divided Rate Unanimous Divided Rate 
Political Party 
Same 353 52 14.2% 321 39 10.1% 
Diverse 713 I I I 13.5% 602 99 1:?.9% 
x2 = 0.09, ns x2 = 0.99, ns 
Ideology 
Same 294 23 7.3% 255 18 6.6% 
Diverse 767 140 15.4% 655 107 14.0% 
x2 = 12.37, p ( .001 x2 = 10.54, p ( .01 
gamma= .40 gamma= .40 








judges 348 44 11.2% 432 36 7.7% 
x2 = 4.57, p ( .05 x2 = 0.34, ns 
gamma= .19 
Green and Burton Atkins found that when district judges sit by desig-
nation on appeals court panels, they file only one-fourth of the expected 
number of dissents based upon the frequency with which they sit on 
panels. Ninth Circuit judges interviewed by Stephen L. Wasby also 
seem to reject the hypothesis by maintaining that district court judges 
did not contribute to inconsistency in the circuit more than did circuit 
judges.20 
Six tests of Hypothesis 4 are presented in Table 5.4. In each of the 
two issue areas the effects of heterogeneity on dissent are separately 
tested for each of the three characteristics discussed above. Only those 
decisions in which the characteristics of all three panel members could 
be determined were included in the analysis. 21 
The strongest support for the hypothesis comes from the analysis of 
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diversity in regard to policy views. 22 For both criminal and labor 
relations cases, panels whose membership reflected diverse policy 
positions had a dissent rate more than twice as high as the rate for more 
homogeneous panels. Both of the relationships meet the conventional 
standards of statistical significance. Similar results were obtained when 
the analysis was repeated for different portions of the twenty-three-year 
time period studied. 
The most surprising result was the finding that there was no 
significant relationship between diversity in party membership and the 
rate of dissent. In fact, for labor cases a slightly higher rate of dissent 
was recorded for panels composed entirely of members of the same 
party (particularly if all three were Democrats). One possible explana-
tion for this absence of effect may be provided by the Patterson and 
Rathjen study of state supreme courts. 23 They found that heterogeneity 
in regard to political factors had the greatest effect on dissent rates 
when the state supreme court was elective rather than appointive and 
when it was a third-level rather than a second-level court. Moreover, 
political factors explained less variance for single dissents than for 
multiple dissents. Because courts of appeals are second-level courts 
with appointive panels and only single dissents, all three criteria would 
lead to the prediction that diversity of party membership would have a 
reduced impact on dissent rates. 
The test involving the presence of a district court judge produced 
mixed results. For labor relations cases there was a modest, statistically 
significant relationship in the predicted direction. The magnitude of the 
effect (gamma = . 19), however, was only half that produced by 
diversity in policy views (gamma = .40). For criminal cases, although 
there was a very slight relationship in the predicted direction, it was 
statistically insignificant. 
Hypothesis 5: Intercourt relations affect the manifestations of dissent. 
Courts of appeals are inescapably bound within a judicial system in 
which they interact in significant ways with courts both above and 
below. The possibility exists that the nature of their relations with other 
courts will have a significant impact on conflict within their own 
panels. 
Two distinct tests were employed. Richardson and Vines argue that 
"dissent on the circuit court is primarily a function of the reversal of 
lower court decisions. "24 Most dissenting judges expressed support for 
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Table 5.5. Dissent Rates in Appeals Court Decisions Affirming and 
Reversing Decisions Below 
Criminal 
Appeals Court Dissent 
Decision Unanimous Divided Rate 
Affirm 
Reverse 
2,545 138 5.1% 
569 91 13.8% 




Unanimous Divided Rate 
1,775 123 6.4% 
841 115 12.0% 
x2 = 25.16, p ( .001 
gamma = .33 
a district judge being reversed, thus reducing the loneliness of dissent. 
On the three circuits studied by Richardson and Vines, the dissent rate 
for reversals was as much as six times the rate found in decisions 
affirming the district court. The data in the present study permitted a 
test of the Richardson and Vines thesis for all eleven circuits. The data 
are displayed in Table 5.5. 
The analysis of both criminal and labor cases provides strong 
support for the hypothesis. 25 Although the magnitude of the differences 
in dissent rates between reversals and affirmances does not reach the 
levels discovered by Richardson and Vines for civil liberties cases, the 
differences are both substantial and statistically significant. The larger 
differences are found in criminal appeals, with a 13.8 percent dissent 
rate in reversals compared to a 5. 1 percent rate for affirmances. The 
higher rate of dissent for reversals was manifested in every circuit 
except the seventh. 
The nature of the relationship between the courts of appeals and the 
Supreme Court may also have significance for conflict in the circuits. It 
was hypothesized that sharp changes in policy by the Supreme Court 
would tend to upset established relationships on the courts of appeals. 
The proportion of prodefendant and promanagement decisions of the 
Supreme Court changed significantly in 1970. The proportion of pro-
management decisions jumped from zero in 1969 to 40 percent in 
1970. The proportion of prodefendant decisions declined from 79 
percent in 1968 to 63 percent in 1969 and then fell to 50 percent in 
1970. As indicated above, these new decisional trends remained rela-
tively stable for the remaining five years included in the present data 
set. Such a change was hypothesized to lead to an increase in the rate of 
130 The U.S. Courts of Appeals 
dissent in the courts of appeals. When all cases in the twenty-three-year 
period studied are included in analysis, there are no significant dif-
ferences in the dissent rates before and after the Supreme Court policy 
change, although it might be argued that any increase in the dissent rate 
would be only temporary during a period of adjustment. The data 
provide some support for this interpretation. For labor cases, the dissent 
rate in the two years before the Supreme Court policy shift was only 
6.51 percent. In the two years following the shift it soared to 12.5 
percent (significant at the .05 level). For criminal cases the change in 
the dissent rate is in the predicted direction but is not statistically 
significant. If only reversals (in which, as noted above, appeals court 
judges appear to have greater discretion) are included in the analysis, 
the changes are more dramatic. For reversals of labor decisions the 
dissent rate increased from 8.6 percent to 20.8 percent in the two years 
after the policy shift by the Supreme Court. For criminal appeals the 
dissent rate increased from 9.1 percent to 16.9 percent. 
Overall it may be concluded that there is substantial support for 
Hypothesis 5. Both reversals of district court decisions and policy 
changes by the Supreme Court increased the rates of dissent in the 
courts of appeals. 
Hypothesis 6: There will be fewer dissents in threat situations. Studies 
of the effect of external threat on coalition formation have been limited 
to the Supreme Court. Peterson concludes from an analysis of the 
literature that the evidence on the impact of threat situations on dissent 
is mixed. 26 Part of the dispute in the literature revolves around the 
proper definition of a threat situation. Consequently, no consensus 
exists on the designation of the periods of time in which the courts faced 
serious external threats. 
Because of this lack of consensus, three separate tests of the 
hypothesis were performed. Each test examined the dissent rate in time 
periods characterized by a prominent scholar as involving a threat 
situation for the Supreme Court and compared them to the dissent rate 
in nonthreat periods. Stuart Nagel's study of "court-curbing" periods 
includes one such period (1955-59) in the time frame covered by the 
present study. David W. Rohde and Harold J. Spaeth identify the two 
periods involving the greatest threat to the Supreme Court's power as 
1958 and 1968. Washy argues that in general the period ofthe Burger 
Court was marked by a relative absence of threat compared to the 
Warren Court years. 27 
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For the first test, the years 1955-59 (threat) were compared first to 
all other years studied and then to 1953-54 plus 1960-62 (the five 
nonthreat years closest to the five threat years). In the second test, the 
years 1958 and 1968 (threat) were compared to all other years and to the 
two years on either side of the threat years. For the third test, the years 
1954-68 (threat) were compared to 1969-75. 
For all three tests, performed separately for each issue, the results 
were the same. No significant differences were found between the 
dissent rates in threat and nonthreat periods. Although no support was 
found for the hypothesis, it is probably not fair to say that the data 
convincingly refute the hypothesis. Although there is some reason to 
suspect that external threats to the Supreme Court may imply threats to 
the lower federal courts, there is no firm evidence to date that estab-
lishes this connection. 
SOCIO-POLITICAL SYSTEM 
AS AN INFLUENCE ON DISSENT 
The effects of a wide variety of social, economic, and political charac-
teristics of decision making at all levels in the federal system have been 
conclusively demonstrated in numerous studies. It is therefore reason-
able to expect that the social and political context within which judges 
find themselves will have an influence on significant aspects of their 
decision making. 
Hypothesis 7: Urbanization is associated with increased dissent levels. 
Urbanization is one of a number of environmental factors associated 
with increased social and political complexity. Consequently, urbaniza-
tion can be expected to produce the conditions that lead to increased 
demands and conflict in the larger political system, which in turn might 
be expected to lead to increased legal conflict. It is not surprising 
therefore that a number of studies have discovered an association 
between urbanism and dissent rates on state supreme courts. 28 
To test the applicability of this hypothesis to variations in the rate of 
dissent among circuits, an index of urbanism for each circuit had to be 
constructed. First, census data on the proportion of each state's popula-
tion living in urban areas was obtained for each state in a given circuit. 
This percentage was multiplied by the number of nonsenior circuit 
judges from that state, and the sum of these scores from each state was 
divided by the number of nonsenior judges in the circuit. 
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Separate indices were computed from 1960 and 1970 census data 
and were compared to circuit dissent rates for the six-year period, 
which included the census year. Each issue area was thus subjected to 
two tests of the hypothesis. Pearson product-moment correlations were 
then computed between each circuit's index of urbanism and its rate of 
dissent for the six-year period. 
The results provide strong support for the hypothesis. For each of 
the two issues in each of the two time periods there was a strong 
relationship between high levels of urbanization and high rates of 
dissent. For labor cases the correlations were r = . 89 with 1960 census 
data and r = . 87 with 1970 data. For criminal appeals the results were r 
= . 88 for 1960 data and r = . 87 for 1970 data. In each of the four tests, 
more than three-fourths of the variation in dissent rates among circuits 
is explained by differences in urbanization. Thus on the courts of 
appeals as in state supreme courts, urbanization appears to be associ-
ated with conditions that result in increased judicial conflict. 
Hypothesis 8: Changing societal values are associated with increased 
levels of dissent. It has often been argued that conflict on courts mirrors 
conflicts that divide society at large. Consequently, Nagel has sug-
gested that high dissent rates on the Supreme Court coincide with times 
of considerable societal conflict. Grossman and Wells concur. They 
suggest that public expression of dissent seems "more appropriate in a 
period of great political and social change. "29 Although these con-
clusions are based on observation of Supreme Court behavior, their 
logic should be applicable to the courts of appeals as well. 
Perhaps the clearest public manifestation of changing societal 
values (at least in the two issue areas included in the present study) 
during the period examined was the 1968 presidential election. Nixon 
campaigned forcefully on the need to reverse the criminal procedure 
decisions of the Warren Court, and his theme apparently struck a 
responsive chord in a large portion of the public. The hypothesis would 
therefore lead to the prediction that the rate of dissent on criminal 
appeals would be high either in the period immediately before and/or 
after the 1968 election. The data, however, provide no support for the 
hypothesis. In the two years preceding the election the dissent rate was 
6. 7 percent and in the two years following the election it was 7.5 
percent. Neither rate is significantly different from the 7. 0 rate for the 
entire twenty-three-year period. Similar results are obtained using 
three- and four-year periods. 
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The 1950s are popularly viewed as a period of relative calm 
preceding widespread social upheaval in the 1960s. The hypothesis 
thus leads to the prediction that rates of dissent would have been lower 
in the 1950s. The data again provide no support for the hypothesis. For 
criminal appeals the dissent rate was marginally higher in the 1950s 
than in the 1960s (7 .5 percent versus 6.3 percent). For labor cases the 
results are in the predicted direction, but the difference is trivial (8.1 
percent versus 8.2 percent). Hypothesis 8 is therefore not supported. 
Hypothesis 9: Cases raising constitutional issues are more likely to 
produce dissent than those decided on nonconstitutional grounds. This 
hypothesis is related to the preceding one because constitutional issues 
are more likely to be important and to attract widespread public notice 
and generate societal conflict. Moreover, judges may be more likely to 
express publicly their disagreements with the majority position on such 
important issues than on issues of relatively minor significance. 
Howard reports that no judge is expected to compromise on important 
principles, but when the disputed point will make little real difference, 
many judges are inclined to go along with the majority. 30 
It proved impossible to test this hypothesis with data from labor 
relations cases. By the 1950s too few labor cases reaching the courts of 
appeals raised constitutional questions to make analysis meaningful. 
In 44 percent of the criminal cases examined, however, one or more 
constitutional issues were discussed in the opinion of the court. 
The data in Table 5.6 provide some support for the hypothesis. 
Although the relationship is relatively weak (gamma = .16), it is in the 
predicted direction and does reach generally accepted standards of 
statistical significance. 
Hypothesis 10: The policy direction of a court's decision is related to 
the incidence of dissent. The leading work to examine this question is 
the Richardson and Vines study of three courts of appeals during the 
1960s. They found that on two of the three circuits, dissent in civil 
liberties cases was usually an expression of nonlibertarianism. 31 In 
contrast, dissent in labor cases was found to be more often in a pro labor 
direction. A test of these conclusions with data from all eleven circuits 
is provided in Table 5.7. 
The data in Table 5. 7 provide strong confirmation of the 
Richardson and Vines thesis. Dissents in criminal cases are much more 
likely to occur when a court makes what is usually labeled a "liberal" 
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Table 5.6. Dissent Rates for Criminal Appeals Decisions in Appeals 
















Table 5. 7. Dissent Rates for Different Policy Positions Supported by 
Appeals Court Decisions 
Criminal Labor 
Unani- Dissent Unani- Dissent 
Decision mous Divided Rate Decision mous Divided Rate 
Prodefendant 569 89 13.5% Promanagement 1,059 120 10.2% 
Antidefendant 2,543 140 5.2% Antimanagement 1,563 112 6.7% 
x2 = 57.48, p ( .001 x2 = 11.14,p ( .001 
gamma= -.48 gamma= -.48 
(i.e., prodefendant) decision whereas in labor cases dissents occur 
more frequently from a "conservative" (i.e., promanagement) decision. 
The difference in dissent rates in criminal appeals ( 13.5 percent versus 
5.2 percent) is particularly striking and represents one of the strongest 
relationships discovered in the present study. But it is not immediately 
apparent why liberals and conservatives should have different rates of 
dissent in different issue areas. Additional research would be helpful to 
clarify this point and to compare these results to analysis based on other 
issue areas and other courts. 
This chapter has examined variation in the rates of dissent in all 
eleven United States courts of appeals. 32 Most previous studies of 
dissent have concentrated on the supreme courts of either the states or 
the nation. Among the findings were that some of the factors that have 
been shown to be related to the incidence of dissent in supreme courts 
are not helpful in explaining dissent in the courts of appeals. The most 
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important of such negative findings was that appeals court panels 
whose membership includes both Democrats and Republicans are no 
less likely to issue unanimous opinions than are panels that are exclu-
sively Democratic or Republican. 
The present study also provided one of the few opportunities to test 
hypotheses on changes in patterns of dissent over time. Although 
considerable variation was discovered, none of the hypotheses relating 
to change over time was supported. The impact of the variables with the 
greatest explanatory effects on dissent rates (ideological diversity, 
urbanization, and reversals of decisions below) did not appear to 
change significantly over the twenty-three-year period studied. The 
changes in dissent rates over time which were discovered therefore 
remain unexplained, appearing as merely random variation. The pres-
ence of this unexplained variation is yet another reason for students of 
courts to devote more effort to the relatively neglected task of studying 
change over time in the courts. 
Factors discovered to be most strongly related to high rates of 
dissent were the presence of difficult legal issues in cases, ideological 
diversity in the panels, urbanism, reversals of decisions below, and the 
policy direction of the decision. The finding of significant effects for 
the index of urbanism in the circuit suggests the need for more research 
on the consequences of social, economic, and political characteristics 
for outcomes on the courts of appeals. This area has been neglected in 
the past, presumably because circuits were not conceived of as units 
having any political meaning in the larger political system. The find-
ings noted above suggest, however, that the nature of political conflict 
in the states making up each circuit may aggregate to produce signifi-
cant differences between circuits. 
A number of studies of the policy-making process in legislatures 
have suggested that significant differences often exist between different 
issue areas. We need to investigate more systematically the effects of 
differences in issue or policy areas on the judicial process and the 
behavior of judges. In the present study, the effects of difficult legal 
questions, reversals, and the policy direction of the appeals court 
decision were substantially different for criminal and labor cases. On 
the other hand, no differences of note were found for the effects of 
workload, party or ideological diversity on the panels, or urbanization. 
Finally, one of the most surprising findings was the absence of 
effect of changes over time or differences between circuits in workload 
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on the rate of dissent. This finding is in sharp contrast to the opinion of 
some judges that heavy workloads were one of the chief inhibitors of 
dissent. Perhaps the lesson to be learned is that although valuable 
insight may be obtained from interviews with judges, conclusions 
based on interviews need to be subjected to critical examination of the 
data. 
I am appreciative of the funding received from Project '87 which made possible 
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Parameters of Dissensus 
on Shifting Small Groups 
JUSTIN J. GREEN 
The research reported herein focuses on three aspects of the U.S. courts 
of appeals. First, the chapter surveys the theory underlying the study of 
dissensus in unanimous decisions by collegial courts. Second, it reports 
several recent changes in the structure and operation of the courts and 
how they have affected judicial decision making. Third, it updates a 
1976 study of voting behavior on the courts of appeals. The prime 
objectives of both the 1976 research and this project are to determine 
whether the relatively low dissent rate on the courts of appeals masks 
disagreement among the judges and to provide the basis for future work 
in the broad area of judicial consensus. The findings have significant 
repercussions for research on the courts of appeals and suggest some 
precautions as well as strategies that might be adopted in the study of 
judicial behavior. 
THEORY 
The empirical study of dissensus on apparently consensual courts 
began with Robert J. Sickels's examination of zoning cases decided by 
the Maryland Court of Appeals. 1 He discovered that although all such 
cases were decided unanimously, the decisions were not always harmo-
nious, and he suspected that an unidentified external factor was at 
work. His research revealed that the court assigned each zoning case to 
a justice, in rotation, and that he prepared the draft opinion. All other 
members then supported that opinion regardless of their views on the 
merits of the case. Sickels uncovered a dramatic instance of court 
norms effectively suppressing dissent; were it not for his research, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals would surely have been labeled consensual 
in its disposition of zoning cases. 
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In a sense, Sickels only confirmed the conclusion of many others 
who have read and studied the memoirs left by justices of the U.S. 
Supreme Court: judges do not always dissent even when they believe 
the majority to be in error. He advanced the study of judicial behavior 
by demonstrating this phenomenon through the analysis of a large 
number of cases rather than by using the files and recollections of 
individual justices in individual cases. Research and efforts to construct 
a theory of judicial behavior have been forced to come to grips with the 
behavior that Sickels identified, leading to much study of the condi-
tions that elicit a dissent. An important element in the development of 
such a theory has been the construction of definitions of consensus and 
dissensus that permit the possibility of significant suppressed dissent 
and that, therefore, demand inquiry beyond the mere counting of votes. 
J. Woodford Howard has provided a widely adopted definition of 
dissensus that has proved most useful in stimulating research on how 
judges disagree: dissensus is discordant outcomes without dissent. 2 
Discovery of dissensus so defined on a court requires aggregating cases 
in a search for underlying, masked disagreement. 
In 1976 Atkins and Green published an article that follows in the 
Sickels tradition, though it antedates Howard's major contributions to 
theory in this area. 3 The principal conclusion drawn at the end of that 
study involving nineteen thousand cases decided between 1966 and 
1970 was that although the dissent rate on the U.S. courts of appeals 
was extraordinarily low, considerable disagreement occurred among 
members of each circuit bench when deciding criminal appeals. 
Donald R. Songer followed up these findings by attempting to 
determine whether panels of the courts of appeals are presented with a 
true choice, a prerequisite for disagreement, in the cases they decide. 4 
By classifying judges as liberal or conservative based upon their votes 
in nonunanimous cases, which clearly present a choice of decisions, 
and then examining their votes in unanimous cases, Songer concluded 
that between 20 and 35 percent of the appeals decided unanimously 
presented true choice situations in which there was hidden disagree-
ment. 
Songer's research relied upon the trichotomous classification of 
judges based upon one set of decisions and the application of these 
labels to another set of votes. Both the Atkins and Green 1976 research 
and the follow-up research described here omit this intermediate, data-
suppressing step. The classification scheme displays the weaknesses 
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associated with labeling individuals as liberal or conservative, includ-
ing arbitrarily setting lines dividing one group of judges from another, 
and does not appear essential to the overall research objective. For the 
reasons explained below, the coefficient of variation based upon a large 
number of unanimous panel decisions is a superior measure for inves-
tigating the extent of dissensus as defined by Howard. 
STRUCTURAL AND OPERATIONAL CHANGES 
Over the last two decades, courts and legislatures in all jurisdictions 
have struggled to cope with the pressures of rapidly rising caseloads. 
The adjustments have, in many cases, resulted in substantial structural 
change, such as the creation of new courts or the extensive reorgan-
ization of existing judicial bodies. Another common strategy has been 
to increase personnel. If the number of cases is too great for the judges 
to decide within a reasonable time, one fairly obvious solution is to 
expand the bench. This is not always a simple, noncontroversial change 
as the arguments over the size of the U.S. Supreme Court and the 
benches of the Fifth and Ninth circuits of the U.S. courts of appeals 
demonstrate. 5 A third approach, often initiated by the judges, has been 
to make changes in court rules and internal procedures to expedite the 
processing of cases and to lighten the judges', as opposed to the court's, 
workload. All three changes may well be accompanied by revamping 
the support system, making adjustments in staff, computerizing opera-
tions, and similar modifications designed to speed the disposition of a 
constantly lengthening docket. 
Although the media have tended to focus on trial courts when 
discussing caseloads, the U.S. courts of appeals have long worked in 
the shadow of a rapidly lengthening docket. Between 1962 and 1982, 
for example, the number of filings in the courts of appeals increased 
580 percent, from 4,823 to 27,984 cases. 6 The problem pervades the 
entire system; each circuit bench has been forced to address a continu-
ous increase in the number of filings. Solutions to the difficulties posed 
by expanding caseloads have been both national and local in character. 
Federal agencies generated some of the changes, but each circuit was 
also free to address the problem in its own way. Four strategies were in 
common use throughout the period, and the results now form part of the 
judges' decision-making environment. 
First, Congress in 1978 expanded the size of all but one circuit 
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bench. 7 The total number of courts of appeals judges was increased by 
36 percent, from 97 to 132. In some cases the expansion was substan-
tial: the Fifth Circuit bench grew from I5 to 26 judges, the Ninth 
Circuit from I3 to 23. The Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978 authorized 
the largest single expansion of the judiciary in the nation's history and 
reduced at least temporarily the per judge caseload of the courts of 
appeals. Relief, however, was minimal and short-lived. In I970, II ,662 
appeals were filed for 97 judges to hear, an average of I20 cases per 
year. In spite of the major expansion of the bench in I978, the per judge 
case load in I982 reached an even higher level. In that year, 27,984 
appeals were filed, or 2I2 for each of the 132 judicial positions, an 
increase of nearly 77 percent in twelve years. Clearly, during this time 
the workload of the courts of appeals far outstripped the expansion of 
personnel approved by Congress. 
Second, all circuits have expanded the number of available judges 
by extensive use of senior judges, visiting appeals court judges, and 
district judges sitting "by designation." After the passage of the Om-
nibus Judgeship Act, use of these special judges was generally reduced 
although by 1980 some circuits, notably the Ninth, had returned to the 
former practice. To illustrate, between I966 and I970 a special judge 
sat on 52 percent of all panels of the courts of appeals. By I980, this 
proportion had declined to 44 percent. The Ninth Circuit, however, 
rarely forms a panel composed entirely of active judges appointed to 
that circuit's bench. 8 If the Ninth Circuit is omitted from the I980 data, 
special judges sat in 28 percent of the cases decided, a substantial 
decline from previous levels. The extensive use of special judges was a 
very controversial move, the effects of which are still under review. 9 
Without doubt, use of the special judges permitted the courts of appeals 
to hear and decide thousands of cases that would otherwise have been 
delayed for months for want of available judges. The issue yet to be 
resolved conclusively is whether the quality of judicial decisions has 
been adversely affected by the dramatically increased use of special 
judges, especially district judges sitting by designation and, converse-
ly, whether in recent years, when panels were more likely to consist 
solely of appointed judges, the quality of judicial decision making 
improved. The debate over the use of special judges continues in the 
literature. Unless and until overwhelming objective evidence can be 
assembled to demonstrate that a panel of two appointed judges and one 
special judge is less competent than one of three appointed judges, the 
Parameters of Dissensus 143 
use of special judges will increase as the workload of the courts of 
appeals continues to grow. That is, of course, an impossible research 
task. As long as Congress fails to provide sufficient judicial positions, 
the courts of appeals will, in effect, provide their own through the 
increased use of special judges. 
Third, the circuits implemented internal rule changes to lighten the 
workload or to facilitate the prompt disposition of cases. Obviously, 
these changes varied from one circuit to the next, but of general note is 
the adoption of a "not for publication" rule. In 1971, the Judicial 
Conference of the United States asked each circuit to develop a plan 
under which only the most important decisions, those that established 
precedent or otherwise significantly contributed to the growth of the 
law, would be published. 1o Although all circuits adopted a not for 
publication rule, the extent to which it has reduced the amount of time 
spent writing opinions seems to vary widely by circuit, as several 
studies have demonstrated. 11 The intent of the conference's request was 
to allow judges more time to hear and decide cases by eliminating the 
burden of producing an opinion of publishable quality in each case. The 
unintended consequences of the rule are only now beginning to 
emerge. 
Finally, two related structural changes are worth noting because of 
their potential value as precedent. In 1978, Congress authorized the 
geographically mammoth Fifth Circuit to form administrative subdivi-
sions so as to improve efficiency of operation. 12 Since the bench was 
simultaneously increased to twenty-six judges, some organizational 
change was essential lest circuit management become impossible. Just 
two years later, Congress created the Eleventh Circuit by subdividing 
the Fifth Circuit. 13 This legislation is much too recent for its effects to 
be evaluated. Such research ought to be undertaken at the first oppor-
tunity, however, because discussion of according similar treatment to 
the Ninth Circuit continues in Congress and in legal circles. 14 That 
circuit is also geographically enormous, and significant further expan-
sion from the present bench size of twenty-three could severely compli-
cate the task of administering the circuit. 
These structural changes are clearly important because of their 
effect on the administration of justice in the United States. They are also 
significant because they change the nature of the work group and may 
have a substantial effect on the internal operations of the courts of 
appeals. Even an apparently simple change, such as adding a seat to the 
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bench, has a potentially significant effect on the highly complex 
interpersonal relationships on the court. 15 The number of possible 
panels increases geometrically as the bench is expanded. If panels are 
randomly constituted, judges will sit with each other less often and, 
presumably, know less about each other. If the expansion of the bench is 
successful in reducing the per judge workload to more manageable 
proportions, special judges will appear less often and this factor in the 
development of a bench's decisional patterns will shrink in signifi-
cance. 
AN UPDATE 
The changes in the U.S. courts of appeals over the past twenty years 
amount to a laboratory, providing an opportunity to assess the effects of 
structural change on small group decision making. In the following 
pages, the Atkins and Green study of dissensus is updated to determine 
whether the broad outlines of judicial voting behavior noted at the time 
of its publication are still present. Whether or not change in behavior 
has occurred, the fact remains that the decision-making environment 
was transformed over the ensuing years. What does the literature claim 
the effects of these changes to be? Are there deviations from expecta-
tions, and if so, how are these to be fitted into the puzzle? To update the 
data for 1966-70, data were collected on all published criminal cases 
decided by three-judge panels of the courts of appeals in 1980. 
To follow up the 1966-70 study, the best point of departure is 
dissent rates: have they changed markedly from a decade earlier and 
how do any changes fit with the structural modifications that have taken 
place in the interim? It must be conceded at the outset that the effect of 
the not for publication rules is generally unknown, although at least 
some helpful research is available. These rules were not in effect 
between 1966 and 1970 but, as Daniel H. Hoffman and others have 
demonstrated, they are clearly a factor today. Hoffman shows that the 
filing of a dissent significantly increases the probability of publica-
tion.16 Numerous unanimous cases were not published in 1980, pre-
sumably because they were not of value as precedent, though similar 
decisions were published in 1966-70. Because no circuit is currently 
publishing all of its decisions, Hoffman's research suggests that the 
dissent rate will be higher in 1980, a function of the reduction in the 
base, that is, the number of decisions published. 17 Table 6.1 displays 
the dissent rates for the 1966-70 period and the analogous data for 
1980. 18 
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Table 6.1. Dissent Rate by Circuit 
Circuit 1966-70• 1980 
I 2.6 0.0 
2 6.4 9.8 
3 6.5 10.0 
4 5.4 11.5 
5 3.0 2.2 
6 4.2 7.0 
7 12.7 7.0 
8 2.6 3.4 
9 5.6 2.7 
10 0.8 7.4 
•Source: Burton M. Atkins and Justin J. Green, "Consensus on the United 
States Courts of Appeals: Illusion or Reality?" American Journal of Political Science 
20 (1976): 743. 
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The results are somewhat mixed but do not support the expectation 
of a generally higher dissent rate in 1980. Overall, the dissent rate on 
the courts of appeals remained virtually unchanged, 5.8 percent in 
1966-70 compared to 5. 1 percent in 1980. The dissent rate should have 
been higher in 1980 than in 1966-70, but it was higher in only six of the 
ten circuits. Hoffman reports that the circuits publishing the lowest 
proportion of opinions after the adoption of the not for publication rules 
were the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth. In these three circuits, the data 
might well be expected to approach the extreme-publication only of 
cases decided by split panels. The Fourth Circuit does indeed display a 
very high dissent rate, 11.5 percent, double the level of 1966-70. The 
dissent rate in the Tenth Circuit increased ninefold, but in the Ninth 
Circuit it was halved. Examining circuit case loads to determine number 
of filings per judicial position reveals that the Fourth Circuit had the 
highest case load, which is consistent with a decision to publish propor-
tionally fewer cases and with an increase in the dissent rate. Workload 
in the Ninth and Tenth circuits ranks near the bottom of the order. A 
likely complicating factor is geography; the Ninth and Tenth circuits 
are both rather sprawling, and travel time must be a consideration. In 
sum, then, the effects of the not for publication rule are visible in some 
situations, such as the Fourth Circuit, but both in the overall dissent rate 
and those in the individual circuits, the expectation of a higher level of 
dissent in 1980 is not supported by the data. 
Pursuing a tangent for a moment, consider the effect of the Om-
nibus Judgeship Act of 1978 on workload. Although it might be 
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possible to determine the number of judicial positions needed to 
achieve a specified level of efficiency on the basis of caseload, geogra-
phy, and other factors, clearly the number of new positions created in 
each circuit was a function, at least in part, of political considerations. 
Comparing the per judge caseloads of 1966-70 and 1980 suggests that 
the expansion of the circuit benches overcompensated for workload in 
the Fifth and Ninth circuits and did not compensate adequately in the 
First Circuit. All other factors being equal and, concededly, they are 
not, the dissent rate in the First Circuit should increase as a result of the 
proper application of the not for publication rule. It did not. In fact, no 
dissents were filed in the First Circuit in criminal cases in 1980, 
perhaps an extreme manifestation of the point often made in the 
literature that a heavy workload suppresses dissent. 
Some additional correlates of the dissent rate are also worth exam-
ining with the more recent data. The literature strongly suggests that a 
principal suppressor of dissent is workload: judges simply do not have 
the time to write and file dissenting opinions when there are mountains 
of appeals to be heard and decided. 19 The 1966-70 data showed, as 
expected, a strong inverse correlation (rho of - .564) between work-
load, measured as filings per judge, and dissent rate. This situation was 
much changed in 1980. The workloads of the circuits were more 
uniformly distributed in 1980 than in 1966-70; particular circuits can 
no longer be singled out as having a substantially higher. or lower than 
average workload as in the earlier period. More interestingly, the rank-
order correlation between workload and the dissent rate is .423. Al-
though not as strong a correlation as was present in 1966-70, it is in the 
opposite direction than would be hypothesized. The usually anticipated 
negative relationship between workload and dissent rates simply does 
not exist in the 1980 data. 
These findings seem confusing and perhaps contradictory. That is 
to be expected because there are two powerful factors at work and 
neither is completely understood. On the one hand is the readily 
comprehended claim that a higher workload, such as in 1980, should 
suppress dissent. On the other hand, the not for publication rule should 
allow more time to write dissenting opinions and result in a higher 
dissent rate by suppressing the publication of numerous unanimous 
cases. Without substantial amounts of data on the not for publication 
decisions in each circuit for 1980, it is difficult to draw detailed 
conclusions. On balance, however, it is fair to say that consideration of 
dissent as a measure of disagreement leads to the conclusion that the 
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courts of appeals were relatively more harmonious in 1980 than a 
decade earlier. 
It must be conceded that the not for publication rule has a 
putatively substantial effect on research strategy as well as on the 
administration of justice. All research based upon published decisions 
of the courts of appeals must recognize the possibility of bias stemming 
from the application of the rule. The need to supply basic data and to 
resolve questions associated with the use of the rule is obvious. One 
way of continuing research on disagreement in the court while awaiting 
this research is to reduce the impact of the not for publication rule by 
adopting the research strategy first applied in 1976. At that time, the 
rationale for developing a new research approach was the concentration 
by scholars on nonunanimous decisions to the exclusion of 94 percent 
of the courts' production. The mathematically simple computation of 
the coefficient of variation based upon votes cast in unanimous cases 
was a way to bring all of the courts' decisions into the research design. 
Since then, the not for publication rule has provided a second per-
suasive reason for using the .coefficient of variation. Adopting this 
approach would mitigate the effect of the rule in estimating the level of 
disagreement on the courts of appeals. 
There are now three classes of cases decided by panels of the courts 
of appeals: split decisions (nearly all of which are published), pub-
lished unanimous decisions, and unpublished unanimous decisions. 
Measuring disagreement by the dissent rate concentrates on the first 
group to the exclusion of the second and third. From the study of 
nonunanimous decisions, no conclusions can be drawn about disagree-
ment in other kinds of cases. Using the coefficient of variation and 
unanimous published cases reveals more about the operations of the 
courts of appeals and provides the basis for research on unpublished 
decisions, but it still does not address directly questions of behavior in 
deciding unpublished cases. It is, therefore, a better but not optimal 
research strategy. The research, then, is directed only to the public 
image of the courts of appeals. Unlikely though it may be, the possibil-
ity remains that a circuit could convey the impression of harmony while 
masking considerable dissensus by the way in which it applies the not 
for publication rule. In spite of these restrictions, however, using the 
coefficient of variation computed over unanimous cases to study dis-
sensus on the courts of appeals has the advantage of reducing the effect 
of the not for publication rule. 
To use this strategy, the data base was modified to include only all 
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published unanimously decided cases. All votes in the data set were 
scored as either supporting or not supporting the government's position 
in a criminal appeal. A further distinction was drawn between cases that 
raised a constitutional claim (most often under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
or Fourteenth Amendments) and those that did not. This is, of course, a 
time-honored classification in the study of appellate courts justified by 
the intuitive though never demonstrated idea that cases raising constitu-
tional claims are more important than others. To the litigants, ob-
viously, this distinction is insignificant. Nonetheless, to maintain 
consistency with the literature, each judge's government support score, 
based on at least five votes, was computed along with the mean, 
standard deviation, and coefficient of variation for each circuit for the 
two types of cases. The results are presented in Table 6.2. 
As the 1976 article made clear, the coefficient of variation is by no 
means a perfect measure of disagreement; it is only a more thorough 
one than the simple dissent rate. The principal difficulty associated 
with use of the coefficient of variation is that it is not normed: circuits 
cannot be labeled as high or low in dissensus because such standards do 
not exist. But comparisons can be drawn between circuits for the same 
time period and between time periods for the same circuit to determine 
whether judicial behavior has changed. 
The data in Table 6.2 show clearly that the low dissent rate on the 
courts of appeals masks or hides a substantial amount of disagreement 
among the judges. There is dissensus in each circuit, indicated by the 
failure of the government support scores for each judge to cluster tightly 
about the mean, and, just as obviously, this result was to be expected. 
The higher the coefficient of variation, the greater the difference of 
opinion among the judges as to how criminal cases ought to be decided. 
Over all circuits, the average coefficient of variation for cases present-
ing a constitutional claim is 20.3 while the comparable rate for cases 
without such a claim is 19.8. Since constitutional cases are generally 
thought to present the more difficult questions and allow more room for 
disagreement, the similarity of the means is somewhat unexpected. 
Apparently as much masked disagreement occurs in constitutional 
cases as in nonconstitutional cases, and this was true of seven of the ten 
circuits as well as for all circuits combined. These averages acquire 
substantially more meaning if compared to the 1966-70 data. At that 
time, the average coefficient of variation for constitutional cases was 
18.4, not significantly different from the 1980 figure of 20.3. For 
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Table 6.2. Characteristics of Government Support Scores in Criminal 
Cases 
Constitutional Standard Coefficient Number 
Circuit Claim Raised Mean Deviation of Variation of Judges 
Yes .894 .042 4.7 4 
No .831 .034 4.0 
2 Yes .814 .158 19.4 14 
No .786 .273 34.7 
3 Yes .601 .136 22.6 10 
No .682 .194 28.5 
4 Yes .718 .186 25.9 9 
No .780 .190 24.4 
5 Yes . 711 .124 17.4 29 
No .810 .110 13.6 
6 Yes .634 .164 25.9 11 
No .654 .098 15.0 
7 Yes .826 .170 20.6 9 
No .751 .162 21.6 
8 Yes .827 .084 10.2 9 
No .907 .066 7.3 
9 Yes .817 .186 22.8 23 
No .688 .121 17.6 
10 Yes .762 .098 12.9 9 
No .884 .103 11.7 
nonconstitutional cases, however, the average coefficient of variation in 
1966--70 was 9.2. If that figure is compared to the 1980 mean of 19.8 
one must conclude that judges on the courts of appeals agreed far less 
on how these cases should be decided in 1980 than in 1966--70. This 
disagreement was not reflected in an increased dissent rate, however, 
and becomes visible only when a measure such as the coefficient of 
variation is applied to all cases, including those decided by a unan-
imous vote. By the one measure but not the other, the level of disagree-
ment appears to have increased substantially between the two time 
periods. 
A major methodological issue examined in the 1976 article con-
cerned the two measures of disagreement: are they measuring the same 
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concept? At the time, the conclusion was that they were not. The 
evidence consisted of low Spearman rank-order correlations (rho) 
between disagreement as measured by the two variables. If the dissent 
rate and the coefficient of variation were simply two different ways of 
measuring the same phenomenon, the correlations should be very high. 
But in 1966-70 they were not; the correlation between the two mea-
sures over all circuits using constitutional cases was .052 and in 
nonconstitutional cases .382. In 1980, these correlations were .542 and 
. 773 respectively. Whereas it appears that in 1966-70 the two measures 
were tapping different types of disagreement, such was not the case in 
1980. Circuits with higher dissent rates also showed greater disagree-
ment in unanimous cases as measured by the coefficient of variation. 
Comparing the 1966-70 coefficients with those computed using 
the 1980 data reveals another striking difference. During the earlier 
period, the First Circuit appeared riddled by disagreement. In 1980, 
however, it was a model of harmony. Although that distinction may 
present an interesting secondary research question, the broader issue is 
the identification of factors that incline circuits toward dissensus. This 
topic was not investigated using the 1966-70 data, nor have later 
projects taken it up directly. Two obvious sources ought to be checked. 
The first is easily discarded: types of cases heard. There is no reason to 
believe that circuits with high coefficients of variation heard different 
types of cases than those with lower coefficients. The second potential 
source is personnel. A hypothesis worth testing would be whether 
circuits presenting high coefficients are marked by a bench fairly 
evenly divided between the political parties. 20 Given all that is known 
about the recruiting process, party of the appointing president would be 
the best variable to adopt as a surrogate measure of political ideology. 
Like all substitutes, it is imperfect in several respects, but it is adequate 
to test the hypothesis that benches composed of judges with diverse 
backgrounds will disagree more frequently than will more homoge-
neous benches. 
The literature on small groups reports that people are disinclined to 
be sole dissenters. If a three-judge bench is divided between conserva-
tives and liberals, and if dissent is suppressed by factors related to small 
groups, the minority judge on each panel will vote with the majority 
though truly disagreeing with the decision. This will become clear 
when that minority judge joins a like-minded individual to form a 
majority, which might then force another judge to agree without dis-
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sent. Such behavior increases the coefficient of variation in the circuit. 
Complicating factors in this exercise are that panels of the courts of 
appeals are not always randomly constructed and that ideology has, in 
the past, been used as the basis for forming panels. 21 
In I980, most of the circuit benches were fairly evenly divided 
according to the party of the appointing president. Of the II 0 judges in 
active service 70 (64 percent) had been appointed by a Democratic 
president. Rank-ordering the circuits by the partisan division on the 
bench and then computing a rank-order correlation using the coeffi-
cient of variation yielded interesting results. For cases presenting a 
constitutional claim, the rank-order correlation coefficient between 
partisan division and dissensus as measured by the coefficient of 
variation is .043. For cases without a constitutional claim, the rho is 
.558. Although the coefficients show, as expected, that the more 
narrowly divided is the bench the more likely it is to be in disagreement 
on the proper disposition of cases even though that disagreement is not 
carried to the point of filing a dissenting opinion, the expected relation-
ship was substantial only in nonconstitutional cases. The frequent focus 
on constitutional cases in the literature, in the apparent belief that they 
are the important cases, suggests that the correlation would be lower in 
cases not presenting a constitutional claim, but this did not prove to be 
the case. 
Although the data in Table 6. 2 can be analyzed in myriads of ways, 
one conclusion stands out. In the 1976 article, the dissent rate was 
found to have significantly understated the amount of disagreement on 
the courts of appeals. The I980 data show that the dissent rate is the 
same or a bit lower than it was in 1966--70, but the coefficients of 
variation tend to be higher. While continuing to present the image of a 
consensual court, the rotating panel structure of the court has permitted 
judges to disagree with each other in the general judicial philosophy 
used to decide cases. All of the arguments presented by Atkins and 
Green, as well as by Sickels and by Howard to the effect that dissent 
rates are not always the best measure of disagreement on a court are 
confirmed by examination of the I980 data. There are changes, signifi-
cant and worthy of further investigation, in the parameters of disagree-
ment, but to understand the phenomenon demands an inquiry beyond 
the use of dissent rates. 
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Of Judges, Hobgoblins, 
and Small Minds: Dimensions of 
Disagreement in the Ninth Circuit 
STEPHEN L. WASBY 
Consistency, we are often told, is the hobgoblin of small minds. Yet we 
are hesitant to suggest that judges and legal scholars who have com-
plained about doctrinal inconsistency, for example, in the Supreme 
Court's jurisprudence, are small-minded. Commentators have ex-
hibited concern that the law should be uniform at all levels of the court 
system and that inconsistency should be avoided. The role of the law as 
a stabilizing force in society must be recognized, and, unless judicial 
rulings are reasonably consistent, lawyers will not be able to counsel 
clients or to keep disputes out of court. That is, of course, not to say that 
the law should be rigid or mechanical; it need not stand still in order to 
have a stabilizing effect. 
Attention has been focused on intercircuit inconsistency by the 
Supreme Court's rules (Rule 17, formerly Rule 19), which make 
conflict between the U.S. courts of appeals one factor to be considered 
in the decision whether to grant certiorari. Attention is further focused 
on the matter by justices dissenting from the denial of review when 
there is an intercircuit conflict and arguing that our judicial system 
requires the capacity to produce a body of uniform national law. 1 
Claims that individual U.S. courts of appeals do not maintain sufficient 
internal uniformity of doctrine have directed attention to intracircuit 
inconsistency. 2 
There is, however, another view. Its advocates do not make incon-
sistency a virtue or argue that it does not exist. They either place 
inconsistency in context by arguing that, particularly over the short 
term, it is a necessary part of the way the law grows, or-based on 
intensive study of cases or participants' views-they minimize the 
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seriousness or significance of the problem created by inconsistency. 
For example, a study conducted for the Commission on Revision of the 
Federal Court Appellate System (the Hruska Commission, named for 
its chair, Sen. Roman Hruska) showed relatively few direct intercircuit 
conflicts in which a court "deals with the same explicit point as some 
other case and reaches a contradictory result," although indirect con-
flicts and "side-swipes" did exist, as did both "strong" and "weak" 
partial conflicts. 3 In another study, the judges of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which received particular attention 
during Hruska Commission testimony, indicated that intracircuit in-
consistency was far less serious than alleged and was not a major 
concern.4 
Those arguing that inconsistency is necessary may accept uniform-
ity as a goal but place emphasis on the need for law to change and for 
variation to occur in aid of that change. J. Woodford Howard, Jr., has 
stated the position most effectively: "Uniformity, after all, is not an 
absolute but an organizational objective to be weighed against compet-
ing goals. Perfect harmony, indeed, is an undesirable obstacle to legal 
growth. Just as the doctrine of stare decisis affords appellate judges 
sufficient leeway to bridge the values of the past and present, so the 
quest for uniformity contains room for regional experimentation and 
adaptation of national law to continental diversity. "5 In an adversary 
common law system, law changes incrementally as courts face cases 
raising different aspects of recurring problems and as judges distin-
guish present cases while trying to follow available precedent. The 
result may be considerable unevenness, particularly in the short term as 
the law develops in fits and starts. Inconsistency may also be functional 
in other ways. For example, the intercircuit conflict that results as each 
lower appellate court develops its own doctrine "bubbles up" to the 
Supreme Court for resolution, thus providing the high court material 
through which to state uniform national law. As Justice Stevens has 
remarked, "Experience with conflicting interpretations of federal rules 
may help to illuminate an issue before it is finally resolved and thus may 
play a constructive role in the lawmaking process. "6 
Such nontraditional views should caution us in any discussion of 
judges' doctrinal inconsistency. They should not, however, prevent us 
from suspending judgment on whether inconsistency is a virtue or 
detriment and from further exploring the forms, dimensions, and extent 
of inconsistency and disharmony, dissensus, and disagreement-the 
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latter terms avoiding the pejorative connotations of "inconsistency. "7 
This chapter provides an examination of disagreement-lack of 
unanimity in votes or opinion-writing in particular cases-in the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from 1970 through 197 5. After 
an initial conceptual discussion of consistency and disagreement and 
their causes, the Ninth Circuit judges' views on inconsistency are 
presented, and literature on levels of disagreement and its causes in the 
U.S. courts of appeals is reviewed. Agreement and disagreement by the 
different types of judges who decide the Ninth Circuit's cases-active-
duty and senior circuit judges, active-duty and senior district judges, 
and visiting judges from outside the circuit, individually and in combi-
nation-are then examined. Finally, the relationship between the 
court's disposition of district court rulings and disagreement within the 
court's panels is discussed. 
INCONSISTENCY AND DISAGREEMENT 
What Is C onsisteney? In the judicial context, consistency is not an exact 
concept. 8 In a multimember court, it can refer to consistency across the 
entire court or within a panel of judges. Focused discussion of consist-
ency requires first that one "identify cases that are similar in ways that 
are relevant to the issues being adjudicated." Then a baseline, departure 
from which is inconsistency, must be established. That baseline might 
be "a distinct line of authority" governing cases: if cases "raise one or 
more issues that are governed by a line of authority common to [the] 
case," conflict might occur between the decisions in those cases. 9 U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions provide an external baseline for examining 
inconsistency in the U.S. courts of appeals. Although most judges 
Sheldon Goldman interviewed "strongly suggested that stare decisis, 
when the precedent involves policy set by the Supreme Court, is largely 
responsible for encouraging decisional consensus on the appellate 
courts," the Supreme Court often has not spoken to issues faced by the 
lower appellate courts. 10 This makes its word unavailable either as a 
source of guidance to the lower courts or as a measure of their inconsist-
ency. 
An internal baseline is provided for the courts of appeals by their 
own en bane decisions, which create circuit precedent. Because the 
appeals courts do not sit en bane frequently, circuit precedent is most 
often provided by one of the court's panels, which are the court of 
Disagreement in the Ninth Circuit 157 
appeals for the cases they decide. When not explicit, circuit precedent 
may be relatively obvious from the central thrust of a series of incre-
mentally developed panel opinions. Absent clear circuit precedent, a 
baseline from which to measure inconsistency might be constructed 
from liberal or conservative trends evident in the judges' voting pat-
terns.11 
The basic rule is that "once a panel of a circuit formulates a rule of 
decision in one case, the other judges of the circuit are bound to follow 
that precedent, right or wrong, in future cases, at least until it is 
reconsidered by the entire court sitting en banc." 12 Because judges at 
times dislike circuit precedent, however, they must face squarely "the 
question of whether to adhere to earlier decisions that they disagreed 
with. " 13 The tradition of adhering to earlier panel decisions is suffi-
ciently strong that "judges have declined to dissent because 'the law of 
the Circuit has apparently been determined to the contrary, and so I 
shall join in my brothers' disposition.' " 14 However, at times they "fail 
to accord to prior decisions . . . willing acceptance and whole hearted 
enforcement." 15 Judges in the Second, Fifth, and D.C. circuits admit-
ted to fudging on the rule of not overruling another panel "by distin-
guishing cases, narrowing down rulings, and other tactics." 16 
If inconsistency is departure from circuit precedent, disharmony is 
seen in judges' voting disagreement and their failure to join a majority 
opinion even when they agree with the court's disposition of a case. 
Both concurring and dissenting opinions are indications of dishar-
mony, even though the latter is directed at the results of the decision-
with implications for "who gets what, when, and how" in the immedi-
ate case-whereas the former does not affect the immediate disposition 
of a case but may pose questions for the longer-term development of 
doctrine or may provide signals of internal friction to those observing 
the court. In any event, taken together, they "understate internal dishar-
mony" because they represent only "the differences judges failed to 
compose." They also do not measure either "intensity of disagreement 
among circuit judges nor its reflection in voting blocs, bargaining over 
the language of opinions, and divergent outcomes among rotating 
panels." 17 
The possibility of such "divergent outcomes" means that inconsis-
tency may coexist with the absence of disagreement. A panel may thus 
be unanimous while simultaneously it is inconsistent with the court's 
overall position-producing "discordant outcomes without dissent." 18 
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When two or more unanimous panels consider the same issues, they 
may produce results pointing in different directions even if homage is 
paid to the court's precedents, masking disagreement within the larger 
court. Robert J. Sickels found this situation in zoning appeals cases 
decided by the Maryland Court of Appeals, which assigns opinion-
writing by lot. Such a procedure leaves the court, "by division of labor, 
. . . in the hands of the judge who writes the opinion rather than the 
members who subscribe their perfunctory concurrence." 19 Systematic 
rotation of judges among panels in the U.S. courts of appeals may lead 
to similarly discordant results with disagreement over both interpreta-
tion and application of circuit precedent. If there is departure from 
systematic rotation in panel assignments, it is possible for the minority 
position within the court to be dominant in a subject area. 20 
Causes of Inconsistency. Inconsistency, dissensus, disharmony, dis-
agreement-whatever the phenomenon or phenomena are called-
have several causes. Principal among them is appellate courts' case-
load, reinforced by the number of "extra" judges necessary to dispose 
of that caseload. The courts' use of rotating rather than fixed panels or 
en bane sittings provides a structural explanation; closely related are 
behavioral norms deriving from the panel structure. Judges' attitudes, 
ideologies, or party affiliations that subsume attitudinal differences 
provide an additional explanation. 
Inconsistency in doctrine is particularly likely when a court de-
cides many cases with a common element, such as issues of appellate 
procedure, standards by which lower court judgments are to be re-
viewed, or substantive matters such as the "intent to monopolize" 
standard in antitrust law. Inconsistency in result may stem from a large 
number of cases in the same subject area, such as labor law, leading to 
apparently erratic decisions concerning enforcement of National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) orders. High caseloads have, however, been 
thought a major reason for low dissent rates, in part because there is 
much "routine litigation" in the workload, particularly for courts with-
out discretionary jurisdiction. 21 Thus "overworked judges, under pres-
sure to deal rapidly with an ever-increasing caseload . . . will be less 
inclined to indulge in writing numerous dissents. "22 Indeed, the judges 
of the Second, Fifth, and D.C. circuits thought workload "the chief 
depressant of dissent. "23 For the fiscal years 1965-71 , although there 
was a high negative correlation (- .44) between a court's dissent rate 
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and the rate at which appeals were terminated-less a matter of work-
load than of efficiency-there was "little support" for the hypothesis 
that circuits with the heaviest workloads would also have the lowest 
dissent rates. 24 
Courts confronting large caseloads are compelled to draw on 
judges from other courts for assistance. 25 The Ninth Circuit, which 
made greatest use of extra judges, used seventy per year during the late 
1970s, and almost one hundred later. The presence of such judges 
"further increases the number of possible panel combinations that may 
appear"; because panels will be less likely to be aware of each others' 
decisions and because the extra judges will be less likely to know 
circuit precedents, intracircuit inconsistency may also increase. 26 This 
suggestion appears to be borne out because from 1965 to 1969, judges 
sitting by designation differed from a circuit's regular judges in their 
support for particular positions: less for labor, more for the government 
in tax cases, and less for criminal defendants making a constitutional 
claim. However, when "conflict is measured by dissent, ... desig-
nated judges are disagreeing less, or conforming more to majority 
sentiment, than the regular judges. "27 District judges filed roughly 
one-fourth the dissenting opinions and one-seventh the concurring 
opinions expected on the basis of their panel participation; judges from 
outside the circuit filed about one-third the expected dissents; and 
senior circuit judges, though still filing proportionately fewer dissents 
and only one-half the expected concurring opinions, did so more than 
did district or visiting judges. 28 These data illustrate the point that "for 
any judge to file a solitary opinion requires a strong will plus opportun-
ity; for a designated judge to do so must require the presentation of the 
most salient of issues in order to force the creation of an opportunity. "29 
The use of panels and rotation of judges among panels may also 
contribute to dissensus. Judges dispersed across panels "need not clash 
over how an issue should be resolved; yet ... disparate points of view 
may nevertheless emerge. "30 In addition to "inject[ing] a certain 
amount of flexibility into the manpower commitments of the admin-
istration of appellate justice," rotation dilutes personal conflicts and 
keeps coalitions "relatively fluid" in panels. It "hinders, if not pre-
cludes, effective formation of stable sub-group patterns"; if panel 
membership were not rotated, each panel would develop "distinctive 
policy patterns, at odds with the other panels. "31 Personal conflict is 
avoided but "at the expense of institutional solidarity"; indeed, panel 
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rotation can "breed diverse outcomes" and allow dissensus "to flourish 
among unanimous panels. . . . The more . . . disagreement is dis-
persed among panels, the more diffuse becomes circuit policy." More 
generally, rotation, which "pluralize[s]" the appellate courts, is to those 
courts "what regionalism is to the whole [judicial system ]-a de-
centralizing and destabilizing force. "32 
"Behavioral norms enforced by peer groups" also affect levels of 
disagreement. Many circuit judges do not regard this as the major 
factor, with most judges "not hesitat[ing] to dissent if they thought their 
protest would influence the Supreme Court or another circuit. "33 Yet 
because a dissent in the court of appeals is less likely to be used by the 
court's judges in the future than is a dissent in the Supreme Court, "the 
suppressed dissent is a more common phenomenon in an intermediate 
appellate court than in a court of last resort. "34 Also serving to depress 
dissent is an "unwritten rule . . . that judges must be able to reasonably 
justify their votes in their written opinions. "35 Dissenting is thus not 
merely a matter of casting a vote but entails the time-consuming task of 
writing a justificatory opinion. Similarly, dissent rate would be lowered 
by the view that judges should discuss a case "in a spirit of 'give-and-
take' (or accommodation) in an effort to reach decisional consensus" 
without making disagreement public. 36 Psychological pressure on a 
would-be dissenter can serve as an effective reinforcement for these 
norms: in a three-judge panel, a judge must dissent alone, whereas in a 
larger court there is greater possibility that a colleague will join in the 
dissent. 37 As Burton Atkins notes, "The small group setting . . . places 
behavioral constraints upon the individual and subdues his inclination 
toward individuality. "38 
What about judges' attitudes? "Attitudes and values defined politi-
cally rather than legally" are important for understanding judges' votes 
in the courts of appeals; circuit judges Goldman interviewed "per-
ceived attitudinal differences concerning various issues as being the 
cause of conflict in the appellate courts. "39 He found that in fiscal years 
1962-64, judges' party affiliations were related to their judicial votes 
"notably when the issues involved economic liberalism," but demo-
graphic variables "such as religion, socio-economic origins, education, 
and age were . . . almost entirely unrelated directly to voting be-
havior. "40 However, "negative correlations were found between dissent 
and voting on civil liberties and on labor issues."4 I 
Goldman also found that for 1965-71, "interrelated politically 
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defined attitudes account for much of the overt conflict among courts of 
appeals judges. "42 In this later period, Democratic and Republican 
judges differed on civil liberties and criminal procedure in non-
unanimous cases, although they had not earlier.43 Although experi-
ence-separate from age-had little effect on dimensions of voting in 
1965-71 , older judges were "more conservative on the criminal pro-
cedures, civil liberties, labor, injured persons, political liberalism, 
economic liberalism and activism dimensions" than were younger 
judges. 44 Political party affiliation was the single most important back-
ground variable tested on all these dimensions except for activism, for 
which age was the most important. In the later period, unlike the earlier 
one, there were "no statistically significant correlations of dissent 
behavior to voting on any of the issues" so that "political and economic 
conservatives do not have a greater propensity for dissent than do 
political and economic liberals. "45 However, judges with previous 
judicial experience dissented less than those without such experience. 
Nonetheless, it is likely that differences in dissent rates between 
circuits are "a result of the different attitudinal predispositions of the 
judges and the particular combinations of judges on the panels. "46 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
Inconsistency. The Ninth Circuit has been used as an example of a court 
in which, according to former Solicitor General Erwin Griswold, a 
prior decision on a question "makes no difference" because another 
panel "may take a different view of the problem," even after the 
problem was "quite specifically pointed out to them." Indeed, alleged 
Griswold, "in the Ninth Circuit very little attention was paid to the 
question of intracircuit conflicts," with "another panel ten days later 
deciding essentially the same question the other way without any 
reference to the first case. "47 
Although most Ninth Circuit judges I interviewed differed with 
Griswold about the magnitude of inconsistency, they felt that intracir-
cuit inconsistency occurred more frequently in some areas of the law 
than in others. 48 Judges' attitudes or ideologies were thought to be the 
principal cause of inconsistency in the Ninth Circuit. Most of the 
ideological disagreement to which attention was called was not on 
partisan Democratic-Republican grounds-although some judges said 
they could tell when "staunch Republicans" were on the panel in NLRB 
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cases-but the result of "strong philosophical disagreements." Such 
disagreements were reinforced because, although many judges were 
content to adhere closely to existing circuit precedent, others were 
"advocates, always trying to make a point, trying to move the court over 
to their position, to change the law of the circuit." 
For example, the presence on a panel of one or two judges who, 
according to their critics, "want[ed] to reverse all criminal cases" led to 
"trouble like a conjunction of stars" requiring an en bane sitting of the 
court. "Some judges have higher thresholds of indignation" than oth-
ers, particularly in the area of search and seizure: "Some feel all 
wiretapping is evil and resolve all cases against the government"; 
others resolve all cases for the government, "which is trying to protect 
us," or, as stated by a self-styled "strict constructionist" judge, some 
want to "help defendants and punish the police or punish defendants 
and help the police." When judges have "different notions of justice" 
that "reflect different approaches in society," they cannot be convinced 
to change their minds about such notions, which also serve to color 
their perceptions about facts and how they apply the law to the facts. 
Other frequently mentioned major causes of inconsistency were 
the size of the court's caseload, which often led to different panels 
dealing with the same issues, and the increased number of judges 
needed to process that caseload, which created difficulty in coordinat-
ing the flow of information within the court. As one judge put it, "The 
bigger the court, the more difficult it is to arrive at consensus." Ninth 
Circuit judges generally agreed that the participation of district judges 
and of the circuit's own senior appellate judges did not contribute to 
inconsistency; opinion concerning visiting judges was divided.49 Dis-
trict judges, if contributing to inconsistency at all, did so "no more than 
[did] the mingling of the court's own judges" or only "idiosyn-
cratically" or in "aberrational circumstances." District judges might 
dissent, but such dissents did not "contribute to differences between 
panels." A minority of circuit judges, however, were critical of district 
judges as unaware of trends in circuit law and thus "out of step." One 
judge, who felt the court lost "harmony of decision and integrity of 
precedent" when a "whole lot of strangers are dabbling in writing law," 
said district judges' presence also created "uncertainty" about circuit 
precedent. 
Disagreement. Prior studies reveal very low levels of disagreement in 
the U.S. courts of appeals. In fiscal years 1962-64, the proportion of 
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nonunanimous decisions ranged from 2.8 percent in the Sixth Circuit 
to 15.5 percent in the District of Columbia Circuit. 50 The District of 
Columbia Circuit again had the highest rate of disagreement ( 13.2 
percent) in 1965-71; it was the only circuit in which more than 10 
percent of the decisions were non unanimous. The Seventh Circuit had a 
disagreement rate of just under 10 percent, and three others had rates of 
disagreement of roughly 7.5 percent; the rest disagreed less than 5 
percent of the time. 51 These figures are small in absolute terms and 
certainly small by comparison with the U.S. Supreme Court, less than 
half of whose decisions were unanimous. 
Another study showed dissents in only 6.2 percent of cases across 
all circuits in 1965-69.52 The frequency of separate concurring opin-
ions was even lower than the frequency of dissents; they appeared in 
only 2.9 percent of all cases, with "the rate of concurrence ... almost 
perfectly correlated with the rate of dissent"-parallel to the finding 
that in the Second Circuit "the bulk of concurring opinions were written 
by the most frequent dissenters. "53 
Informal norms may provide an explanation for differences be-
tween dissent rates and rates of concurring opinions. For a judge who 
disagrees with his colleagues to register a dissent may not be consid-
ered inappropriate, particularly if principle is involved, but to rob a 
major opinion of some of its force through a separate concurring 
opinion may not be well regarded, and for a judge to divide a two-judge 
majority between two opinions is particularly disliked. A separate 
concurrence thus breaks unity far more in a three-judge panel than in a 
larger court such as the U.S. Supreme Court. This may explain why, in 
the Second Circuit, "the judges either settle their differences or, failing 
this, dissent," with partial dissents preferred over concurring opin-
ions.54 
The information presented here on the Ninth Circuit for calendar 
years 1970-75 is based on rulings by that court's three-judge panels; en 
bane rulings and the small number of decisions by two-judge panels are 
excluded. During 1970-75, three-judge panels of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided more than seven thousand cases. 
The great majority of the court's panels contained at least two circuit 
judges, whose votes were thus determinative in most of the court's 
cases. The Ninth Circuit's work was, however, no longer performed 
only by the court's own circuit judges, including senior circuit judges. 
District judges and senior district judges, who sat on well over half the 
court's panels, performed a significant and increasing role, although 
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visiting judges played only a small if nonnegligible role. Statistics for 
the immediately preceding five years show that this general picture of 
participation by extra judges was true of other U.S. courts of appeals as 
well. 55 
The data base includes published decisions for 1970-75 and "Not 
for Publication" rulings for 1973-75. For 1970-72, published rulings 
include virtually all cases except those on preliminary motions and 
some other decisions such as affirmances of denied preliminary injunc-
tions; even brief Memorandum Orders were published. It was not until 
late 1972 that the court adopted rules calling for the designation of 
certain cases as not for publication. 
Because data from published cases alone would show a substantial 
decrease in cases decided after 1972, data on unpublished opinions 
after that time must be provided to present a more complete picture of 
the court's work. The court's calendaring procedures did not inten-
tionally assign less important cases-those in which the opinions are 
more likely to be designated "Not for Publication"-to panels con-
taining district or visiting judges. Thus it is possible that extra judges 
might participate more in one type than in the other, making it even 
more important to include both types of cases in the data base. Identi-
fication of circuit precedent is more difficult, and the possibility of the 
development of intracircuit inconsistency greater, when there is a 
decrease in the number of published opinions. This is true because it is 
in those opinions that doctrine is most clearly developed and because of 
the possibility that inconsistencies will be "buried" in unpublished 
rulings. 56 
In the Ninth Circuit, a case is designated "Not for Publication" by 
the panel deciding it, although the panel may defer to the opinion-
writer's wishes in deciding whether or not to publish. Thus if a district 
judge writing for a panel is seized by the urge to see his or her name in 
"Fed Second" and other panel members defer to the "writing judge," 
allowing the case to be published, publication may be more, rather than 
less, likely for cases in which extra judges participate. Indeed, exam-
ination of the Ninth Circuit's publication record for 1973-75 shows that 
when a panel contained a senior circuit judge, cases were more likely to 
be published than if the panel contained three active-duty circuit 
judges. Similarly, cases decided by panels including senior district 
judges were also more likely to be published than cases decided by 
panels including active-duty district judges. The cases least likely to be 
published were those on which a visiting judge served. 
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In the following analysis, several practices have been followed. 
One is that concurrences are counted with disagreements. Although 
dissents-of which there are proportionately more than of con-
currences-are stronger statements of disagreement that concurring 
votes and opinions, both break the unanimity of a three-judge panel. A 
second is that, despite the judge's recognition that inconsistency occurs 
more frequently in some areas oflaw, such as search and seizure, than in 
others, no decomposition of the cases by subject matter has been 
attempted. The principal reason is that, to provide sufficient instances 
of panels composed of particular combinations of judge-types in a 
particular year, extremely broad categories would have to be used. Few 
panels sit together for a substantial number of cases in any substantive 
categories of law where disagreement is meaningful to the judges. We 
also consider judges fungible within a given category of judges. That a 
particular judge might account for a nonnegligible proportion of the 
participation by a category, for example, senior district judges or 
visiting judges, is not factored into the analysis. Such differences may 
account for some of the year-by-year variation evident in the data, but 
this is not likely because of the number of different judges who 
participated in the Ninth Circuit's cases. 
Disagreement: An Overall View. In the Ninth Circuit for 1970-75, 
disagreement was registered in only 6.4 percent of all cases, both 
published and unpublished; the rate was somewhat lower at the end of 
the period than at the beginning. (Although Ninth Circuit judges easily 
recognized that disagreement in the courts of appeals is lower than in 
the Supreme Court, many did not think the level was low, an indication 
of the importance of one's perceptions of the level of disagreement.) 
Once the court began regular use of unpublished opinions, there was a 
much higher rate of disagreement-more than I 0 percent in both 1973 
and 1974--in published cases, while the disagreement rate for un-
published cases was substantially less (3.3 percent in 1973, 1.3 percent 
in 1974). This pattern was like that in the 1978-79 reporting year for all 
circuits; there was much more dissidence in published than in not for 
publication opinions, with separate opinions in 12.4 percent of pub-
lished cases (range: 2.8-21.1 percent) and 0.5 percent of the un-
published opinions (range: 0-1.5 percent). 57 Most Ninth Circuit 
disagreements were dissents, with a ratio of roughly 3:1 or 4: I. Over 
the six-year period, the proportion of concurrences to total disagree-
ments in published cases was roughly one-fourth in the first four years 
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but rose to just over two-fifths in 197 5. Concurrences accounted for 
between 25 and 30 percent of all disagreements in unpublished cases 
for 1973-75. 
Reversing our focus, we find that cases in which disagreement was 
registered were more likely to be published than were cases in which 
the panel unanimously agreed on a single opinion. In 1973, although 
three-fifths of all cases decided by panels of three circuit judges were 
unpublished, three-fifths of the cases in which such panels disagreed 
were published. In 1974, with two-thirds of their decisions un-
published, all cases in which disagreement was registered were pub-
lished. The pattern for cases decided by panels containing a senior 
circuit judge is not dissimilar. Roughly half of all the cases were 
unpublished for the three years, but of the cases in which there was 
disagreement, from three-fourths to just under 90 percent were pub-
lished. For cases on which district judges, senior district judges, and 
visiting judges served, in all three years only a relatively small percent-
age containing disagreement were not published. 
Differences between the rates of disagreement appearing in pub-
lished and unpublished cases may result in large measure from a Ninth 
Circuit rule. One criterion is that publication should not occur unless an 
opinion "is accompanied by a separate concurring or dissenting expres-
sion, and the author of such separate expression desires that it be 
reported or distributed to regular subscribers" (Rule 2l(b) (6)). Thus 
disagreement would make publication more likely, but, as the latter 
clause indicates, a judge writing a separate opinion might not press for 
publication, and some disagreement does appear in unpublished cases. 
Variation was evident in the forms of disagreement among catego-
ries of judges. Roughly one-third of the disagreements circuit judges 
registered in published cases were concurrences; for unpublished opin-
ions, the proportion was only slightly lower. Only one-fifth of senior 
circuit judges' disagreements took the form of separate concurrences. 
(For unpublished opinions, except for those of circuit judges, the 
number of disagreements was too small for percentages to be mean-
ingful.) Roughly one-fourth of disagreements by district judges and 
senior district judges combined were concurring opinions; district 
judges were somewhat more likely to dissent and senior district judges 
somewhat more likely to concur, making the latter more like circuit 
judges in this regard. Almost all visiting judges' disagreements were 
dissents. 
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Circuit judges disagreed in 3 percent of their sittings; the chief 
judge, Richard Chambers, had a slightly higher disagreement rate, 
fluctuating around 4 percent. Rates varied from year to year for the 
other categories of judges. Senior circuit judges registered disagree-
ments in just over 1 percent of their sittings in 1971 but in over 5 percent 
of their sittings in 1974. District judges' disagreements rose to under 5 
percent of their sittings in 1975 but with only one other exception were 
just under 3 percent. Senior district judges' disagreements fell in the 
latter half of the period; after being over 4 percent of their sittings from 
1970 to 1972, the figure dropped to nearly 3 percent in 1973 and 1974, 
then to just over 1 percent in 197 5. In part a function of a small number 
of sittings, the fluctuation for visiting judges was particularly great. 
They registered no disagreements in two years (1970 and 1974) but 
disagreed almost 10 percent of the times they sat in 1972. 
The rate of disagreement as a percentage of sittings in published 
cases rose over the period for circuit judges and senior circuit judges 
and for district judges but not for senior district judges or for visiting 
judges. For circuit judges, the rate of disagreement increased from 
roughly 3 percent to just under 5 percent in 1973 and to almost 7 
percent in 1974; for senior circuit judges it rose over 5 percent in 1973 
and over 9 percent in 1974 before falling to only 3 percent in 1975, 
roughly the same level as before the practice of not publishing cases. 
Starting in 1973, district judges' disagreement rate was roughly twice 
pre-1973 levels and in 1975 increased to almost 10 percent. 
If we look at specific combinations of categories of judges, we find 
that for the entire six-year period, there was disagreement in only 
slightly over 5 percent of the cases decided by panels of three circuit 
judges. Their highest level of agreement was in 1972 (97 .2 percent of 
the cases), the lowest level in 1970 (91. 8 percent agreement). For 
1973-75, there was less disagreement in unpublished cases than in 
published ones-2.3 percent against 8.7 percent. 
The overall level of agreement for the six years was roughly the 
same for all combinations of judges other than three circuit judges, but 
there are some minor differences between them (see Table 7.1). Al-
though the agreement level was exactly the same for panels of two 
circuit judges and a senior circuit judge as for panels of three circuit 
judges, it was slightly lower for other combinations and lowest Uust 
under 92 percent) for panels with two circuit judges and a visiting 
judge. There are, however, somewhat greater differences across dif-
Table 7. 1. Percentage of Agreement in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
Year C-C-C % C-C-SCJ % C-C-DJ % C-SCJ-DJ % C-C-SDJ %C-SCJ-SDJ %C-C-VJ % OTHER % TOTAL % 
Published Opinions 
1970 402/36 91.8 66/2 97.1 303/18 94.4 210 100 75/9 89.3 1/0 100 47/3 94.0 1/0 100 897/68 93.0 
1971 416/30 93.3 239/12 95.2 184/13 93.4 62/3 95.4 5014 92.6 22/2 91.7 5514 93.2 51/3 94.4 1079171 93.8 
1972 281/8 97.2 191/15 92.7 205/20 91.1 64/8 88.9 8114 95.3 19/5 79.2 38/6 86.3 30/5 85.7 909171 92.7 
1970-72 1099174 93.7 496/29 94.2 692/51 92.6 128/11 91.4 206/17 91.7 4217 83.3 140/13 90.7 82/8 90.2 2885/210 92.7 
1973 12017 94.5 73/8 90.1 131/30 81.4 43/4 91.4 83/8 91.2 40/4 90.9 27/6 81.8 17/0 100 534/67 88.9 
1974 81/9 90.0 63/9 87.5 158/24 86.8 54/6 90.0 91/12 88.3 26/5 83.8 19/6 76.0 17/4 81.0 509175 87.2 
1975 5316 89.8 74/4 94.9 169/15 91.8 44/9 83.0 9119 90.0 40/1 97.6 56/6 90.3 37/2 94.9 564/52 91.2 
1973-75 254/22 91.3 210121 90.0 458/69 84.9 141/19 86.5 265/29 89.1 106/10 90.6 102118 82.4 71/6 91.5 1607/194 87.9 
TOTAL 1353/96 92.9 706/50 92.9 1150/120 89.6 269/30 88.8 471/46 90.2 148/17 88.5 242/31 87.2 153/14 90.8 4492/404 91.0 
Table 7. 1. Continued 
Year C-C-C % C-C-SCJ % C-C-DJ % C-SCJ-DJ % C-C-SDJ % C-SCJ-SDJ % C-C-VJ % OTHER 
Not for Publication Decisions 
1973 19017 96.4 68/4 94.4 216/6 97.3 43/1 97.7 10213 97.1 18/0 100 31/2 93.9 
1974 172/0 100 66/2 97.0 286/2 99.3 82/2 97.6 136/3 97.8 23/1 95.8 49/1 98.0 
1975 70/3 95.9 85/0 100 236/11 95.5 60/0 100 107/4 96.4 46/0 100 67/3 95.7 
1DTAL 432/10 97.7 219/6 97.3 738/19 97.4 185/3 98.4 345/10 97.1 87/1 98.9 147/6 95.9 
GRAND 
TOTAL 1784/106 94.4 921/55 94.4 I ,884/139 93.1 457/32 93.5 800/53 93.8 239118 93.0 385/34 91.9 
Key: c = Circuit judge SDJ = Senior district judge 
SCJ = Senior circuit judge VJ = Visiting judge 
DJ = District judge 
Note: The figures are for the number of cases in which there was agreement over the number of cases in which 
there was disagreement. Hence for 1970 published cases decided by three circuit judges, there were 402 cases in which 






% TOTAL % 
100 676123 96.7 
100 827/11 98.7 
100 693/21 97.1 
100 2196/55 97.6 
92.0 6656/456 93.6 
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ferently composed panels on a year-by-year basis. For example, in 
1970, compared to only 7. 2 percent disagreement for panels of three 
circuit judges, disagreement occurred in just over 10 percent of the 
cases when a senior district judge sat with two circuit judges, and there 
was only 2. 9 percent disagreement when a senior circuit judge sat with 
two circuit judges. In 1972, panels of three circuit judges registered less 
than 3 percent disagreement, those with two circuit judges and a district 
judge had a much higher disagreement rate (8. 9 percent), and disagree-
ment occurred in 13.7 percent of the cases when a visiting judge sat 
with two circuit judges. Disagreement was also high when there were 
two extra judges on a panel instead of only one. Combinations of a 
circuit judge, senior circuit judge, and district judge registered dis-
agreement more than 10 percent of the time they sat together; disagree-
ment exceeded one-fifth when a circuit judge and a senior circuit judge 
sat with a senior district judge, somewhat higher than the rate for 
1970-72 (one-sixth of their cases). 
In 1973, when either a district judge or a visiting judge joined two 
circuit judges, higher levels of disagreement (11.6 and 12.1 percent 
respectively) were likely than for three circuit judges, with disagree-
ment registered disproportionately in published cases-just under 20 
percent for both panel combinations. The pattern was similar in 1974, 
when, although the number of cases was small, for panels of two circuit 
judges and a visiting judge, disagreement occurred in almost one-
fourth of the cases. In that year, the combination showing the highest 
overall disagreement rate was that of circuit judge, senior circuit judge 
and senior district judge; they disagreed in just over 10 percent of all 
cases and in 16.2 percent of published ones. That this category of panel 
registered very little disagreement the following year, 197 5, with none 
in unpublished cases, is illustrative of year-by-year fluctuation. 
Published cases for 1973-75 decided by panels of three circuit 
judges showed lower percentages of disagreement than those decided 
by other frequent combinations. The highest level of disagreement 
(17 .6 percent) was found in panels with two circuit judges and a 
visiting judge, with panels of two circuit judges and a district judge 
close behind (15.1 percent). Panels of two circuit judges and a senior 
district judge registered only I 0. 9 percent disagreement, still more than 
that by panels of three circuit judges. Also registering more than 10 
percent disagreement in published cases during this period were panels 
of a circuit judge, senior circuit judge, and district judge ( 13.5 percent). 
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Disposition of Cases. We now tum to the relation between disposition 
of cases and disagreement and to the question of whether some catego-
ries of judges participate more in reversals than do others. In the 
Second, Fifth, and District of Columbia circuits in the mid-1960s, 
dissents were "more likely when Courts of Appeals disturbed (14%) 
than affirmed ( 6%) decisions below. "58 In another study, neither the 
hypothesis that senior circuit judges, district judges, and visiting 
judges would be less likely to participate in courts of appeals rulings 
vacating or reversing the court below nor the hypothesis that district 
judges would be less likely to reverse their own colleagues was sus-
tained; there was "no notable tendency for panels composed solely of 
circuit judges to reverse the court below, compared to panels including 
a designated judge. Nor is there clear evidence of reluctance on the part 
of designated judges to vacate or reverse a judgment, "59 although there 
was a slight tendency for panels with a senior circuit judge to be more 
likely to reverse and those with a district judge to be somewhat less 
likely to reverse. 
A court of appeals has available a variety of dispositions in addition 
to "Affirm" and "Reverse." In tabulating the data, I have combined 
"Affirm" and "Affirm and Remand" (designated affirmances) and 
"Reverse," "Reverse and Remand," and "Remand" (designated rever-
sals). "Affirm in part, Reverse in part" has been added to the reversals 
because they indicate at least some disagreement with the district court, 
although others have assigned such partial affirmances a weight mid-
way between affirmances and reversals and still others have counted 
them as affirmances. 60 Instances in which the court vacated or vacated 
and remanded court rulings are also added to reversals in the data 
presented in Table 7. 2. The court might also dismiss appeals, deny 
petitions for rehearing, and grant or deny enforcement of Labor Board 
orders, shown separately in the table. 
Disagreement is registered in a higher percentage of reversals than 
affirmances, both overall and generally year by year for the various 
combinations of judges. Most exceptions are found in combinations of 
judges accounting for only small numbers of cases. Published and not 
for publication rulings are combined here, but published opinions 
contain roughly twice the proportion of reversals that unpublished 
rulings contain. 6t 
For the six-year totals, for all combinations of judges, the rate of 
disagreement was usually twice as high or higher for cases in which the 
Table 7 .2. Disposition of Cases, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
Disposition C-C-C % C-C-SCJ % C-C-DJ % C-SCJ-DJ % C-C-SDJ % C-SCJ-SDJ % C-C-VJ % OTHER % TOTAL % 
Affirm a 1255/51 96.1 640/26 96.1 1337175 94.7 330/10 97.1 548/25 95.6 164/12 93.2 288/16 94.7 12817 94.8 4690/222 95.5 
Reverseb 340/47 87.9 180/23 88.7 400/55 87.9 84/19 81.6 181119 90.5 42/6 87.5 81/13 86.2 47/8 85.5 1335/190 87.5 
Vacatec 50/3 94.3 25/1 96.1 43/3 93.5 4/0 100 27/4 87.1 11/0 100 8/3 72.7 5/0 100 173/14 92.5 
Re+ Vad 390/50 88.6 205/24 89.5 443/58 88.4 88/19 82.2 198/23 89.6 53/6 89.8 89/16 84.8 52/8 86.7 1508/204 88.1 
Dismiss 70/1 98.6 37/0 100 40/3 93.0 17/1 94.4 13/0 100 7/0 100 3/1 75.0 7/0 100 194/6 97.0 
EQe 49/3 94.2 33/4 89.1 53/3 94.6 2112 91.3 36/4 90.0 12/0 100 5/0 100 8/1 88.9 217115 93.5 
Petition 
Denied 20/1 95.2 6/1 83.3 11!0 100 1/0 100 511 83.3 3/0 100 0/1 -0- Ill 50.0 47/5 90.3 
TOTAL 1,784/106 94.4 921155 94.4 1,884/139 93.1 457/32 93.5 800/53 93.8 239/18 93.0 385/34 91.9 196/17 92.0 6,656/452 93.6 
Note: For explanation of presentation of figures, see note to table 7 .1. 
arncludes affirm and remand. 
bincludes remand, reverse and remand, and affirm in part/reverse in part. 
cJncludes vacate and remand 
dReverse and vacate combined 
0 Enforcement of order granted or denied. 
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court reversed than when it affirmed the lower court. In reversals, 
panels of two circuit judges and either a senior circuit judge or senior 
district judge registered disagreement less often than did panels of three 
circuit judges or two circuit judges and a district judge. Panels of a 
circuit judge, senior circuit judge, and district judge showed the great-
est rate of disagreement in reversals (18 .4 percent), more than six times 
their disagreement rate in affirming the lower court. Panels of two 
circuit judges and a district judge in 1971 and panels of two circuit 
judges and a senior circuit judge in 1974 were the only combinations 
deciding more than a small number of published cases in which the 
pattern of higher disagreement in reversal cases was not borne out. 
It has been strongly suggested that district judges are more likely to 
affirm than to reverse the trial court because of their "institutional 
loyalty" to the district court and their own sensitivity to being reversed, 
although senior district judges are thought to be more neutral toward 
district judges than are their active-duty colleagues. 62 Thus we neecl to 
examine what categories of judges are most likely to disagree in 
reversals. Circuit judges' suggestions that when a panel reversing the 
trial court registers disagreement, extra judges are more likely to 
dissent (thus voting in the direction of affirming their district court 
colleagues) than to join the majority are not borne out. In 1970-72, 
district judges on nonunanimous panels did not lean more to affirm-
ance or reversal in dissent than when they were part of the majority. In 
published cases in 1974, such district judges did behave somewhat as it 
was suggested they would, that is, they were somewhat more likely to 
affirm than were their circuit judge colleagues, but in 1973 and 1975, 
when they dissented in nonunanimous reversals, they were somewhat 
more likely to reverse their district court colleagues than were dissent-
ing circuit judges with whom they served. (Among the unpublished 
opinions in 197 5, the three dissenters would have affirmed, with the 
majority more likely to reverse--only weak support for the judges' 
suggestions.) 
Behavior of senior district judges shows support for the hypothesis 
only in 1974 published cases, but the number of cases is very small. In 
the other years, when differences existed, a dissenting senior district 
judge was more likely to reverse than were dissenting appellate col-
leagues. Visiting judges either did not dissent in reversals or their 
participation was too infrequent to allow a test of the hypothesis except 
in 1972, when they showed a slight tendency to be more likely than 
circuit judges to affirm in dissent. 
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A hypothesis is that former district judges among the circuit judges 
will sympathize with district judges more than will appellate judges 
without such prior experience and thus will be less likely to reverse; a 
competing hypothesis is that former district judges now on the appel-
late court, having had a greater chance to acclimate themselves to court 
of appeals work, will be less deferential to district judges than will 
district judges sitting with the appellate court by designation. For 
1970--72, we find no differences between Ninth Circuit judges who 
were former district judges and their colleagues who lacked district 
court experience. In 1973 published cases, the former district judges 
were more likely to affirm the trial court when they dissented than were 
their colleagues when they were in dissent. (In unpublished opinions 
for 1973-75, no pattern was visible.) 
One must be careful not to make sweeping statements on the basis 
of this relatively limited set of data from several years of cases from a 
single appellate court. Nevertheless, such in-depth examination is 
important-indeed, necessary-for a more complete picture of appel-
late court inconsistency and disagreement. This study of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit shows a perspective from inside the 
court that what intracircuit inconsistency exists is concentrated in 
several areas of the law rather than affecting (and infecting) all areas of 
the law and is not a major problem. As one would expect from previous 
studies, the level of disagreement in the court is also low. Yet there is 
noticeable variation in rates of disagreement from one category of 
judge or combination of categories to another and fluctuation from one 
year to another. No particular category or combination stands out as 
having a particularly high disagreement rate, although some combina-
tions registered more disagreement than did panels of three circuit 
judges-perhaps an indication of a modestly disruptive effect of the 
presence of extra judges. Because of the expectation that district 
judges' votes would be skewed in the direction of affirmance, an 
important finding is that they did not disproportionately vote to affirm 
their district court colleagues. 
Adoption of the position that the law can develop only or largely 
through disagreement and "inconsistency" leads one to view the pic-
ture presented here not as demonstrating major difficulties of integrat-
ing a court with many participants, but perhaps instead indicating a 
leavening effect assisting in the law's development. There is, however, 
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enough disagreement and inconsistency that we can say, first, that this 
large appellate court does not feel-and is not-burdened by an over-
weening concern with uniformity; second, that the judges' minds thus 
are not "small"; and, last, that at least certain hobgoblins have not been 
bothering the Ninth Circuit, however much they have been haunting the 
court's critics. 
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A Microlevel Analysis of 
Appeals Court Conflict: 
Warren Burger and His 
Colleagues on the D.C. Circuit 
CHARLES M. LAMB 
In this chapter, as in Stephen Wasby's, one court of appeals is examined 
in detail to promote an understanding of specific aspects of judicial 
conflict. Conflict is operationally defined and measured here in terms 
of voting disagreement. The magnitude of judicial conflict thus in-
creases in direct proportion to increases in the percentage of cases 
decided nonunanimously. No attempt is made to develop and test an 
overarching theory of judicial conflict, which ideally should include a 
number of variables, as other contributors to this book explain in their 
chapters. Rather, the goal is to look at some largely unexplored dimen-
sions of conflict in a court of appeals that has witnessed a very high 
level of dissent over time, while simultaneously recognizing some 
problems associated with investigating appeals court voting behavior at 
the micro level. I 
Political science literature on the courts of appeals was surveyed to 
determine which of these courts has experienced the greatest magni-
tude of disagreement over time. Burton Atkins found that the rate of 
conflict on the District of Columbia Circuit between 1956 and 1962 
made it the best candidate for quantitative investigation. Sheldon 
Goldman's research also indicates greater conflict on the D.C. Circuit 
than on any other between 1962 and 1971. Both Atkins and Goldman 
additionally concluded that criminal justice cases stimulated more 
conflict on the D.C. Circuit than did any other single cluster of issues. 2 
Their conclusions are consistent with those of Donald Songer in 
Chapter 5 of this volume. 
Table 8.1. Conflict in En Bane and Three-Judge Criminal Justice Panels, 1956-1969 
Total Number of Percent of Total Number of 
Total Number of Percent Decided Dissenting Votes in Dissenting Votes in Three-Judge Panel Percent Decided 
Year En Bane Decisions Nonunanimously En Bane Decisions En Bane Decisions Decisions Nonunanimously 
1956 3 66.7 5 18.5 19 52.6 
1957 4 100.0 15 41.7 24 29.2 
1958 4 100.0 13 36.1 25 52.0 
1959 6 83.3 12 22.2 27 18.5 
1960 2 100.0 7 38.9 23 30.4 
1961 7 85.7 17 27.0 17 23.5 
1962 6 100.0 15 27.8 39 15.4 
1963 9 55.6 10 12.3 43 18.6 
1964 5 100.0 17 37.8 31 48.4 
1965 8 100.0 28 39.4 28 42.9 
1966 2 50.0 2 11.8 28 39.3 
1967 3 100.0 7 29.2 27 18.5 
1968 I 100.0 2 25.0 36 30.6 
1969 I 100.0 4 44.4 18 38.9 
Totals 61 86.9 !54 28.3 385 32.8 
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Because of these findings, criminal justice cases decided by the 
D.C. Circuit between 1956 and 1969 were selected as the general focus 
of this chapter. The broader objective is to probe the relationship 
between voting conflict and (1) lower court reversals and (2) appeals 
court outputs in a way that has received little attention in literature on 
appeals courts. These were also the years when Warren E. Burger 
served on the D.C. Circuit before his elevation to the Supreme Court. 
As a more specific focus, to clarify the lower court experience of the 
chief justice, emphasis is placed on the relationship between voting 
conflict and judges' background traits and on voting disagreement 
between Burger and his colleagues over time and on five major crimi-
nal justice issues. 
APPROACH, DATA, AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 
The micro level approach relied on in this study has both advantages and 
disadvantages. A principal advantage is that it may be used to explore 
detailed aspects or extreme degrees of conflict, particularly that invol v-
ing specific issues within a broader data set. Such amplification is not 
possible in macrolevel studies and is useful for in-depth analysis of 
prominent appeals court judges. A disadvantage, however, is that the 
data base is small and is spread over fourteen years during which the 
D.C. Circuit experienced five turnovers in personnel. The small 
number of observations in certain years and the absence of one natural 
court limit the testing of some possible hypotheses and the application 
of certain statistics. Inferential statistics and the reporting of levels of 
significance are not used in this chapter because the complete popula-
tion is the data base and there is no generalizing to other courts. Any 
statistic that rests for its interpretation on a level of significance at-
tempts to determine how often a certain pattern will be present in a 
population based on the analysis of a sample. If, however, one has the 
entire population, drawing statistical inferences is not essential. 
Table 8.1 allows a detailed description of some of the data which 
Atkins, Goldman, and Songer analyzed primarily at the macrolevel. 
Because of the focus on Burger, the data base consists of all criminal 
justice cases in which he participated over the fourteen-year period, 
including unanimous and nonunanimous three-judge and en bane 
panel decisions. Defining the focus in this manner results in a data set 
of 61 en bane and 385 three-judge decisions. 3 Column 3 shows that 
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court members were divided in 86.9 percent of the en bane panels-a 
striking level of disagreement for any court, even surpassing the overall 
dissent rate on the Supreme Court for any term on which data are 
available. 4 One could argue that since complex, controversial issues are 
more often adjudicated en bane, conflict in those cases is naturally 
more discernible than on three-judge panels, but that argument is 
inadequate to account for the extremely high rate of dissent found 
here. Yet, though conflict was a normal occurrence in these en bane 
decisions, the size of dissenting groups was frequently small (column 
5). In contrast, conflict occurred in 32.8 percent of all three-judge 
panels (column 7). This figure is also very high for a court of appeals, in 
which split decisions typically occur in less than 10 percent of all 
cases. 5 It is relevant to recall here that in the research reported in 
Chapter 5 Songer discovered an overall dissent rate of more than 22 
percent in all criminal cases decided by the D.C. Circuit from 1959 to 
1970, but after Burger left the court the dissent rate dropped to 13.4 
percent. 
Consistent with this chapter's approach, two other points should be 
mentioned about Table 8.1. Since the magnitude of conflict is almost 
three times more likely to occur in en bane than in three-judge panels, 
one might conclude that this finding is related to small group studies 
which suggest that judges may behave differently in different environ-
ments or that the size and composition of panels may affect voting. 
Among other things, the literature indicates that when the en bane 
procedure is employed, judges may feel more at ease in dissenting if 
they can gain the support of at least one colleague. 6 Yet such a 
conclusion here is fraught with difficulties. Although the data confirm 
findings that frequent use of the en bane procedure tends to underscore 
intracourt conflict, 7 small group dynamics cannot explain the oscilla-
tions in magnitude of conflict because different judges were usually 
interacting on different three-member panels. To draw a small group 
inference, the same judges must serve on each panel and all variables 
must be controlled except size of group. Instead of a small group 
explanation, these variances undoubtedly reflect the mathematical 
probability that as the size of the decision-making group increases, the 
likelihood increases that at least one judge will dissent. Second, Table 
8.1 indicates considerable conflict fluctuation longitudinally. The 
D.C. Circuit decided anywhere from 50 to 100 percent of its en bane 
criminal justice cases nonunanimously in any given year. (The percent 
of dissenting votes out of all votes cast also varied but not as markedly.) 
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Major oscillations in magnitude of conflict on three-judge panels are 
also evident, ranging from 15.4 to 52.6 percent. Although the data set 
is small, Table 8.1 suggests that conflict may be dynamic rather than 
static longitudinally. As explained in other chapters of this volume, a 
number of factors may account for this finding. 
Several hypotheses or expectations involving the general and spe-
cific foci of this chapter are investigated in the following pages. At the 
same time, the limitations on analysis imposed by the small data set and 
the mixture of en bane and three-judge panels continue to be mentioned 
periodically. 
CONFLICT WHEN OVERRULING DISTRICT COURTS 
One widely cited study focusing in part on the courts of appeals reached 
an important finding which surprisingly had not been tested again in 
published form with respect to the appeals courts prior to this book. 
Richard J. Richardson and Kenneth N. Vines analyzed a sample of civil 
liberties decisions announced by three circuits. 8 Although the authors 
did not explain whether their data included three-judge or en bane 
decisions or both, they concluded that there was considerably greater 
conflict (three to six times as much) on a court of appeals that reversed 
than on one that affirmed district courts. This finding is tested here with 
criminal justice data, the hypothesis again being that there was a far 
greater magnitude of conflict on the D.C. Circuit when it reversed the 
district court. The theory behind this hypothesis is that nonunanimous 
reversals are manifestations of a conflict situation within an appellate 
court. Judges experience obvious choice points and may decide to 
move in different directions for various reasons, including dissimilar 
attitudes, values, and role conceptions. Unanimous affirmances, on the 
other hand, strongly suggest the absence of meaningful choice points; 
therefore, a substantial level of conflict would not be theoretically 
expected.9 To be cautious, I have excluded from the data base cases 
affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanded without a specific 
statement of affirmance, dismissed as frivolous or on related grounds, 
vacated judgments, and sentences set aside without reversal. On these 
grounds, 118 of 446 cases (26.5 percent) were excluded. Of these 
cases, by far the largest number involved decisions affirming in part 
and reversing in part, for they are usually extremely difficult to classify 
objectively and consistently as either affirmances or reversals. 
Table 8. 2 allows a reexamination of the finding of Richardson and 
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Vines. It shows that 46.3 percent of the 54 three-judge reversals but 
only 28.8 percent of the 274 three-judge affirmances were decided 
non unanimously, whereas 93.1 percent of the 29 en bane reversals and 
89.3 percent of the 28 en bane affirmances were decided non-
unanimously. Thus the hypothesis is supported only for three-judge 
panel decisions. Richardson and Vines found that district court rever-
sals tend to be prolibertarian. The data here support this finding. 10 The 
nature of the data, however, warns against any conclusion being drawn. 
Because of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, a 
vast majority of these criminal cases were appealed from anti defendant 
decisions. A reversal, consequently, is almost by definition prodefen-
dant, which is not true of the more general category of civil liberties 
decisions examined by Richardson and Vines. 
CONFLICT MAGNITUDE AND COURT OUTPUT 
Although reversing lower courts may cause judicial conflict, some 
consequences of conflict may be related to court output. Two general 
hypotheses selected here relate magnitude of conflict to the time 
required for reaching decisions and the volume of the court's outputs. 
Neither has been directly tested for the courts of appeals, but research 
on the Supreme Court indicates that one effect of a high level of conflict 
is a delay in decision making because judges tend to devote more time 
to writing dissenting and concurring opinions. 11 Hence the first hy-
pothesis is that the greater the magnitude of conflict, the longer the time 
judges will take from oral argument until final decisions are an-
nounced. The second hypothesis, which logically follows, is that there 
will be a substantial decrease in the total number of decisions an-
nounced by the court in years of greater conflict. If these hypotheses 
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Table 8.3. Conflict in Three-Judge Panels, Time Required for 
Decision, and Number of Decisions, 1956-1969 
Days to Decision Days to Decision Total Decisions 
(Mean) (Median) 
Percent Non-
unanimous Unani- Non- Unani- Non- Unani- Non-
Decisions mous unanimous mous unanimous mous unanimous 
52.6 (1956) 46.8 188.0 21.0 188.0 9 10 
52.0 (1958) 28.1 106.9 21.0 99.0 10 10 
48.4 (1964) 80.3 174.3 57.0 185.0 15 15 
42.9 (1965) 85.8 150.3 54.0 107.0 15 II 
39.3 (1966) 101.3 190.0 67.0 161.0 14 12 
38.9 (1969) 70.3 214.8 68.5 221.5 10 6 
30.6 (1968) 139.9 211.5 109.5 201.0 22 II 
30.4 (1960) 62.2 119.3 36.0 129.0 16 6 
29.2 (1957) 33.5 122.9 25.0 57.0 13 7 
23.5 (1961) 61.7 88.7 41.0 80.0 13 6 
18.6 (1963) 35.5 104.4 28.0 104.5 32 8 
18.5 (1967) 92.2 189.8 79.0 190.0 22 5 
18.5 (1959) 56.9 87.0 39.0 65.0 17 5 
15.4 (1962) 63.5 105.8 53.5 91.0 28 5 
Average 68.4 146.7 50.0 134.2 
Note: In thirty-two three-judge panel decisions, no date of oral argument is provided by 
the Federal Reporter, Second Edition. These cases were therefore excluded from the data in 
this table. 
contain any validity, it should be obvious from ranking years of greatest 
conflict, derived from Table 8. 1. 
Table 8. 3 is designed to examine these propositions for three-judge 
panel decisions. (Reflecting one disadvantage of a microlevel study 
such as this one, the small number of en bane decisions precludes a 
similar analysis of them.) The table shows the mean and median 
number of days required for three-judge decisions handed down at 
different levels of conflict and the total number of three-judge decisions 
each year. Surprisingly little support for the two hypotheses is evident. 
Although in each year substantially more time was necessary to hand 
down nonunanimous decisions, the length of time required varied 
greatly by year almost irrespective of the magnitude of conflict. In none 
of the four years in which conflict rose above 40 percent did the mean 
number of days needed to reach a decision rank in the top four, and in 
only one ( 1956) did the median number of days rank in the top four. In 
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contrast, 1967 witnessed only an 18.5 percent rate of dissent, but the 
median and mean number of days necessary for decisions ranked third 
and fourth, respectively, out of fourteen years. 
Concerning the total number of three-judge decisions each year, 
the data suggest a weak relationship between magnitude of conflict and 
the number of unanimous decisions announced, but for non unanimous 
decisions the hypothesis is clearly not confirmed. Indeed, ironically, 
the relationship between magnitude of conflict and number of non-
unanimous decisions announced each year appears to be roughly the 
opposite of what was hypothesized. Of the seven years of greatest 
conflict, in only one (1969) was the number of nonunanimous deci-
sions generally as low as anticipated. In light of these findings, addi-
tional testing of both hypotheses with a larger data set would seem 
worthwhile. 
Another point of interest is that the longest periods of delay for 
non unanimous three-judge decisions occurred in 1969, Burger's final 
year on the D.C. Circuit. In that year the magnitude of conflict was not 
substantially higher than the average for all fourteen years when the 
data in Tables 8.1 and 8.3 are compared (38.9 percent versus 32.8 
percent), but an average of214.8 days and a median of221.5 days were 
required to announce the 1969 decisions. Of the seven non unanimous 
three-judge decisions handed down that year, Burger dissented in the 
last four, and in three he authored a dissenting opinion. At least two 
explanations are plausible concerning these delays in expediting the 
court's business. First, Richard Nixon's nomination of Burger as chief 
justice on May 21 , 1969, may have had some effect on slowing the 
process since two of Burger's last four decisions were announced after 
his nomination and an average of 211.5 days was required in those 
cases. Perhaps Burger was preoccupied by the prospect of assuming his 
new duties as chief justice. Second, relevant here is the very critical 
tone of Burger's dissent in Frazier v. United States, 12 one of his last 
opinions on the D.C. Circuit, which required 298 days for decision. 
Frazier was announced after Burger had been invited to the White 
House and knew he might be elevated to the Supreme Court. 13 Hence 
Burger may have reserved a great deal of time so he could carefully 
mold a final jab toward D.C. Circuit liberals (in this case David L. 
Bazelon and Spottswood W. Robinson), who had regularly disagreed 
with him on criminal justice issues. To draw on the concept of Walter F. 
Murphy, in Frazier Burger seemed to be using a sanction against his 
colleagues through a strongly worded dissent. 14 Burger could write a 
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stinging dissent knowing he was probably leaving the court and need 
not worry about alienating his D.C. Circuit colleagues for purposes of 
future coalition-building. Not coincidentally, perhaps, Burger's 
Frazier opinion was also emphasized during Senate confirmation hear-
ings as being consonant with the "law and order" stance that Nixon had 
successfully taken in the 1968 presidential campaign and similar views 
by conservative Senate Judiciary Committee members. 
JUDICIAL CONFLICT AND BACKGROUND TRAITS 
The more specific focus on conflict between Burger and his appeals 
court colleagues begins with a hypothesis suggested by social back-
ground theory, the purpose of which is to determine whether back-
ground characteristics affect judicial decision making. The 
fundamental theoretical link in the paradigm is the notion that certain 
background traits are independent variables that help explain judges' 
behavior, including the propensity of one judge to agree or disagree 
with his brethren. Sheldon Goldman has conducted the most extensive 
background research on the courts of appeals. Two of his main con-
clusions were that appeals court judges who are Democrats and either 
Catholic or Jewish are more liberal than judges who are Republicans 
and Protestants. Other research focusing specifically on criminal jus-
tice cases is largely consistent with Goldman's findings. Among oth-
ers, StuartS. Nagel has shown that judges who are Democrats are more 
likely to vote in favor of criminal defendants than judges who are 
Republicans. S. Sidney Ulmer and Nagel have additionally provided 
evidence that Catholic judges are more inclined to support defendants 
than are Protestant judges. 15 One would therefore hypothesize that 
Burger, a Republican Protestant, would be in greatest voting conflict 
with judges who were Democrats and either Catholic or Jewish. 
Table 8.4 categorizes the D.C. Circuit judges who served between 
1956 and 1969 according to these background traits. The purpose is to 
determine whether any patterns emerge when these two background 
characteristics are related to magnitude of agreement and disagree-
ment. Put otherwise, one may investigate the hypothesized relationship 
by calculating the percentage of times that each judge voted with 
Burger as shown through a four-cell matrix using the party and religion 
variables. The data include all nonunanimous three-judge and en bane 
decisions. 
It is obvious from Table 8.4 that Burger was in most agreement 
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Table 8.4. Background Traits and Voting Agreement with Burger in 
Nonunanimous Decisions, 1956-1969 
Protestant 
Henry W. Edgerton 
Carl E. McGowan 
Wilbur K. Miller 
E. Barrett Prettyman 
Spottswood W. Robinson 
George Thomas Washington 
Walter M. Bastian 








David L. Bazelon 
Charles Fahy 
Harold Leventhal 
Edward A. Tamm 
J. Skelly Wright 
Republicans 







Sources: The data on political party and religious identification are taken from Judges of 
the United States; Who's Who in America; The American Bench; the Dictionary of American 
Judges; and U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Legislative History of the United States 
Circuit Courts of Appeals and Judges Who Served during the Period 1801 through May 1972 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972). 
over time with four judges: Edward A. Tamm, John A. Danaher, E. 
Barrett Prettyman, and Walter M. Bastian. Given the background 
literature, one would have anticipated the high level of consensus 
between Burger and Bastian, but certainly not between Burger and 
Tamm. Burger agreed with the court's other two Republicans at an 
average rate of 81 . 5 percent but with the eleven Democrats at only 4 7. 6 
percent. By contrast, Burger's average agreement was 53.5 percent 
with the other seven Protestants but 52.1 percent with the six Catholic 
or Jewish judges. Therefore, although only two other Republicans 
served on the court, the data suggest that party was clearly more related 
to conflict than was religion. The picture becomes muddied, however, 
when party and religion are both related to conflict. Of the Democrats, 
Burger agreed 49.8 percent of the time with Protestant judges and 45.0 
percent with Catholic or Jewish judges. Yet these averages should not 
disguise the fact that of the four judges with whom Burger experienced 
the greatest magnitude of conflict in a substantial number of cases, 
three were Democrats and either Catholic or Jewish (Bazelon, Charles 
Fahy, and J. Skelly Wright). 
To relate only two background variables to voting conflict and 
consensus clearly is an elementary approach. It does not pretend to be 
methodoligically sophisticated or to consider a comprehensive list of 
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background traits such as that developed by C. Neal Tate.'6 Yet the data 
demonstrate, as one would anticipate, that Burger was in strong con-
sensus with Republican judges and most likely to be in greatest conflict 
with colleagues who were Democrats and either Catholic or Jewish. 
Overall, the findings are mixed and only partially support Songer's 
macrolevel conclusion in Chapter 5 regarding the relationship between 
conflict and judges' political party identifications. 
CONFLICT, JUDGES, AND ISSUES 
Micro level research implies analysis that goes beyond general levels of 
disagreement shown in Table 8.4. It is entirely possible that such data 
may mask important fluctuations in conflict between Burger and his 
colleagues over time and on specific issues. Indeed, beginning with C. 
Herman Pritchett's The Roosevelt Court, political scientists have com-
pared aggregated and disaggregated data to describe oscillations in 
voting agreement among judges longitudinally and on particular is-
sues. When substantial fluctuations occur, a microlevel approach clar-
ifies change over time and indicates which issues are most related to 
variation in conflict. The data in Table 8.4 were therefore more closely 
examined for both three-judge and en bane panels. 
Table 8.5 breaks down the data by year. During Burger's initial two 
years on the D.C. Circuit he experienced strong to moderate conflict 
with Bazelon, Henry W. Edgerton, and Fahy. The only judge he voted 
consistently with was Judge Prettyman. This pattern suggests support at 
the appeals court level for small group studies demonstrating that newly 
appointed Supreme Court justices do not tend to align with colleagues 
at either extreme of the ideological spectrum. 17 Between 1958 and 
1964 consensual changes in voting relations appear. Burger's voting 
became more harmonious with that of Danaher, Wilbur K. Miller, and 
George T. Washington. Conflict with Bazelon, Edgerton, and Fahy also 
diminished somewhat. 
In contrast, dramatic changes in voting patterns emerged from 
1965 through 1969. A very high magnitude of conflict is clearly 
evident during these years as the cleavage between Burger and Bazelon, 
Wright, and Fahy became severe. This was the first period in Burger's 
lower court career in which he maintained conflictual voting relations 
with more than half of his brethren. So pronounced was disagreement 
between Burger and the Bazelon-Wright duo that it surpassed such 
Table 8.5. Voting Agreement Between Burger and his Colleagues in Nonunanimous 
Criminal Justice Cases, 1956-1969 
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Totals 
Bastian 
Three-judge 2i2 lil 2i2 3i3 lil 2i2 2i2 13il3 
En bane 2i2 2i4 li4 4i5 2i2 5i6 3i6 5i5 li5 4i4 lil 30i44 
Bazelon 
Three-judge OiiO Oi2 2i9 li2 Oi2 Oil Oi4 Oi3 Oi3 Oi5 Oi5 Oi3 Oi4 Oi3 3i56 
En bane Oi2 2i4 3i4 2i5 012 2i6 4i6 Oi5 4i5 Oi8 Iii Oi3 Oil Oil 18i53 
Danaher 
Three-judge Ill lil 2i2 lil lil 3i3 lil Ill lil 12il2 
En bane 112 2i4 2i4 5i5 2i2 6i6 6i6 5i5 215 8i8 lil 3i3 Ill Ill 45i53 
Edgerton 
Three-judge Oi4 Oi4 Oil Oil Oi2 Oi2 Oil Oi9 Oi2 Oil Oi27 
En bane Oi2 3i4 3i4 3i5 Oi2 2i6 4i6 Oi5 3i3 18i37 
Fahy 
Three-judge li3 Oi3 Oi4 Oil Oil Oi2 Oi2 li4 3i4 Oil li6 Oi2 6i33 
En bane Oi2 2i4 3i4 3i5 Oi2 2i6 4i6 5i5 4i5 017 Oil 23i47 
Leventhal 
Three-judge lil lil 2i2 
En bane Oi4 lil 2i3 lil Oil 4il0 
McGowan 
Three-judge lil Oil 112 Oil 2i5 
En bane 2i2 2i8 lil 2i3 lil Oil 8il6 
Table 8.5. Continued 
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Totals 
Miller 
Three-judge Oil 1/3 113 Ill Ill Ill Ill 619 213 Ill Ill 16125 
En bane 212 214 1/4 315 212 316 216 515 115 818 Ill 30148 
Prettyman 
Three-judge 10110 313 313 212 Ill 011 19120 
En bane 112 314 314 515 212 616 515 013 25131 
Robinson 
Three-judge 112 011 014 117 
En bane Ill 011 112 
Tamn 
Three-judge Ill Ill 414 213 819 
En bane 414 Ill 313 Ill Ill 10110 
Washington 
Three-judge 011 011 011 112 Ill 013 113 3112 
En bane 112 214 314 315 112 316 416 515 415 016 Ill 27146 
Wright 
Three-judge 011 013 318 012 112 011 011 4118 
En bane 011 515 112 018 011 013 011 011 6122 
Table 8.6. Summary Data on Conflict in Five Criminal Justice Issues, 1956-1969 
Searches and Effective Assistance Unnecessary Insanity 
Arrests Seizures of Counsel Delays Defense 
Percent of cases decided nonunanimously 32.3 66.7 45.8 72.2 46.2 
(10/31) (22/33) (11124) (26/36) (24/52) 
Voting divisions in en bane panels No en bane 5-4 5-4 5-4 5-4 
panels 7-2 5-4 5-4 5-4 











Years in which conflict was greatest 1958-59 Generally 1956-59 1958 1957 
1964-66 constant 1964 1961 
Judge(s) with whom Burger experienced Bazelon Bazelon (1117) Bazelon ( 117) Bazelon (5/17) Wright ( 116) 
greatest conflicta (0/6) Edgerton (1/5) Edgerton (I /6) Fahy (6/15) Miller (4/12) 
Fahy (2/5) Fahy (1/5) Miller (5/11) Bazelon (7/19) 
Judge(s) with whom Burger experienced Insufficient Prettyman ( 13/ 13) Prettyman ( 4/5) No agreement Prettyman 
greatest consensusa (9/9) 
data Bastian (5/5) Miller ( 4/5) rate above Danaher 
(16/18) 
55 percent Bastian (8/13) 
Fahy (8/13) 
3 A minimum of at least five joint participations in nonunanimous decisions is used in this table. 
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Supreme Court rivalries as those between Louis Brandeis and James C. 
McReynolds or Hugo Black and Owen Roberts. 18 A corresponding 
high degree of consensus characterized Burger's voting relations with 
four other judges-Danaher, Bastian, Tamm, and Miller. 
Voting on specific criminal justice issues was also investigated to 
delve further into conflict between Burger and his colleagues. The 
analysis has two main objectives: to compare the magnitude of conflict 
between Burger and his colleagues across major criminal justice is-
sues, and to determine whether Burger was in conflict with the same 
judges on specific issues as in criminal justice generally. One disadvan-
tage of this microlevel approach is that when the 174 nonunanimous 
cases are disaggregated into discrete categories, the number in each is 
too small for analysis except on five issues: arrests, searches and 
seizures, unnecessary delays prior to preliminary hearings, effective 
assistance of counsel, and the insanity defense. 19 The data are sum-
marized in Table 8. 6 
Table 8.6 shows considerable variance in magnitude of conflict 
across issues. Search and seizure provoked more than twice as much 
disagreement as arrest questions. Conflict in effective assistance cases 
was high but falls between that generated by the first two issues. En 
bane panels were rarely used in these three issues but always resulted in 
a divided court. Importantly, Burger experienced conflict and con-
sensus with essentially the same judges as indicated in Table 8.5. By 
contrast, an extremely high 72.2 percent disagreement rate was present 
in unnecessary delay cases, and the nine en bane decisions were 
substantially divided. Levels of conflict between Burger and his col-
leagues were somewhat different in unnecessary delay cases, however, 
with Burger agreeing far more often with Edgerton, Washington, and 
even Bazelon. At the same time, Burger's level of consensus with more 
conservative court members declined. 20 A somewhat similar pattern 
emerges for criminal insanity cases. Of fifty-two panels, at least one 
dissent occurred in twenty-four, and conflict was evident in all but two 
of eleven en bane panels. For the first time Burger experienced his 
highest magnitude of conflict not with Bazelon but with Wright and 
Miller. Meanwhile, relative consensus existed between Burger and 
Edgerton, Fahy, and Washington, again atypical except in unnecessary 
delay cases. Overall, therefore, the data in Table 8.6 suggest notable 
variations in magnitude of conflict depending on the issue and in 
patterns of disagreement between Burger and several of his colleagues. 
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This chapter has investigated conflict on the D.C. Circuit between 
1956 and 1969 in criminal justice cases. Emphasis has been placed on 
one possible cause of conflict (reversing lower court decisions), two 
possible effects of conflict (delays and decreases in decisional outputs), 
one possible cause of conflict among individual judges (background 
differences), and conflict between Warren Burger and his colleagues 
over time in criminal justice litigation generally and in five major 
issues. 
It was first hypothesized that when the D.C. Circuit reversed a 
district court, intracourt conflict would be substantially higher than 
when the lower court was affirmed. The hypothesis was confirmed for 
three-judge but not for en bane decisions. Second was the expectation 
of a relationship between greater magnitude of conflict and (I) greater 
time required for the court to reach a decision and (2) decreases in total 
outputs. Since the size of the en bane data base was small, this 
hypothesis was tested only with three-judge decisions, and surprisingly 
neither expectation was confirmed. Additional research involving both 
hypotheses would seem worthwhile. 
Concerning the chapter's more specific focus, it was first suggested 
that there would be a relationship between magnitude of conflict 
between Burger and his brethren when two background charac-
teristics-political party identification and religion-were examined. 
Relying on a simple test of the hypothesis, the findings were mixed 
although Burger was in very high agreement with other Republican 
judges and usually in greatest conflict with judges who were Demo-
crats and either Catholic or Jewish. When the data were examined by 
year and disaggregated into three-judge and en bane panels, there was 
considerable variance in magnitude of conflict between Burger and 
other judges over time and in specific criminal justice issues. Perhaps 
this type of microlevel research will be most justified in the future to 
clarify the behavior of prominent appeals court judges. Especially for 
those ultimately elevated to the Supreme Court, comparative institu-
tional and individual research involving both levels of federal appellate 
courts may provide some new insights into judicial process and be-
havior. 
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Dissent in State 
Supreme Courts: Patterns 
and Correlates of Conflict 
HENRY R. GLICK and 
GEORGE W. PRUET, JR. 
The presence of dissent on collegial courts, especially the U.S. Su-
preme Court, has long been a research interest in political science. In a 
shorthand way, the level of dissent reveals the amount of conflict and 
consensus on appellate courts. Certainly the lack of dissent does not 
guarantee that judges always agree on issues and solutions to cases, 1 
but formal dissents are a clear indicator that judges seriously disagree 
on basic features of cases. High levels of dissent also have led social 
scientists to doubt the power of stare decisis or other legal doctrines to 
account for most judicial decisions. Judges who respond to the same 
cases and have access to the same legal sources but consistently reach 
different conclusions are influenced by something other than law. High 
levels of dissent have provided the crucial raw materials for systematic 
empirical research demonstrating that small group interaction, judges' 
backgrounds and attitudes, and their social and political environments 
substantially influence judicial decision making. 
In addition to focusing on individual judges and courts, dissent can 
be viewed as a reflection of conflict in society. There is a link between 
the amount of political conflict within a society and the presence of 
conflict within that society's political institutions. In this sense, courts 
are not isolated parts of government, immune to the influence of 
political pressures, but are components of the broader political system. 
Similar to other political institutions, they respond to various political 
influences and concerns. From this perspective, conflict exhibited by 
an appellate court is analogous to conflict found in a legislature or in the 
executive branch. 
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This chapter focuses on conflict and consensus on state supreme 
courts revealed through variations in levels of dissent. Instead of study-
ing dissents and particular decisions of one or a few appellate courts, 
we are concerned with the level and causes of dissent on all fifty state 
supreme courts. Our primary objective is to describe current levels of 
dissent in the fifty states, to compare current and past levels of dissent, 
and to examine several hypotheses concerning the social conditions 
that often are believed to produce differences in the level of dissent. The 
main theme of this chapter is that although courts are more insulated 
from political and social pressures than legislatures and the rest of 
government, state courts respond to and reflect conflict in state political 
and social systems. 
DISSENT IN STATE SUPREME COURTS 
Most research on dissent has studied the U.S. Supreme Court, mainly 
because it is the highest court in the land but also because it regularly 
produces many decisions with dissents, typically at least 50 percent 
since the 1943 term. 2 Usually researchers are able to find only a 
handful of state supreme courts and an occasional federal court of 
appeals in which levels of dissent are high enough to attract attention or 
to serve for background and attitude studies of decision making. 3 The 
most important studies of dissent including all fifty state supreme 
courts were conducted using data from the early to mid-1960s, but 
during this period, there was not much variation in dissent. 4 Fewer than 
ten states produced dissents in 20 percent or more of their cases, and 
only the supreme courts in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and New York 
produced dissents at or above the 40 percent mark. 5 
These high dissent rates were not typical of supreme courts in most 
states and could create a misleading impression that conflict is com-
mon in state supreme courts. As stated earlier, an important question is 
whether the level and variation of dissents have changed very much 
since earlier fifty-state studies. Other research suggests that dissent is 
on the rise, 6 but there have been no recent fifty-state surveys. The level 
of dissent informs us about conflict on courts, but the amount of dissent 
also has implications for future small group and other research on 
judicial decision making. Higher levels of dissent on more courts 
present both more opportunities and compelling reasons for additional 
comparative research. 7 
Patterns and Correlates of Conflict 201 
Research on state court decision making is important also because 
state courts hear the vast majority of all cases decided in the United 
States. For instance, the federal courts combined decide approximately 
240,000 cases per year while state courts in Florida decide almost 3 
million and those in New York decide nearly 4 million annually. State 
supreme court workloads vary from several hundred to several thousand 
cases each year. Although the percentage of highly controversial state 
supreme court decisions is much smaller than that in the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the odds are extremely high that when citizens go to court, either 
in civil or criminal cases, they go to a state court. The likely impact of 
state courts on most Americans looms very large in judicial politics. 
Decision making on these courts deserves more attention. 
LEVEL OF DISSENT 
To begin the analysis of dissent in the fifty states, Table 9. 1 presents the 
percentage of state supreme court cases in which there were dissents for 
five periods beginning in 1916. Data for 1916, 1941 , and 1966 were 
obtained from earlier research. 8 Data for 197 4-7 5 and 1980--81 were 
added to bring the analysis up to date. Dissents for two years for each of 
the latest periods ( 197 4-7 5 and 1980--81) were compared and averaged 
to avoid the possibility that an individual year might not reflect the time 
studied.9 
Table 9.1 reveals that very high levels of dissent still are the 
exception in the fifty states. Only thirteen states had dissent rates at or 
above 25 percent, although three others were very close. Comparisons 
across the years, however, show considerable growth in the level of 
dissent. In 1974-75, only eight state supreme courts produced dissents 
in 25 percent or more of their cases. In 1966, there were seven, in 1941 , 
five, and in 1916 only two states had dissent levels at or above 25 
percent. 
The mean percentage of cases involving dissents also has risen 
from approximately 12 percent in 1941 and 1966 to nearly 15 percent 
in 1974-75 and to over 18 percent in 1980--81. Variation among states 
in dissent rates increased a little in 1980--81, but since the standard 
deviations from 1966 on are similar, the figures suggest a general 
upward shift in the level of dissent in most of the states. Comparison of 
individual states between 1966 and 1980--81 confirms a general pattern 
toward more dissents: thirty-eight state supreme courts experienced 
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Table 9.1. Percentage of Decisions with Dissents in State Supreme 
Courts 
Rank in Mean Mean 
1980-81 State 1980-81 1974-75 1966 1941 1916 
High Dissent Courts, 1980-81 (Dissent > 25 percent) 
I California 54.8 18.8 32.3 16.7 5.3 
2 Louisiana 43.1 42.3 12.7 0.9 12.8 
3 Florida 42.2 61.5 28.2 17.7 4.1 
4 Idaho 40.1 19.9 9.0 35.6 12.2 
5 Oklahoma 37.6 24.7 26.5 19.7 0.1 
6 Ohio 36.8 27.4 34.9 14.1 14.8 
7 Pennsylvania 32.8 39.2 41.0 5.0 1.5 
8 New Jersey 30.6 1.6 7.1 30.2 14.0 
9 Washington 30.2 25.3 11.5 28.7 10.0 
10 Missouri 27.6 12.3 4.1 0.7 17.4 
II Kentucky 27.1 4.3 8.1 3.0 0.1 
12 Arkansas 26.4 19.1 13.6 14.3 9.6 
13 New York 25.3 26.9 41.0 15.8 34.1 
Low Dissent Courts, 1980-81 (Dissent ( 25 percent) 
50 Hawaii 2.4 11.8 
49 Maine 2.5 4.6 4.2 7.0 2.5 
48 Rhode Island 2.6 3.2 1.4 5.4 6.5 
47 Vermont 3.1 3.8 5.9 1.7 5.4 
46 Delaware 4.0 4.1 3.4 15.4 15.0 
45 New Hampshire 5.0 7.8 7.3 1.4 3.3 
44 Massachusetts 5.7 11.0 1.2 0.6 0.0 
43 Nevada 6.0 4.4 9.8 6.8 11.4 
42 Mississippi 6.1 6.6 3.9 8.0 0.1 
41 Connecticut 7.4 3.4 3.6 3.9 11.9 
40 Arizona 8.3 7.0 6.1 1.8 8.3 
39 Virginia 8.5 3.3 7.4 19.6 0.1 
38 Iowa 9.1 12.0 19.7 14.4 5.2 
37 North Dakota 9.2 13.2 8.4 15.1 10.0 
36 Minnesota 10.0 5.2 6.8 10.8 5.9 
35 West Virginia 10.1 15.7 10.7 14.3 4.8 
34 Colorado 10.7 12.5 9.8 26.3 18.5 
33 New Mexico 10.7 6.2 6.0 10.3 6.2 
32 Tennessee 11.2 6.0 3.0 2.3 1.6 
31 North Carolina 11.4 18.3 2.4 17.8 13.2 
30 Nebraska 11.4 13.0 11.2 7.1 36.5 
29 Alabama 14.3 16.5 1.7 4.1 6.1 
28 Wisconsin 15.1 8.8 8.0 3.9 8.6 
27 Indiana 15.3 28.8 11.5 5.7 7.1 
26 South Carolina 17.0 9.4 3.4 8.3 17.0 
25 Montana 17.3 6.5 11.9 16.1 0.1 
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Table 9.1. Continued 
Rank in Mean Mean 
1980-81 State 1980-81 1974-75 1966 1941 1916 
Low Dissent Courts, 1980-81 (Dissent ( 25 percent) 
24 Illinois 17.3 14.6 7.2 15.7 15.0 
23 Maryland 18.5 9.9 5.4 8.6 5.6 
22 Georgia 18.7 18.0 8.3 7.2 5.8 
21 Oregon 18.9 16.5 9.1 12.2 9.1 
20 Texas 19.2 13.0 19.1 3.4 5.7 
19 South Dakota 21.1 23.4 24.3 12.0 18.6 
18 Kansas 21.9 5.2 12.1 13.4 8.5 
17 Wyoming 22.2 16.4 9.7 4.3 2.6 
16 Michigan 24.0 29.5 46.5 19.0 9.6 
15 Alaska 24.6 12.5 
14 Utah 24.9 20.1 11.7 33.0 7.7 
i = 18.4 i = 14.91 i = 12.3 i = 11.7 i = 8.9 
S.D.= 12.27 S.D.= 11.53 S.D.= 11.13 S.D. =8.80 S.D.=7.66 
Note: Includes per curiam but not memorandum decisions. 
Source: West's Regiofllll Reporters, 1974, 1975, 1980, and 1981, and Henry Robert 
Glick and Kenneth N. Vines, State Court Systems (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
1973), p. 79. 
increased levels of dissent between 1966 and 1981 and only ten experi-
enced decreased levels of dissent. 10 
On a number of state supreme courts, levels of dissent rose dramat-
ically between 1966 and 1980-81 , suggesting that important changes 
have occurred in state judicial politics. For example, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, described in the 1970s as very harmonious and co-
hesive, 11 increased its level of dissent from 7 .I percent in 1966 (1.6 
percent in 1974-75) to slightly more than 30 percent in 1980-81. 
Courts in about a dozen other states have doubled or nearly tripled their 
rates of dissent since the 1960s. 
Yet there are a few large changes in the opposite direction. A 
remarkable decrease occurred in the Michigan Supreme Court, often 
described as a partisan, contentious, and divided court. 12 In 1980-81, 
it had a dissent rate of 24 percent and ranked sixteenth, compared with 
its rank as number one in dissents in 1966 at 46.5 percent. The New 
York and Pennsylvania supreme courts, also often described as very 
contentious with high levels of dissent, have decreased their levels in 
1966 of around 40 percent to 25.3 and 32.8 percent, respectively, in 
1980-81. 
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Table 9.2. Intercorrelations of State Supreme Court Dissent Rates 
1980-81 1974-75 1966 1941 1916 
1980-81 .65 .59 .36 .07 
1974-75 .65 .65 .18 .10 
1966 .59 .65 .22 .15 
1941 .36 .18 .22 .18 
1916 .o7 .10 .15 .18 
Despite increases in levels of dissent in 1980--81 , caution must be 
used in describing or identifying trends in state supreme court dissent. 
For instance, previous correlations among levels of dissent revealed 
practically no relationships among the states in the three periods 1916, 
1941 , and 1966. !3 Table 9. 2 reproduces these correlations plus the 
relationships for 1974-75 and 1980--81. Unlike the earlier figures, 
however, dissent rates in 1966, 1974-75, and 1980--81 are moderately 
related (R = . 59 to . 65), and the 1980--81 and 1941 dissents also are 
somewhat related. Therefore, dissent rates in many of the states are 
shifting in the same general direction and in corresponding propor-
tions. The sharp downward shifts that occurred in Michigan, Pennsyl-
vania, and New York are exceptions to the overall pattern of moderate to 
high increases in the rate of dissents. 
The moderately high positive correlations between the 1966, 
197 4-7 5, and 1980--81 rates suggest that there may be common forces 
responsible for increasing levels of dissent. Perhaps the levels of state 
political conflict generally were higher, or the recent creation of inter-
mediate appellate courts in states previously without them gave more 
state supreme court judges time for the luxury of writing more dissents. 
Besides identifying patterns of supreme court dissent, an interesting 
line of research would be to relate patterns of conflict in state supreme 
courts to other indicators of conflict in state and national politics, such 
as in legislative voting, conflict among political parties and interest 
groups, and between legislatures and governors, and in other areas of 
state politics. Political scientists increasingly appreciate the connec-
tions between courts and other aspects of political and social systems, 
but there still is a tendency to concentrate on the inner workings of 
courts and the behavior of small groups of judges rather than to adopt a 
broader perspective on the causes of dissent and political conflict 
generally. A broader focus on judicial dissent as part of social and 
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political conflict would enlarge our understanding of the links between 
judicial and other forms of political behavior. 
FACTORS AFFECTING DISSENT 
There are many possible influences on conflict and dissent in appellate 
courts. Some have been studied extensively in the past, and our research 
compares current relationships with those previously uncovered. The 
influence of three major factors is reported here: the social and econom-
ic diversity of the states, the level of other political conflict and 
complexity in the states, and the impact of state court structure and 
organization. We have selected several specific indicators to represent 
the influence of these three sets of variables. 
Social and Economic Complexity and Political Competition. Our first 
hypothesis is that state social, economic, and political heterogeneity, 
complexity, and competition contribute to higher dissent rates. There-
fore, conflict should be greatest in states that have diversified econo-
mies, varied populations, substantial urban-rural differences, two-
party competition, the largest budgets, and the highest increases in 
expenditures. These economic, social and political cleavages should 
produce much more conflict in the states' political institutions, includ-
ing the courts.I4 
It is not necessary to elaborate on each independent variable that 
may be related to levels of dissent. Most of the indicators of complexity 
are self-explanatory from Table 9. 3. Several that may not be are 
percentages of private and criminal litigation in 1980, integration, and 
education and welfare spending. The percentage of private and criminal 
litigation is a measure of the complexity and controversial nature of a 
supreme court's docket. Private litigation includes cases such as di-
vorce, contract disputes between individuals, wills and estates, suits for 
injuries, and landlord-tenant cases. 15 We hypothesize that private liti-
gation as well as criminal appeals generally are viewed as less contro-
versial by most judges and that large percentages of these cases in a 
court's docket will depress dissent. Although criminal appeals raise 
questions of procedure and constitutional protections, we believe they 
generally are not controversial in the states because there are so many of 
them in nearly every state and they often are desperate efforts to obtain a 
release from jail, a new trial, or a stay of execution. On average, state 
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Table 9.3. Correlations of Social and Political Factors and Court 
Structure with State Supreme Court Dissent, 1980-81 
(Zero Order Correlations) 
States with States without 
Intermediate Intermediate 
All Appellate Appellate 
States Courts Courts 
Social and Economic Complexity 
Urbanization, 1980 .21 .30 -.22 
Percent change in urbanization, 1970-80 -.13 -.16 .16 
Percent nonagricultural employment, 1980 .10 -.03 - .46• 
Median income -.14 .07 -.12 
Percent black population -.13 -.17 .22 
Percent private litigation -.27 -.19 .01 
Percent criminal cases .06 -.05 -.04 
Integration .01 .II -.27 
Political Complexity and Competition 
Total state expenditures, 1978 .48• .48• -.08 
Percent change in total expenditures, 1968-78 .03 -.14 .23 
Percent Democratic vote for governor .05 -.08 .01 
Percent majority party lower house, 1978 .04 -.05 .06 
Education/welfare expenditures -.17 -.06 - .54• 
Complexity of Court Structure 
Multiple court locations -.20 -.09 -.26 
Number of judges .31• .33 -.08 
Jurisdiction of supreme court .30• -.05 _b 
Presence of intermediate appellate court .25 
Caseload, 1980-81 .12 .07 .01 
"Significant at .05 level. 
"Correlation not computed because states without intermediate appellate courts do not 
provide supreme court discretion to hear cases. 
supreme courts uphold convictions three-fourths of the time. Con-
sequently, we hypothesize that state supreme courts will come to view 
these cases as relatively trivial and unimportant. Integration is a com-
posite measure of state social and economic complexity designed to tap 
features of states in the postindustrial period. Education and welfare 
expenditures measure the commitments of the states to important and 
often controversial policies. The highest expenditures for these pur-
poses tend to be in the richer, urban-industrial states with greater 
amounts of political competition and social heterogeneity. 16 We expect 
support for them to parallel high levels of dissent. 
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Social, economic, and political diversity may affect dissent di-
rectly and indirectly. Direct influences may occur through judges' 
backgrounds and attitudes. 17 Supreme court judges often live in dif-
ferent parts of a state and in varied communities, they have had different 
personal and political experiences, and they may even feel that they 
represent different constituencies. 
Previous research has discovered that diversity among state su-
preme court judges is an important contributor to the level of dissent as 
well as to the direction of decisions. 18 This research should be updated 
and retested, especially since the level of dissent is much higher and 
involves more courts. It is important to know whether diversity among 
judges still affects the level of dissent or whether dissent is increasing 
generally, regardless of variations among judges. This research ques-
tion, however, was beyond the scope of the present study. 
Court Structure. The structure of state courts influences their behavior. 
Earlier studies have shown that certain characteristics of state judici-
aries are associated with the presence of conflict. One structural char-
acteristic found to be associated with dissent is the number of justices 
involved in making collective decisions. 19 As the number of justices on 
a court increases, so should the likelihood of conflict and its expression 
in the form of dissent. 
Probably the structural variable that has been most closely associ-
ated with the occurrence of dissent is the presence of an intermediate 
appellate court, which usually results in many socially and politically 
trivial appeals being decided before they reach the supreme court. 
Therefore, many cases that would have been settled by the supreme 
court, typically with unanimous agreement, are removed so it can 
address the more legally complex and politically controversial appeals. 
States that do not provide this filter place a heavier burden on their 
courts of last resort. In other words, as these supreme courts are 
swamped by a large number of trivial legal issues, the proportion of 
cases with potential for dissent is reduced and there is less time to deal 
with complex cases that would likely lead to conflict and dissenting 
votes. 
An additional structural variable included here is the number of 
locations where supreme courts meet. Some state supreme courts hear 
cases in different parts of the state, and the judges move several times 
each year. State supreme court judges also sometimes live and maintain 
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their offices in different cities rather than in the state capitol or supreme 
court building. We hypothesize that there will be more dissent in these 
states because the judges may not be able to develop cohesive social or 
work groups. 
Another explanatory variable that we have introduced is a measure 
of the discretionary jurisdiction of state supreme courts. One explana-
tion for the high rates of dissent exhibited by the U.S. Supreme Court is 
its wide discretion in determining the cases it will hear. In line with this 
reasoning, all of the fifty state supreme courts were coded for their 
discretionary jurisdiction with a score of zero given to courts with no 
discretion and a score of five given to those with nearly complete 
discretion. We would expect supreme courts with substantial discretion 
to exhibit higher levels of dissent than courts that have little to say about 
what cases are to be decided. 
A final structural variable is caseload. The reasoning is straightfor-
ward. We hypothesize that the larger the caseload, the less likely it is 
that disagreement will be expressed because there is much internal and 
external pressure to complete the court's business. Smaller caseloads 
provide judges more time and opportunity to express dissents. 20 
FINDINGS 
Table 9. 3 presents the correlations between each of the three sets of 
predictors and dissent in 1980-81. Correlations were computed for all 
fifty states and for states with and without intermediate appellate courts. 
The presence of intermediate appellate courts received special attention 
because much previous research has found that these courts are related 
to levels of supreme court dissent as well as to the kinds of issues that 
state supreme courts are likely to hear. 21 
Several measures of state complexity are related to levels of dissent 
in the way we hypothesized. Most of our indicators, however, have little 
impact. The only variable reflecting social and economic complexity 
that has any appreciable effect on dissent in all fifty states is the 
percentage of private litigation. Increases in private litigation tend to 
depress dissent somewhat. Among the political variables, total state 
expenditures are correlated most clearly with levels of dissent. The 
percent of change in total state expenditures between 1968 and 1978, 
however, had no impact. As suggested earlier, we believe that high state 
expenditures stimulate substantial political competition over the fruits 
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of government. Although total state expenditures are related somewhat 
to certain other characteristics of the states, such as population size and 
social complexity, the level of expenditures taps the high stakes of state 
politics and its accompanying competition. 22 It also correlates with 
dissent in the fifty states much more highly than any other indicator of 
state social, economic, or political complexity. High expenditures 
probably reflect a complex political environment in the state with 
multiple political issues, demands for government resources, and dis-
agreement over how these issues ought to be resolved and funds 
allocated. Some ofthese disputes become court cases, but more likely, 
judges in these states have been affected by years of state political 
competition. Two measures of the complexity of court structure are 
modestly related to dissent. Courts with more members and those with 
some control over their workload are somewhat more likely to produce 
more conflict. Judges on these courts probably select a larger percent-
age of controversial and unusual cases. Too much cannot be made of 
this finding, however, because the correlations are low. 
Several predictors in Table 9. 3 are similar to those used previously 
to explain levels of dissent in 1966.23 They are used here partly to note 
any changes in relationships since 1966. A few changes appear in the 
correlations, although none is a very powerful indicator of dissent. For 
instance, the correlation between urbanism in 1960 and dissents in 
1966 was .28 whereas the correlation for urbanism in 1980 and dissents 
in 1980-81 was . 21. The effect of the percentage of black population 
also remained very small. For 1966 dissents, percentage of black 
population correlated - .11 and in 1980--81 it was - .13. In 1966, 
interparty competition correlated .16 with dissents, and in 1980--81 
Democratic votes for governor and party dominance of the lower house 
of the legislature correlated .05 and .04 with dissents, respectively. 
Despite some changes, none of these environmental variables has any 
appreciable impact on the overall level of dissents on state supreme 
courts. 
An interesting pattern emerges when we examine the relationships 
between our predictors and dissent for states with and without inter-
mediate appellate courts. The correlation between percent urban popu-
lation and dissent in all fifty states is . 21. For states with intermediate 
appellate courts it is .30, but in states without intermediate appellate 
courts it is - .22. A similar pattern occurs for nonagricultural employ-
ment, integration, and education and welfare expenditures. The correla-
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tions are low and usually positive for all fifty states and for those with 
intermediate appellate courts but increase notably and are negative for 
states without intermediate appellate courts. Private litigation tends 
slightly to depress dissent in all states but has no effect on supreme 
courts that have no intermediate appellate courts below them. 
These results generally are similar to earlier correlations between 
environmental variables and supreme court dissents in states with 
. intermediate appellate courts. In 1966, three environmental variables 
(percent urban population, 1960; percent foreign born, 1960; and 
percent black population, 1960) had a multiple correlation of . 29 with 
dissent on all fifty supreme courts. But the multiple correlation between 
this same set of variables and dissent increased to .51 when examining 
only those states with an intermediate appellate court. 24 These findings 
suggest that an intermediate appellate court generally is necessary to 
permit social and economic complexity to have a noticeable impact on 
levels of dissent. Perhaps supreme court judges in some urban, non-
agricultural states without intermediate appellate courts have so much 
routine work that dissents rarely seem worthwhile. Table 9.3 suggests 
that dissent rates are not dependent upon the size of caseloads, but 
perhaps the mundane content of their work generally discourages 
dissent. 
Despite the continued effect of intermediate appellate courts on 
levels of dissent, chances are that the impact of this variable will decline 
in coming years. State trends are toward the creation of intermediate 
courts. About two-thirds of the states had them in 1983, and as more 
states adopt them in the future there probably will be very little 
difference among the states on this variable. Rates of dissent may climb 
in many more states, but the presence of intermediate appellate courts 
will no longer account for differences in levels of dissent. 
To examine the combined effects of the independent variables on 
dissent, we selected those with the highest and most significant asso-
ciations with dissent for additional regression analysis. Table 9.4 
presents the standardized regression coefficients (betas) for the largest 
correlations previously examined. The coefficients in Table 9.4 present 
the impact of each of these predictors while controlling simultaneously 
for the impact of the others. When all states are examined, total state 
expenditures is the single best predictor of dissent. Other variables have 
little independent effect. Collectively, however, these four predictors 
account for almost a third of the variation in rates of dissent (R2 = .28). 
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Table 9.4. Combined Effects of Variables with Highest Correlations 
with Dissent, 1980-81 (betas) 
All States 
Total state expenditures, 1978 
Number of judges 
Percent private litigation 
Jurisdiction of supreme court 
R2 = .28 
States with Intermediate Appellate Courts 
Total state expenditures, 1978 
Number of judges 
Urbanization, 1980 
R2 = .32 




Multiple court locations 
R2 = .33 












For states with intermediate appellate courts, total expenditures 
also is the single best predictor, and the number of justices contributes 
some explanation. Urbanization has very little independent impact on 
dissent when controlling for state expenditures and number of judges. 
Education and welfare expenditures best account for dissents in states 
without intermediate appellate courts. The direction of the correlations 
in these states is perhaps the most interesting finding. It suggests that in 
states without intermediate appellate courts, there may be potential 
dissenters waiting to break free were it not for their obligation to hear all 
cases appealed in these states. All predictors collectively explain one-
third of the variance in dissent in states both with and without inter-
mediate appellate courts. 
This chapter has described current levels of dissent in all fifty state 
supreme courts, compared them with past conflict levels, and exam-
ined the impact of a number of environmental and structural variables 
on levels of dissent. An important discovery is that dissent rates are 
increasing in the states. This finding is a boon for researchers in judicial 
politics and should lead to the development of broader theories and 
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models linking state court decision making to additional patterns of 
state politics. 
Many independent variables and hypotheses could be examined to 
explain rates of dissent. Three major categories of variables are the 
social, economic, and political environments of the states; the charac-
teristics of the judges; and the structure, organization, and work of state 
court systems. Several variables are related to levels of dissent, although 
many others, especially indicators of political party conflict, are not. 
We need to collect more precise and perhaps more relevant indicators of 
political conflict in the states. Many commentators, for example, have 
lamented the decline of party competition and the meaning of party 
organization in state politics. If party no longer is very important, 
perhaps we need to find other variables that do relate to conflict and tie 
them to patterns of dissent. Diversity in judges' backgrounds also needs 
to be examined, for it has been a long time since these variables have 
been studied in relation to levels of dissent in the states. 
Court organization continues to be an important factor related to 
levels of dissent. The presence of an intermediate appellate court 
appears to free judges from many mundane tasks and to give them more 
time and stimulation to focus on more controversial issues and to write 
dissenting opinions. Without intermediate appellate courts, social and 
economic diversity does not appear to have much of a chance to affect 
the expression of conflict. The trend is for states to create intermediate 
appellate courts, which may lead to more incentives and opportunities 
for judges to write dissenting opinions. Thus the pattern of increasing 
judicial conflict through formal dissents may continue. 
Finally, research on state court dissent is only one part of the 
comprehensive research needed on the work of state supreme courts. 
The presence of fairly high rates of dissent on many courts presents new 
opportunities to examine the impact of numerous environmental, per-
sonal, and structural factors on the direction of judicial decisions. For 
example, many of the earlier background and attitude studies should be 
retested on a variety of state supreme courts to determine the effect of 
personal characteristics on decision making and the basis of divisions 
while controlling for numerous differences in state political and social 
environments. This work would help students of courts to build more 
general theories about judicial behavior. 
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Measuring Leadership through 
Opinion Assignment in 1\vo 
State Supreme Courts 
VICTOR E. FLANGO, CRAIG R. DUCAT, 
and R. NEAL McKNIGHT 
In 1976, the senior authors created an empirical typology of judicial 
leadership based upon the ratio of non unanimous decisions and dissent 
rates of individual justices. 1 At that time, the authors promised to 
validate the technique using opinion assignment and bloc analysis. This 
chapter takes the first step toward fulfilling that promise by using 
opinion assignment to measure leadership on two state supreme courts. 
LEADERSHIP AND VOTING CONSENSUS 
Following the general idea of the earlier study, the basic premise of this 
study is that the chief justice, as formal leader of a state supreme court, 
is an important determinant of productivity. Productivity on a court 
means deciding the maximum number of cases possible consistent with 
giving each case due consideration. It also means reaching consensus 
whenever possible so that the development of the law is unambiguous. 
This conception assumes that effective leadership results in minimum 
conflict and a high degree of cohesiveness, satisfaction, and productiv-
ity. 2 
Not only the chief justice but most justices desire to increase the 
impact of their decisions and to avoid the adverse effects of visible 
conflict. Other things being equal, they would prefer unanimous deci-
sions. J. Woodford Howard gives several examples of the sacrifice of 
deeply held views to group and institutional interests. Consensus 
decision making may indeed be the relevant model for most judicial 
decisions. S. Sidney Ulmer thus notes, "An obvious fact about col-
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legial courts is that they tend strongly not only toward conformity but 
also toward unanimity. "3 Although the dissent rate in state supreme 
courts appears to be increasing, the proportion of unanimous to non-
unanimous decisions is still high. 4 The traditional explanation for this 
high degree of consensus is that "dissent detracts from the prestige of 
the court and undermines its institutional solidarity. "5 Dissent is 
thought to create uncertainty in the law and thus reduce the impact of 
judicial decisions. 6 
With all the inhibitions against dissent, perhaps it is surprising that 
there is so much dissent on state supreme courts. Because of the 
strictures against dissent, nonunanimous decisions have taken on an 
importance of their own. Burton M. Atkins and Justin J. Green contend 
that the "nonunanimous decision has, perhaps by default, emerged as 
the primary measure of conflict on appellate courts." Sheldon Goldman 
claims that decisions that contain dissents "are manifestations of direct 
and open conflict within the courts. "7 Yet decisions that do not contain 
dissent need not imply consensus. Some justices find dissents dis-
tasteful because they involve criticizing a colleague's work directly. 8 
Voting consensus may even be an artifact of large caseloads and 
consequently of the time justices have available to write dissenting 
opinions. Many state appellate courts deal with heavy caseloads by 
assigning cases to a single judge, who researches and writes the opinion 
of the court. The result is single-judge decision making and a false 
facade of consensus. 9 Consensus in a large percentage of cases could be 
a result of court structure (the absence of an intermediate appellate 
court to screen out the more routine appeals) or court jurisdiction 
(mandatory jurisdiction that forces the court of last resort to consider 
each case). In sum, the absence of dissent may indicate an "illusion of 
consensus," not agreement. 10 
OPINION ASSIGNMENT 
To surmount the methodological problems caused by an artificially 
high proportion of unanimous decisions, opinions will be used to 
measure leadership in this chapter. 11 For decisions on the merits, 
justices must vote for the majority or dissent, and so a certain amount of 
voting agreement is inevitable. Judges who vote together may not do so 
for the same reasons. As Walter F. Murphy writes, "The fact that two or 
more Justices vote together is rather weak evidence that their votes are 
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'the result of interaction; standing alone, voting records tell us very little 
about the force or direction of any interpersonal influence that may 
exist." 12 To join an opinion coalition, however, each justice must make 
a conscious decision either to join or write an opinion or to concur in 
the result. 13 
The opinion coalition is an important stage of decision making. A 
decision on the merits of a case determines which litigant wins, but the 
majority opinion provides legal justification for the decision and estab-
lishes precedent for future decisions. To a large extent, the content of an 
opinion depends upon the opinion-writer. Danelski's comments on the 
selection of an opinion-writer in the U.S. Supreme Court are applicable 
to the selection of spokesmen in other courts as well. The opinion-
writer may determine the value of a decision as precedent (for example, 
the opinion may be placed on one ground rather than another, two 
grounds instead of one, or deal narrowly or broadly with the issues), 
could affect the acceptability of the decision to the public, may retain 
the court's majority in close cases, and may persuade dissenting associ-
ates to join the court's opinion. 14 
Most research on opinion assignment, like that on most judicial 
behavior, has focused upon the U.S. Supreme Court. Thus conclusions 
about opinion assignment may be generalizable only to courts in which 
the chief justice assigns the opinions, if he is in the majority. If not, of 
course, the most senior associate justice in the majority makes the 
assignment. The justice assigned to write the majority opinion prepares 
a draft and circulates it. Yet because justices receiving the draft may 
either join the opinion, request that changes be made, or write their own 
opinions, the opinion majority is often smaller than the decisional 
majority. 
Stanford S. McConkie claims that Hawaii is the only state that 
follows the opinion assignment practice of the U.S. Supreme Court 
precisely. Elliot E. Slotnick counts four states that follow the federal 
method of assignment. 15 Both authors agree that in more than a quarter 
of the states the chief justice assigns opinions in all cases, whether in 
the majority or not. 16 Murphy notes ways the chief justice of the U.S. 
Supreme Court could use his opinion-assignment authority to encour-
age consensus. He may, for example, select a wavering member of a 
coalition to write an opinion or may use the assignment of an opinion to 
reward past cooperation. 17 
More than two-thirds of the states use an automatic method of 
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opinion assignment. Justices either draw cases by lot or, more often, 
receive them by rotation. Assignments are usually made when briefs 
come in, although several courts wait until the postargument con-
ference. IS In less than half of the twenty states in which assignment is 
made on a rotating basis, the assignment holds only if the justice to 
whom the case is assigned is in the majority. In Indiana, for example, 
the reporting justice writes the opinion unless outvoted, in which case 
the dissenting opinion becomes the majority opinion. In Kansas and 
New Mexico, which use a rigid rotational method of assignment, one 
justice has written both the majority and dissenting opinions. 19 In many 
states that use the rotational system, some exercise of discretion by the 
chief justice is permitted. For example, one justice from a New England 
state explained that although opinions were distributed "by lot," the 
"chief justice reserves a certain number of cases for assignment by him 
to a justice who is specifically qualified for that particular case. "20 
Advocates of the rotational method of assignment claim that it 
distributes cases equitably in the long run, limits perceptions that any 
particular justice receives more than his or her share of routine or time-
consuming cases, precludes the development of special experts on the 
courts, and relieves the chief justice of the responsibility for balancing 
the workload. 21 Advocates of assignment by the chief justice claim that 
method is more flexible and permits more rational assignments based 
upon judges' interests and expertise. 22 
The American Bar Association once favored opinion assignment 
by the presiding justice rather than a rotational method of assignment 
so that the views of a justice as expressed in conference, his interest in 
the problem, and his grasp of issues could be considered. The Amer-
ican Bar Association's recent Standards Relating to Appellate Courts 
states only that "responsibility for preparing opinions should be assign-
ed among the judges participating in the decision through procedures 
supervised by the judge who presides in the decision conference." The 
ABA Report warns, however, against unwise specialization, one-
person decisions, and the vulnerability of the court if an "expert" in a 
particular field of law leaves the court. Most state supreme court 
justices disagree with the recommendation. 23 
In sum, a chief justice who is an extraordinary leader can make the 
court perform more effectively and efficiently by using selective opin-
ion assignment. A court without an extraordinary leader may be better 
served by a rotational method of assignment. Slotnick concludes that 
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nondiscretionary assignment methods best maintain social cohesion, 
but the chief justice's discretion in assigning opinions can best accom-
plish the efficient disposition of the workload. 24 An exploration of the 
effect of methods of opinion assignment on leadership is one objective 
of this chapter. 
LEADERSHIP AND OPINION ASSIGNMENT 
There are almost as many definitions of leadership as there are people 
who have attempted to define the concept. Leadership has been defined 
as a formal position in an organization, as charismatic personality, as 
the exercise of influence, as power, and as the instrument of goal 
achievement. 25 We can accept Ulmer's definition of leadership as "a 
process of exerting influence on that behavior, in an organized group, 
which leads to the establishment and achievement of goals. "26 This 
definition neither specifies how influence is exercised nor suggests that 
only one person can be a leader. One person may perform leadership 
functions in one situation or at one time and be a nonleader in other 
situations or at other times. 27 
In this chapter, several indicators will be used to identify leaders. 
Of course, the chief justice occupies the formal leadership position, and 
there is nothing to prevent the chief justice from being the actual leader 
of the court. Leadership, however, is treated not as an assumption but as 
a hypothesis to be tested. 
The actual or informal leader of the court is defined as the court 
member who attracts the most justices to join his opinion coalition. It is 
not unreasonable to assume that a justice would join in opinions he 
finds attractive, whether the basis of the attraction is similar values, the 
brilliance of the opinion, or other factors. Conversely, a justice who can 
attract others to join his opinions exerts influence over them. Indicators 
of actual leadership attempt to tap the charismatic, influence, and 
power dimensions of leadership. Specific indicators will be explained 
as they are introduced. 
Operationally, all indicators of informal leadership are based on 
majority opinion coalitions. In this respect we differ from Ulmer, who 
did not distinguish between majority and dissenting opinions. Yet even 
Ulmer conceded that a majority opinion is special because it becomes 
law. 28 Only the majority opinion provides the rationale for the court's 
decision and becomes precedent for future decisions. 
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In addition to the formal leader (the chief justice) and the informal 
leader (the justice with whom other members of the court most often 
agree), the concept of a rival leader will be explored. This alternative 
leader would be expected to lead the opposition in dissent. If suc-
cessful, this justice would become the new informal leader on the court. 
Indicators of alternative leaders are the same as the ones used to 
identify actual leaders, except that the indicators are based upon 
dissenting opinion coalitions only. 
THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT, 1956-1962 
The Michigan Supreme Court uses a rotational method of opinion 
assignment. A justice is assigned to write an opinion for the case, but 
other justices may also write opinions. Differences among opinions are 
discussed at conference and reconciled if possible. If consensus is not 
possible, the opinion with the most signatures becomes the majority 
opinion. Thus the majority opinion-writer is not known until after 
conference. Justices must support opinions without knowing "whether 
the opinion will be a dissent, a concurrence, or the opinion of the 
court."29 
It is appropriate that we begin our analysis of leadership where 
Ulmer started in 1963-the Michigan Supreme Court. Ulmer chose to 
analyze five hundred opinions written between 1958 and 1960. Because 
our "courts" are defined by change in chief justice, we chose the time 
period that John R. Dethmers was chief justice-1956 to 1962. This 
period has been studied by Glendon Schubert as well as by Ulmer. 30 
Although our time period is longer than Ulmer's, our sample of cases 
(221) is smaller because it does not include unanimous decisions. 
Cases involving dissent exaggerate the amount of conflict on the court 
and thus highlight situations in which leadership is exercised. 3t 
One disadvantage of defining a court by the tenure of the chief 
justice rather than by a change in court membership is that any justice 
who served during the tenure of the chief justice, no matter how briefly, 
could be included in the analysis. Between 1956 and 1962, fourteen 
justices served on the Dethmers court. Justices PaulL. Adams, Emer-
son R. Boyles, Neil E. Reid, Edward M. Sharpe, and Otis M. Smith, 
however, participated in fewer than ten cases in which there was a 
dissenting opinion and therefore are excluded from our analysis. 
Before beginning our examination of leadership, we attempted to 
gain an understanding of the basic structure of the Dethmers court 
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through bloc analysis. Our earlier examinations of leadership revealed 
that after Dethmers assumed the chief justiceship, both his own dissent 
rate and the proportion of decisions on the Michigan Supreme Court 
that were nonunanimous increased, indicating that Dethmers was a 
weak leader. 32 The chief justice along with Justices Leland W. Carr and 
Harry F. Kelly were the only Republicans on the bench during this 
period. A principal compo_nents analysis with an orthogonal rotation 
revealed four dimensions to the court. The loadings are listed in Table 
10.1. 
The Republicans and Justice Eugene F. Black load highest on the 
first dimension. Yet Justice Black has an opposite sign, which indicates 
agreement on the issues involved but disagreement with the Republican 
bloc with respect to how they should be decided. The other dimensions 
are fragmented but show agreement between George Edwards and 
Thomas M. Kavanagh on the third dimension and disagreement be-
tween Talbot Smith and Kavanagh on the fourth dimension. The second 
dimension shows modest disagreement between Black and Theodore 
Souris. It also reveals that John D. Voelker and Souris related to other 
members of the court in opposite ways, but it does not describe their 
relationship with each other because they did not sit together on the 
Dethmers court. The replacement of Voelker with Souris did affect 
relationships within the court. This is about as far as principal compo-
nents analysis can take us, however, for it can describe voting blocs but 
not explain their causes. We must go beyond agreement scores and 
factor loadings to determine leadership within blocs. 
Measures of Majority Leadership. Ulmer uses one summary indicator 
of leadership, the percentage of a judge's total opinion output that 
became majority opinions. 33 He contends that this percentage singles 
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Table 10.2. Majority Opinions in the Dethmers Court 
Majority Percentage 
Opinions Total Opinions Majority Rank Order 
Kavanagh 24 32 75 
Voelker 12 18 67 2 
Edwards 32 54 59 3 
Dethmers 21 38 55 4 
Carr 33 72 46 5.5 
Smith 22 48 46 5.5 
Kelly 22 52 42 7 
Souris II 29 38 8 
Black 29 78 37 9 
Table 10.3. Opportunity to Write Majority Opinions in the Dethmers 
Court 
Majority Percentage 
Opinions Total Opinions Majority Rank Order 
Souris II 39 28 I 
Carr 33 121 27 2 
Edwards 32 130 25 3 
Kavanagh 24 101 24 4 
Black 29 138 21 5 
Voelker 12 66 18 6 
Smith 22 128 17 7 
Dethmers 21 137 15 8.5 
Kelly 22 144 15 8.5 
out those justices most successful in attracting majority support for 
their opinions. Applying this index to our data, we find, like Ulmer, that 
Kavanagh scores highest, as shown in Table 10.2. 
This measure, however, does not take into account the number of 
opportunities the writer had to write a majority opinion. The opinion 
assignment ratio, the percentage of times a justice wrote an opinion 
when that justice was part of the majority, may also be useful as a 
summary measure of leadership. 34 
This ratio in Table 10.3 indicates that Souris and Carr were most 
successful in writing the majority opinion when they were in the 
majority. Souris wrote the largest percentage of opinions when he was 
in the majority, but this percentage is based on a comparatively small 
sample of opinions. 
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Table 10.4. Majority Opinion-Writer and Voting Split in the 
Dethmers Court 
Number of Opinions When Vote Was 
Majority 
223 
Opinion-Writer 7-1 6-2 5-3 4-4 Shapley-Shubik Index 
Kavanagh I 5 II 2 .193 
Carr 6 5 6 6 .191 
Smith 4 4 10 2 .188 
Black 3 6 9 2 .186 
Kelly 3 5 2 3 .185 
Souris 0 4 5 0 .184 
Voelker 0 5 5 0 .183 
Edwards 4 II 9 0 .175 
Dethmers 6 5 4 2 .175 
The discussion of the opinion assignment ratio generates a related 
question: does choice of opinion-writer vary by closeness of the vote? 
Do some justices write the opinion more frequently when the vote is 
close and others when the majority coalition is large? 
Table 10.4 indicates that Chief Justice Dethmers and Justice Carr 
each wrote more opinions than any other court members when only one 
justice dissented. It appears that the chief justice wrote most of his 
opinions when the opinion coalition was large, that is, when only one 
or two justices dissented. Justice Edwards wrote proportionately more 
opinions when the vote was split six to two. Five-to-three voting 
divisions saw the majority opinion most often written by one of the 
Democratic justices-Kavanagh, Smith, Black, and Edwards. Justice 
Souris did not write opinions when the vote was evenly split or when the 
majority coalition was seven. Justice Carr wrote a large number of 
opinions when the opinion coalition was large but also when the vote 
was evenly split. This indicates Justice Carr's ability to hold a coalition 
together and suggests that he could attract at least one Democrat to the 
Republican bloc. 
The Shapley-Shubik index defines power in groups as the proba-
bility that an individual is the one who casts the decisive vote. 35 
Justices who dissent are given no credit; only justices who join in the 
majority share in the power. Applying this index to opinion coalitions, 
rather than voting blocs, still means that smaller opinion coalitions give 
the opinion-writer more power than larger coalitions. Table 10.4 re-
veals Justices Kavanagh and Carr as most powerful. 
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Table 10.5. Support for Majority Opinion-Writers in the Dethmers 
Court 
Majority Number of Number of Number of Percentage Rank 
Opinion-Writer Opinions Agreements Dissents Support Order 
Voelker 12 52 25 67.5 
Kavanagh 24 98 52 65.3 2 
Carr 33 122 77 61.3 3 
Smith 22 88 57 60.7 4 
Edwards 32 123 80 60.6 5 
Dethmers 21 78 51 60.5 6 
Souris II 41 28 59.4 7 
Black 29 105 82 56.1 8 
Kelly 2.2 71 57 55.5 9 
The next indicator measures leadership by the number of justices 
the opinion-writer attracts to his opinions. This measure should show 
the differential success of opinion-writers in attracting support, but 
because our sample contains only nonunanimous decisions it is not 
possible for any opinion-writer to have a support score of 100 percent. 
On an eight-justice court with all justices participating, the opin-
ion-writer would need the support of seven justices in each case for 
which he wrote the majority opinion to be supported I 00 percent. 
Support from six justices in all cases would mean a support score of 
87.5 percent, the theoretical upper limit of this index in the Michigan 
Supreme Court, where the sample consists of non unanimous cases. The 
theoretical lower limit of the index is 50 percent, a score below which 
the justice would no longer be the majority opinion-writer. This index 
in Table 10.5 shows Voelker and Kavanagh as the justices most likely to 
put together opinion coalitions and Kelly and Black as the justices who 
attracted the least support. There is very little difference among the 
scores of the remaining justices. 
Table 10.6 is a matrix of support for the opinion-writer that Ulmer 
labeled an Inter-individual Solidarity Index (lSI). 36 Each cell entry is 
essentially a percentage figure showing the magnitude of support for 
the opinion-writer. For example, Justice Carr participated in twenty 
decisions when Chief Justice Dethmers wrote the opinion. Eighteen of 
these twenty times Carr joined the Dethmers opinion, hence the entry 
90 percent in the Dethmers-Carr cell of Table 10_6, Conversely, De-
thmers was in the majority the thirty-two times when Carr wrote the 
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Table 10.6. Inter-Individual Solidarity Index, Majority Opinions in 
the Dethmers Court 
Majority Percentage Support for Majority Opinion-Writer Average Rank 
Opinion-Writer De Ca Ke Sm Bl Ed Vo Ka So Support Order 
Smith 82 14 36 95 100 85 94 100 75.7 I 
Voelker 8 9 83 100 100 100 100 X 70.3 2 
Kavanagh 66 50 56 65 84 75 72 55 65.4 3 
Edwards 48 38 52 86 70 84 69 70 64.6 4 
Souris 22 18 18 100 80 100 X 90 61.1 5 
Black 57 31 62 69 68 92 75 20 59.2 6 
Dethmers 90 90 43 43 61 29 53 13 52.7 7 
Carr 100 97 50 39 46 25 30 28 51.9 8 
Kelly 77 86 28 42 31 50 70 28 51.5 9 
opinion, joining the majority opinion each time. Because the chief 
justice supported Carr more than Carr supported him, we conclude that 
Carr was the more influential of the two. 
Ulmer rank-ordered each justice's support patterns and used the 
sums of rows as one indication of the relative influence of each justice. 
From these rankings, Ulmer concluded that Kavanagh was the de facto 
leader of the Dethmers court. 37 
Ulmer's practice of creating a matrix of support for each opinion-
writer, rank-ordering justices in order of support for the opinion-writer, 
and then averaging the rank orders to determine leadership seems 
unduly complex. Perhaps it is necessary to use this procedure to 
amplify small differences among justices which result when both 
unanimous and nonunanimous opinions were used to measure lead-
ership. In this chapter either means or medians of support for the 
opinion-writer are taken directly from the lSI and those figures rank-
ordered. Using this approach, Smith, with an average support score of 
76 percent, emerges as the de facto leader of the Dethmers court. (If 
medians of support for opinion-writers are used to rank-order justices, 
however, Voelker appears as the actual leader.) 
Considering only first- and second-order support relationships, 
Figure 10.1 is a sociogram of opinion relationships in the Dethmers 
court. It shows that Justice Smith received the most first and second 
choices. It also demonstrates that Kavanagh was not the first choice 
(did not receive the most support) of any other justice, whereas Voelker, 
for example, was the first choice of Kavanagh, Smith, Black, and 
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Figure 10.1 
Support Relationships in the Dethmers Court 
Key: - First Choice 
--- Second Choice 
Edwards. Figure 10.1 also reveals that the chief justice was the link 
between the Republican bloc of Dethmers, Carr, and Kelly and the 
Democratic group. 
Ulmer rank-ordered each justice on the court to determine which 
opinion-writer each justice supported most often. This technique, in 
effect, forces each justice to support some opinion-writer most. Even if 
a justice joined in the opinions of a particular opinion-writer less than 
50 percent of the time, he still could join the opinions of that justice 
proportionately more often than those of the other justices. 
It seems to us that support scores should be read horizontally rather 
than vertically and that a minimum threshold of support for the majority 
opinion-writer be set. For example, if we arbitrarily set a support score 
of 90 percent agreement with the majority opinion-writer, the so-
ciogram in Figure 10. 1 changes as depicted in Figure I 0. 2. 38 The court 
is divided into two separate blocs, with Chief Justice Dethmers the 
leader of the Republican bloc and Justice Smith the leader of the 
Democratic bloc. In sum, different procedures and different measures 
yield slightly different results. The task now is to see how these 
measures of majority leadership interrelate. 
Rank-order correlations among the five measures in Table 10.7 
reveal that the Inter-individual Solidarity Index, support index, and 
majority opinions are related to each other but not to the opinion 
assignment or Shapley-Shubik indices. The opinion assignment ratio 
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Figure 10.2 
Opinion Support in the Dethmers Court (over 90%) 
Kelly (R) 
Black (D) 
was designed to measure equitability of opinion assignment, not lead-
ership. The Shapley-Shubik index is a measure of power, and although 
leadership is a component of power, it is not the equivalent of power. Of 
the three interrelated measures, the Inter-individual Solidarity Index 
seems to be a better indicator than the two more condensed summary 
indices because it shows support percentages for each pair of justices. 39 
Alternative Leadership. The concept of leadership, we believe, is large 
enough to encompass leadership in opposition as well as in majority. 
Rather than dissent alone, the alternate leader will attempt to forge a 
minority coalition. This minority opinion coalition has the potential for 
becoming a majority coalition if it can attract "swing" justices to 
particular opinions if membership on the court changes. 40 
In many respects, leadership in opposition may be a more difficult 
posture to maintain than majority leadership. By definition, leadership 
in dissent means losing the opportunity immediately to influence the 
development of the law. There may be more payoff to a "swing" justice 
in joining the majority and trying to influence the opinion rather than 
joining a minority. This "chameleon effect" may be the reason some 
justices, who do not feel strongly about the issue in question, vote with 
the majority. On the other hand, relative support given to the dissent 
opinion-writer may more accurately indicate leadership than support 
given to the majority opinion-writer. 41 
Table 10.8 contains the lSI for the Dethmers court based upon 
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Table 10.7. Interrelationship of Leadership Measures in the 
Dethmers Court 
Ulmer's Majority Support Opinion 
Rank• Opinions Index lSI Assignment Shapley-Shubik 
Kavanagh Kavanagh Voelker Smith Souris Kavanagh 
Voelker Voelker Kavanagh Voelker Carr Carr 
Dethmers Edwards Carr Kavanagh Edwards Smith 
Smith Dethmers Smith Edwards Kavanagh Black 
Carr Carr Edwards Souris Black Kelly 
Edwards Smith Dethmers Black Voelker Souris 
Kelly Kelly Souris Dethmers Smith Voelker 
Black Souris Black Carr Dethmers Edwards 
_a Black Kelly Kelly Kelly Dethmers 
Support Majority Opinion Shapley-
lSI Index Opinion Assignment Shubik 
lSI X 
Support Index .61 X 
Majority Opinion .42 .80 X 
Opinion Assignment .10 .23 00 X 
Shapley-Shubik .08 .33 -.05 .22 X 
a Justice Souris was not included in Ulmer's sample. 
Table 10.8. Inter-Individual Solidarity Index, Dissenting Opinions in 
the Dethmers Court 
Dissent Average Rank 
Bloc Writer Percentage Support for Dissent Opinion-Writer Support Order 
De Ca Ke Sm Bl Ed Yo Ka So 
Smith 0 0 0 37 62 100• 36 100 41.8 I 
Black 6 0 9 51 29 100 70 44 38.6 2 
Voelker 0 0 0 60• 100 6Qa 25• X 35.0 3 
Souris 12 6 0 78 23 77 X 35 33.0 4 
Kavanagh 29 33 14 0 67 29 50• 20 31.5 5 
Kelly 84 100 4 7 4 0 5 14 27.2 6 
Edwards 13 6 6 8 31 60 22 86 25.5 7 
Carr 78 76 3 0 3 9 0 0 21.1 8 
Dethmers 93 56 0 0 0 0 0 Qa 18.6 9 
•Percentage based upon five opinions or less. 
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Figure 10.3 
Opinion Support in Dissent (over 80%) 
Dethmers (R) 
Voelker (D) Smith (D) 
( Kavanagh (D) ) 
Key: - 90% or more agreement 
--- 80% or more agreement 
Carr (R) 
Souris (D) 
( Edwards (D) ) 
support for opinion-writers in dissent. Table 10.8 is analogous to Table 
10.6 and may be interpreted similarly. For example, Justice Carr 
participated in fifteen cases in which the chief justice wrote the dissent-
ing opinion. Carr joined Dethmers in the dissenting opinion fourteen of 
these fifteen times, hence the entry of 93 percent in the Dethmers-Carr 
cell. Conversely, Carr and Dethmers shared thirty-six opinions when 
Carr wrote the dissenting opinions. Dethmers joined Carr in twenty-
eight of these, hence the entry of 78 percent in the Carr-Dethmers cell. 
If support scores of all the justices are used to evaluate leadership in 
dissent, Justice Smith was the leader even though not one Republican 
ever joined him in a dissenting opinion. According to the lSI, Chief 
Justice Dethmers attracted the least support in dissent. 
Because the Republican and Democratic opinion coalitions are not 
connected, there is no need to consider Republican rankings in identifY-
ing leaders of the Democratic opinion coalitions and vice versa. Figure 
10.3 is a sociogram of opinion support relationships in dissent. In 
dissent, Chief Justice Dethmers was the de facto leader of the Republi-
cans and Justice Smith was the de facto leader of the Democrats. The 
Republican bloc was the same in dissent as it was in the majority, but the 
Democratic coalition broke down. Justice Smith received the support 
of Voelker and Souris and was still the de facto leader. Voelker and 
Black formed a dissenting pair, and Kavanagh became an isolate. To the 
extent that Kavanagh was unable to attract the support in dissenting 
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opinions that he did for majority opinions, credence is lent to the 
conclusion that the lSI is a better indicator of leadership than percen-
tage of majority opinions. 
Using a different data set than Ulmer, confined to nonunanimous 
decisions over a longer time span, and some different indicators of 
leadership, we find that Kavanagh and Voelker emerge as high on our 
ranking as they did on his. By our modified measure, however, Justice 
Smith was the leader of the court because he was leader of the majority 
voting bloc. Dethmers, Carr, and Kelly rank lower because they could 
not attract enough Democratic votes to put together as many majority 
opinion coalitions. Perhaps our use of nonunanimous decisions empha-
sized the cleaveage, but it did occur along party lines. 
This study introduces the concept of leadership in opposition. On 
that measure, too, Justice Smith is the leader. Justice Black is also 
shown to be a strong leader of the opposition, which may explain why 
he loads on the first dimension of the principal components analysis 
with the Republican bloc, but with an opposite sign. 
PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT, 1961-1971. 
Pennsylvania provides a contrast to Michigan in that the chief justice 
assigns opinions in Pennsylvania. For this illustration, we chose the 
court of Chief Justice John C. Bell, who assumed the office in August 
1961 . Our earlier examination of leadership considered Bell a social 
leader because, although his own dissent rate decreased after he became 
chief justice, the proportion of nonunanimous decisions on the court 
increased from 28 to 31 percent. 42 Between 1961 and 1971 , eleven 
justices served on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, but Justices Anne 
X. Alpern, Alexander Barbieri, and EarlS. Keirn participated in too 
few cases to be included in the analysis. The data base consists of 1 ,422 
nonunanimous cases. 
Before beginning our analysis of leadership on the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, we will again attempt to get an overall picture of the 
bloc structure of the Bell court using principal components analysis 
rotated to an orthogonal solution. Table 10.9 reveals three dimensions 
to the Bell court. Justices Michael J. Eagen, Henry X. O'Brien, and 
Samuel J. Roberts form a voting bloc on one dimension, the disagree-
ment between Chief Justice Bell and Justice H. B. Cohen forms a 
second dimension, and Justice Benjamin R. Jones loads alone on the 
third dimension. Justice Michael Musmanno loads nearly equally on 
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all three dimensions but does not fit on any one of the three very well. 
Justice Thomas W. Pomeroy replaced Justice Musmanno on the bench. 
Measures of Majority Leadership. The proportion of each justices' 
opinions that were majority opinions is listed in Table 10.10. Justice 
O'Brien had the highest percentage of majority opinions. In addition, 
over 80 percent of the opinions written by Justices Eagen and Jones 
were majority opinions. 
The opinion assignment ratio is an inappropriate measure of lead-
ership in a court where the chief justice assigns the opinions. The reader 
may be interested to know, however, that Roberts ranked highest on this 
indicator and Pomeroy lowest. 
Table 10.11 breaks down opinion-writers according to closeness of 
the vote. The Shapley-Shubik index shows Justice Musmanno as the 
most powerful court member. Twenty-seven percent of Musmanno's 
opinions (twenty-six of ninety-six) had two dissenters, and another 16 
percent (fifteen of ninety-six) were written with only a four-person 
majority. Justices Eagen, Jones, and Cohen wrote a high proportion of 
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Table 10.11. Majority Opinion-Writer and Voting Split in the Bell 
Court 
Majority Number of O~inions When Vote Was Shapley- Rank 
Opinion-Writer 6-1 5-l 5-2 4-3 Shubik Order 
Musmanno 28 27 26 15 .197 I 
O'Brien 53 45 26 13 .191 2.5 
Roberts 60 55 37 12 .191 2.5 
Bell 59 39 22 12 .189 4 
Jones 70 53 34 13 .187 5.5 
Eagen 73 66 26 8 . 187 5.5 
Pomeroy 8 13 2 0 .144 7 
Cohen 68 40 28 20 . 127 8 
Table 10.12. Support for Majority Opinion-Writer in the Bell Court 
Majority Number of Number of Number of Percentage Rank 
Opinion-Writer Opinions Agreements Dissents Support Order 
Bell 146 590 179 77 1.5 
Eagen 202 831 244 77 1.5 
O'Brien 164 658 222 75 3.5 
Roberts 194 764 252 75 3.5 
Jones 197 761 268 74 5 
Cohen 169 680 254 73 6.5 
Pomeroy 35 132 48 73 6.5 
Musmanno 105 390 155 72 8 
Table 10.13. Inter-Individual Solidarity Index, Majority Opinions in 
the Bell Court 
Majority Percentage Support for Majority Opinion-Writer 
Opinion- Average Rank 
Writer Be Mu Jo Co Ea O'B R Po Support Order 
Eagen 66 62 89 70 96 73 81 76.7 
O'Brien 64 72 76 74 87 69 91 76.1 2 
Bell 56 82 62 88 93 70 76 75.3 3 
Jones 66 47 85 90 83 59 96 75.1 4 
Roberts 60 80 73 49 86 93 82 74.7 5 
Pomeroy 52 X 97 87 76 89 45 74.3 6 
Cohen 53 69 87 81 91 48 82 73.0 7 
Musmanno 49 58 53 89 92 86 X 71.2 8 
Key: X = did not sit on the bench together. 
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Figure 10.4 
Support Relationships in the Bell Court (over 80%) 
Key: - 90% or more agreement 
--- 80% or more agreement 
233 
majority opinions when there was a single dissenter. Justice Pomeroy's 
opinions nearly always had only one dissenter. This result could be 
interpreted to mean either that Pomeroy's opinions attracted a strong 
majority of support or that he was assigned to write the opinion only 
when strong majority coalitions existed. The latter explanation is more 
plausible because Pomeroy was the "freshman" on the Bell court and 
may have been assigned the easier opinions. 
The next measure of leadership, as portrayed in Table 10.12, is the 
differential success of opinion-writers in attracting support. Bell's 146 
opinions produced 590 agreements and 179 dissents from his col-
leagues, who had to choose whether to join his majority opinions. 
There is only a 5 percentage point difference between Musmanno, who 
received the least support, and Eagen and Bell, who received the most. 
lSI rankings for the Bell court are presented in Table 10.13. Justice 
Eagen is revealed as the majority opinion leader, and bloc-partner 
O'Brien is the second most influential majority opinion leader. 
The sociogram presented in Figure 10.4 shows that all justices, 
even Musmanno, are connected. One reason for the apparent con-
nectedness is the high degree of support given to all justices by Justice 
O'Brien. Comparing both opinion agreement above 90 percent and 
above 80 percent, Justice Jones emerges as the majority leader. 
Unlike the Michigan Supreme Court studied, the justices of the 
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Table 10.14. Interrelationship of Leadership Measures in the Bell 
Court 
Inter-Individual Support Majority Opinion Shapley-
Justice Solidarity Index Index Opinion Assignment Shubik 
Eagen 1.5 2 5.5 5.5 
O'Brien 2 3.5 I 7 2.5 
Bell 3 1.5 5.5 3.5 4 
Jones 4 5 3 3.5 5.5 
Roberts 5 3.5 8 2.5 
Pomeroy 6 6.5 7 8 7 
Cohen 7 6.5 5.5 2 8 
Mus man no 8 8 4 5.5 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court were not easily divided into subgroups. A 
comparison of Tables 10.7 and 10.13 shows more consensus in the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court than in the Michigan Supreme Court. 
Only 6 percentage points separated Eagen, the justice who received the 
most support in the majority, from Musmanno, whose opinions re-
ceived the least support. In contrast, the spread between Justice Smith 
and Justice Kelly on the Michigan Supreme Court was 24 percentage 
points. 
The rank order of justices in the Bell court on five measures of 
leadership in the majority is displayed in Table 10.14. Even a casual 
inspection of these data reveals the same pattern that we discovered in 
Michigan. The lSI, support, and majority opinion indicators are inter-
related; the others are not. Again, the lSI appears to be the best 
indicator of leadership in the majority. The opinion assignment mea-
sure is inappropriate when opinions are assigned by the chief justice, 
power as measured by the Shapley-Shubik index is not equivalent to 
leadership, and the support index failed to distinguish leaders from 
followers. 
Alternative Leaders. Leadership in dissent for the Bell court as mea-
sured by the lSI is reported in Table 10.15. Justice Jones most fre-
quently led dissenting opinion coalitions. All justices received support 
in dissent, unlike the situation in the Dethmers court, on which two 
separate blocs were formed. Musmanno received more support in 
dissent than he did in the majority but was not a leader in the sense of 
forming dissenting coalitions. Indeed, Musmanno was selected to 
illustrate the concept of nonleader or "outsider" on the court. 43 
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Table 10.15. Inter-Individual Solidarity Index, Dissenting Opinions 
in the Bell Court 
Dissent 
Percentage Support for Dissent Opinion-Writer 
Average Rank 
Bloc writer Be Mu Jo Co Ea O'B R Po Support Order 
Jones 43 13 33 20 12 13 40 24.8 I 
O'Brien 7 5oa 0 47 20 44 0 24.0 2 
Roberts 35 40 13 6 24 26 16 22.8 3 
Eagen 19 0 29 25 28 47 II 22.7 4 
Musmanno 10 10 20 12 20 55 X 21.1 5.5 
Pomeroy 33 X 60 0 10 II 13 21.1 5.5 
Bell 49 21 16 5 16 19 25 20.1 7 
Cohen IS 9 40 38 20 2 9 19.0 8 
•Percentage based on five opinions or less. 
No sociogram of opinion leadership in dissent is presented because 
no percentage support scores reached the threshold of 90, 80, or even 
70 percent. In brief, leadership in dissent was very similar to leadership 
in the majority in the Bell court. 
In this chapter, we have attempted to explore the concept of lead-
ership. Like Ulmer, we have assumed that each justice is trying to 
"lead"-to persuade others to his point of view. 44 We have also as-
sumed that every justice is industrious and desires to write at least his 
fair share of opinions. Opinions were not distinguished by subject-
matter area. A justice who writes a disproportionate number of opin-
ions in one subject area would be an expert but not a leader. Although 
expertise may be a consideration in opinion assignment, a leader 
should be able to attract support in a variety of subject-matter areas. 
Our major departure from previous studies of court leadership was 
the identification of leaders in the majority and leaders of the opposi-
tion, which required a separate analysis of majority opinions and 
dissenting opinions. The results from our two case studies are mixed. In 
the Michigan Supreme Court, the concept of leader of the opposition is 
viable. Justice Black was a strong leader of the opposition, which is 
obscured if agreement in majority opinions is mixed together with 
agreement in dissent. Justice Smith, however, was a leader both in the 
majority and in dissent. In Pennsylvania, Justice Eagen emerged as the 
actual leader in the Bell court, and Justice Jones was the leader in 
dissent. Support for the opinion-writer was much more evenly dis-
tributed in Pennsylvania than it was in Michigan. 
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Leadership is closely related to means for measuring it. The early 
part of this chapter makes a case for distinguishing opinion behavior 
from decisional behavior and for basing the study of leadership only on 
nonunanimous opinions. We believe that use of nonunanimous opin-
ions highlights conflict situations in which leadership can be identified 
and measured. 
The Inter-Individual Solidarity Index proved to be the best measure 
of leadership in this study. Leadership may be a component of power, 
but the Shapley-Shubik index of power was not related to our other 
measures of leadership. Similarly, the opinion assignment ratio, though 
measuring equitability of opinion assignment, was not found to be a 
good measure of leadership in this research. All measures of leadership 
revealed a higher degree of consensus in the Bell court than in the 
Dethmers court. During the period of study, the Bell court contained 
three Democrats and five Republicans and the Dethmers court con-
tained three Republicans and six Democrats. 
This study is a preliminary look at leadership in state supreme 
courts because many more courts in many more states should be 
analyzed before our hypotheses can be tested thoroughly. The research 
agenda on leadership in state supreme courts is large, and we will be 
pleased if our reexamination spurs renewed interest in this topic. 
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A Longitudinal Study of the 
Docket Composition Theory 
of Conflict and Consensus 
JOHN A. STOOKEY 
The study of conflict and consensus on state supreme courts has been 
informed by two major theories: docket composition and justice com-
position. 1 The docket composition theory suggests that variation in 
conflict (usually measured as dissent rate) is a function of the types of 
issues a court must hear. That is, the dissent rate is likely to be higher on 
courts that are faced with controversial and complex issues than on 
courts that are confronted with relatively simple issues. The justice 
composition theory, on the other hand, posits that the conflict rate is 
determined by the degree of ideological and role heterogeneity among 
members. 
Although John W. Patterson and Gregory J. Rathjen, Dean Jaros 
and Bradley C. Canon, and Henry R. Glick and Kenneth Vines, 2 
among others, have studied the justice composition theory, there has 
been only one very preliminary attempt to test directly the docket 
composition theory. 3 I say "directly" because considerable attention 
has been given to testing this theory using surrogate measures of docket 
composition. For example, Canon and Jaros related social, political, 
and economic environments of states to supreme court dissent rates. 4 
These environmental variables, they hypothesized, affect dissent rate 
by shaping both docket and justice composition. Docket composition, 
however, was not actually measured and related to dissent. 
Other studies have attempted to measure the relationship between 
structural changes, particularly the creation of an intermediate court of 
appeals, and dissent. The theoretical justification here again is that 
such structural changes modifY the docket composition of the supreme 
court, which in tum increases the dissent rate. Specifically, the dynamic 
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is that supreme courts that are buffered from trial courts by an inter-
mediate court decide proportionally more complex, policy-relevant 
cases than supreme courts, which must hear all appeals directly from 
the courts of original jurisdiction. The logic continues that because 
these complex cases have a higher probability of dissent, the dissent 
rate will be higher in supreme courts that have an intermediate court 
than in those without one. Thus, again, the rationale for this hypothesis 
is that docket composition is affected by structural changes, which 
affect dissent. Also again, however, there have been no studies that 
include a direct measure of docket composition. 
In previous studies of the docket composition and justice composi-
tion theories, cross-sectional, rather than longitudinal, designs have 
been used. As pointed out by Glick and Pruet in Chapter 9, cross-
sectional studies provide the unique opportunity to examine the rela-
tionship between a wide variety of legal and social settings and dissent 
rate. A question that has not been asked, however, is the extent to which 
the generalizations observed in cross-sectional studies hold when ex-
amined from a longitudinal perspective. For example, to what extent 
can historical changes in dissent rates in state courts be accounted for 
by changes over time in the composition of dockets and justices. In 
addition to providing a reliability check for findings generated from 
cross-sectional designs, longitudinal studies will permit for the first 
time exploration of the existence of cycles or regular patterns in dissent 
and also for the impact of specific historical events on dissent rate. 
The purpose of this chapter is to test the validity of the docket 
composition theory using longitudinal data. This will be accomplished 
in the context of an exploratory study of the Arizona Supreme Court for 
the years 1913 to 1976. 
DATA AND HYPOTHESES 
Arizona was the last of the contiguous states to enter the Union in 1912. 
The state constitution provided for a supreme court with sole appellate 
jurisdiction over all criminal cases and all but the most minor civil 
appeals. The court was composed of three members elected for fixed 
terms by nonpartisan ballot. 
To evaluate the ability of the docket composition theory to explain 
the historical evolution of dissent in Arizona, all cases (including per 
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1913 (first full year of statehood) to 1 97 6 were coded. A total of 8, 17 4 
cases as reported in the Arizona Reports were so coded as to year 
decided, litigant types, issues involved, winner, dissent, and court 
immediately below. For the purposes of this study the dependent 
variable is yearly dissent rate, which is equal to the number of cases 
with at least one dissent in a year divided by the total number of cases 
decided that year. For each year a dissent rate was also calculated for 
three specific case types: public, criminal, and private law. 5 Addition-
ally, the percent of the docket devoted to each of these case types was 
calculated for each year. 
The operational research question to be explored is the extent to 
which historical variation in the Arizona dissent rate can be accounted 
for by variations in docket composition. Specifically, the approach will 
be to examine the relationship between dissent rate and percent of the 
docket devoted to private, public, and criminal law issues, the hypoth-
esis being that the higher the percent of cases decided in a year which 
concern public law matters the higher the dissent rate for that year. This 
hypothesis is based upon two assumptions. First, it assumes that public 
law cases contain, on the whole, more controversial legal questions, 
which are likely to evoke greater dissent than private or criminal law 
cases. Second, it is assumed that there will be historical variation in the 
percent of cases devoted to public law issues. This variation may be 
related to social and political changes, such as the advent of the New 
Deal, or to structural changes, such as the creation of an intermediate 
court of appeals. 
ANALYSIS 
Figure 11. 1 presents the time series for dissent rate. The series pictured 
has been smoothed using a three-year moving average to highlight basic 
patterns. 6 As can be seen, the dissent rate in Arizona is historically very 
low: 4.99 percent. This is consistent with previous cross-sectional 
studies, which have placed Arizona in the low-dissent group of states, 
as do Glick and Pruet in Chapter 9. As can also be seen, however, the 
dissent rate fluctuated considerably over time. Particularly noteworthy 
are the periods of high dissent during the 1910s and 1950s. There also 
appears to have been a general upward trend in dissent from 1930 to 
1960. 






16 I I I 15o 15 1 II I I I I I I I I I I 
14 
13 ~ ~ ~ £' 12 I I /'a... 4o ~ 
"' Public Law Cases ,._._ : U 
0::: II f .,. ' : ~ 
_. I \/ C\J [l 10 ' II .....J 
~ I \ U a 9 ,_ ... _, ·---~ 30 :E 
_. H / \ ~ &: 
; ~ :\ -
7 Jt-•-· ' \ f\' \ ' [l ~-·- ,...,, ' : -~ I ' 'I' u / \ : ~ \ : 20 ~ 
6 , \! ·- ............. ~ 
' " 





1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 
(Years) 
Figure 11.2. Dissent Rate and Percentage of Cases Involving Public Law Issues 
The Docket Composition Theory 
Table 11.1. Dissent Rate by Case Type in the Arizona Supreme 
Court, 1913-1976 
Criminal Private Public• Total 
Unanimous 2,163 3,523 2,081 7,766 
(96.82) (95.97) (91.67) (95.01) 
Dissent 71 148 189 408 
(3.18) (4.03) (8.32) (4.99) 
Total 2,234 3,671 2,270 8,174 
(100) (100) (100) (100) 
•Excluding criminal cases. 
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composition theory, the periods of high dissent will also be periods of 
high public law litigation. A precondition to the plausibility of this 
theory, however, is that the dissent rate is substantially higher for public 
law cases than for private or criminal cases. To this point that has simply 
been an assumption; it has not been empirically tested. Table 11.1 
demonstrates support for that assumption. As can be seen, the dissent 
rate for public law cases is twice as great as the rate for either private or 
criminal law. The same relationship holds if the data are compared by 
decade. 
Figure 11.2 presents the same dissent time series as in Figure 11.1 
but compares it directly with the proportion of the docket each year 
devoted to public law issues (also smoothed by using a three-year 
moving median). Visual inspection of this figure provides both support 
for and refutation of the docket composition theory. Support is provided 
in the apparent covariation of the smoothed dissent and docket series 
from 1925 to 1976. We see that both lines experience a long-term 
upward trend during the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s and then drop off in 
the 1960s. The data also show that in the first decade of the court there 
was a radical disparity between dissent rate and docket composition. In 
this period we find the highest dissent rate of any period, juxtaposed 
with the lowest percent of public law cases of any time period. 
In its simplest form the docket composition theory, as herein 
operationalized, may be expressed as follows: dissent rate (DR) = a + 
bX + e, where a is the intercept and X is the percent of cases formally 
decided which involve a public law issue. As might be expected from 
Figure 11.2, this form of the theory when applied to the entire sixty-
four-year period has little explanatory power. When the actual values 
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are calculated, DR = 5.10 + . 0277 X + e. R2 is equalto less than . 05 
and b is statistically insignificant. Examination of the residuals con-
firms the expectation that the radical difference between dissent rate 
and percent of public law cases in the 191 Os caused this low relation-
ship. This is best demonstrated if we limit analysis to the period 1920 to 
1976. The equation then becomes DR= -1.29 + .215X + e, where 
R2 = .256 and b is statistically significant at the .01 leveP 
A more in-depth look at the period 1913 to 1920 may help to 
explain these findings. This is a period during which the dissent rate in 
Arizona was very high. The rate for the entire sixty-four years is 4.99 
percent, but it is 8.55 percent for this period and 10.8 percent for the 
subperiod 1913 to 1917. As pointed out earlier, however, counter to the 
docket composition theory, we find that this was also a period with a 
very low proportion of public law cases. In fact, only 18.59 percent of 
the cases decided by the court between 1913 and 1920 involved public 
law. That is the lowest proportion, by far, of any of the identifiable 
periods. 
Although the docket composition theory seems to fail for this 
period, the justice composition theory holds some promise. Signifi-
cantly, the changes in dissent in this period and between this one and 
the 1921 to 1930 period are directly related to the changing composi-
tion of the court. The years 1913 to 1917 constituted the first natural 
court. The unusually high dissent rate for the court appears to be the 
result of a single justice. Justice Donnell Cunningham cast thirty-one of 
the thirty-seven dissenting votes during this period. The other six were 
in response to his majority opinions. He also accounted for 50 percent 
of the dissents in the second natural court and 75 percent in the third. 
His retirement marks the beginning of the fourth natural court in 1921 
with its dramatic decline in conflict. 
Although justice diversity seems to be the obvious explanation of 
these facts, background analysis does not offer much help in supporting 
that explanation. All three of the justices on the first natural court were 
hand picked by the new Democratic leadership and were extremely 
similar in backgrounds. All were Democrats, were traditional Protes-
tants, were legally trained out of state, had prosecutorial experience, 
began their tenure on the court at the same time, and had political 
experience. The only observed difference was that Justice Henry Ross 
received his legal training in a medium-quality law school and the other 
two justices trained in law offices. 
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Despite the failure of background measures to reveal it, there do 
appear to have been some fundamental ideological differences among 
the justices. This is best exemplified by Justices Alfred Franklin and 
Cunningham, who were delegates to the state constitutional convention 
in 1910. Even though both men were Democrats, a scalogram analysis 
of the voting behavior at the convention shows that they were at exactly 
opposite ends of the scale measuring support for big business. 8 These 
differences in attitude appear to have persisted on the court. 
Another period of discontinuity between dissent rate and docket 
composition is 1950 to 1961. There was a dramatic increase in the 
dissent rate in the early 1950s and an even more dramatic downturn in 
the rate in 1961. This fact appears to be partially a result of changes in 
docket composition, although the more important variable seems to be 
court size. In 1949 the supreme court was increased in size from three to 
five. Social psychological and probability theories suggest that such an 
expansion should be expected to increase the dissent rate. 9 That the 
increase in dissent rate is directly related to the expansion of the court is 
reinforced by the precipitous drop in dissent rate in 1961 , the exact year 
that the supreme court was granted the power to sit in panels of three in 
most cases. Thus we have a quasi-experimental situation that enables us 
to observe the dissent rate as court size increased from three members to 
five and then after eleven years was reduced back to three and a half (the 
average number of justices sitting on cases in the year 1961 ). The 
dissent rate behaves exactly as would be expected. 
Taking into account the changes in the size of the court, the docket 
composition model can be modified to include not only percent of 
public law cases but also number of justices. Thus the equation be-
comes DR = a + bX 1 + bX2 + e, where X 1 is the percent of cases 
containing a public law issue and X2 is the number of justices on the 
court. 10 If the period 1913 to 1920 is excluded, the actual values for this 
equationareDR = -6.27 + .123X1 + 2.19X2 + e.R2 isnowequal 
to .564 and both b1 and b2 are statistically significant at the .01 level. 
Two periods are left unexplored: 1921 to 1949 and 1961 to 1976. 
The former experienced a slow, gradual growth in the percent of the 
docket devoted to public law issues and dissent rate. The docket 
changes are consistent with the increased role of government regulation 
in American life during this period. The correlation between dissent 
and percent public law cases is consistent with the predictions of the 
docket composition theory. 
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The period 1961 to 1976 witnessed only minor changes in the 
dissent rate, but it is a significant period for gaining a more complete 
understanding of the docket composition theory. In 1965 Arizona 
created an intermediate court of appeals (ICA). With the creation of the 
ICA the supreme court was granted what appeared to be almost total 
-discretionary access control. The only limit to the supreme court's 
docket control was a statute stating: "The Court of Appeals shall have: 
appellate jurisdiction in all actions and proceedings originating in or 
permitted by law to be appealed from the superior court, except the 
criminal actions involving crimes punishable by death or life imprison-
ment."11 
Although limitation on the supreme court's access control seems 
minimal, a 1965 court opinion interpreted the statute as requiring the 
supreme court to hear formally all criminal convictions carrying a 
possible sentence of death or life imprisonment. 12 Thus all convictions 
had to be reviewed by the supreme court for the following offenses 
(among others) regardless of whether the death penalty or life im-
prisonment was actually given: assault with a deadly weapon by a 
prisoner, child molestation, murder (first and second degree), sodomy 
with a child, most drug offenses, and even derailing a train. 
This limitation resulted in about 20 percent of the supreme court's 
filings being criminal cases that had to be formally reviewed. This in 
turn resulted in more than 50 percent of the court's formal opinions 
being devoted to such criminal cases, which explains part of the reason 
why the per<:ent of public law cases was so low during this period. It 
also partially explains the low dissent rates. Most of these criminal 
cases were apparently relatively easily resolved first appeals with little 
merit, thereby resulting in a very low dissent rate. This fact combined 
with the general explosion of criminal cases in the early 1960s accounts 
for much of the change in docket composition and arguably for the low 
dissent rate during this period. 
Immediately after the creation ofthe ICA, there was an increase in 
the percent of public law cases and a concomitant increase in the 
dissent rate. For a few years the court was able to use its new-found 
access control to focus on issues that produced relatively high dissent 
rates. By 1969, however, the wave of mandatory criminal appeals 
dominated the court's formal decisions, and the dissent rate again 
dropped. It is only at the very end of the time series that percent of 
public law cases and dissent rate increased because in 1974legislative 
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change modified the court's obligatory jurisdiction in criminal cases to 
include only those in which the death penalty or life imprisonment was 
actually given. 
This discussion implies that structural changes do have an impact 
on docket composition and indirectly on dissent rate. It also demon-
strates the significance for docket composition and dissent rate of 
general social and legal movements, such as the increase in criminal 
appeals generally during the 1960s. Finally, it warns us that we must not 
merely look at whether a state has an ICA but also must examine 
relevant statutes, rules, and decisions to understand fully the likely 
impact on docket composition. 
DISCUSSION 
The findings presented to this point suggest that changes in docket 
composition do have an impact on the historical evolution of dissent 
rate on the Arizona Supreme Court. That conclusion, however, must be 
tempered by some important caveats. Although percent of cases con-
taining a public law issue and dissent rate do tend to covary over time, 
there is no necessary causal relationship between them. For example, 
ideological heterogeneity seems to be a sufficient condition for a 
relatively high dissent rate, as is demonstrated by the first three natural 
courts. As to whether a high percent of public law cases is also a 
sufficient condition for high conflict, we have no answer as yet. Such an 
answer must await a systematic evaluation of the individual and joint 
effects of justice composition and docket composition on dissent rate. 
The accomplishment of this next step, however, does not appear 
achievable, at least in the context of Arizona, with a simple background 
diversity operationalization of justice composition. Apparently grow-
ing out of the social homogeneity and one-party domination of Ari-
zona, the twenty-eight justices who have served on the supreme court 
have had remarkably similar backgrounds. For example, over 95 per-
cent were Democrats from medium-quality schools and had pros-
ecutorial experience. They are almost equally similar on all measures 
traditionally used for background diversity studies. 13 This fact leads to 
two conclusions. First, the similarity of justices' characteristics at 
specific points in time and over time at least partially accounts for the 
relatively low historical dissent rate in Arizona. Second, however, our 
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greater ideological diversity than background analysis reveals. A true 
test of the impact on dissent of justice composition, individually and 
interactively with docket composition, requires more sensitive mea-
sures of ideology. Unfortunately, when dealing with historical analysis, 
the most obvious solution, questionnaires, is not applicable. 
Although not directly measuring justice composition, Figure 11.3 
provides some indirect evidence about the relative ability of the justice 
composition and docket composition theories to account for variations 
in dissent rate. Figure 11.3 shows the historical evolution of dissent 
rates calculated individually for public law, criminal law, and private 
law cases. As can be seen, there is a perceptible degree of covariation in 
the three series, which is inconsistent with what would be expected if 
the docket composition theory were wholly explanatory of dissent. 
Docket composition theory is based on the assumption that dissent 
rates for particular types of cases are constant over time and that 
changes in the aggregate dissent rate are therefore a function of changes 
in docket mix. Although as I have shown, docket mix is significantly 
related to dissent, Figure 11.3 implies that there is also a causal factor 
that similarly affects changes in the dissent rates for each type of case 
and therefore in the aggregate dissent rate. One obvious such factor is 
ideological diversity. 
As a way of concluding, I want to discuss briefly the potential 
contributions of the approach taken here and suggest needed modifica-
tions in future research on appellate court conflict and consensus. 
Two incremental improvements in the study of state supreme court 
conflict and consensus have been suggested and demonstrated in this 
chapter. These are an explicit test of the docket composition theory and 
the use of a longitudinal design. The results suggest that docket 
composition does have an impact on the level of dissent on the Arizona 
Supreme Court. As we have seen, however, ideological diversity is also 
related to the level of dissent. Final determination of the relative ability 
of these two variables to explain historical variations in dissent must 
await more refined operationalizations of each. For example, my opera-
tionalization of docket composition, which classifies cases only into 
three broad types, clearly does not totally reflect the degree of docket 
controversy or complexity. Not all public law cases are controversial, 
complex, or both. Similarly, not all criminal and private law cases are 
mundane. Some alternative measures worthy of consideration in future 
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research include the percent of cases overturning the lower court, the 
average number of Shepards Citations per case, and the percent of cases 
containing constitutional law issues. 
Also required is a more refined operationalization of justice com-
position. Background diversity measures proved unsuccessful for Ari-
zona. As Rathjen and Patterson have shown, however, this is not 
necessarily the case for other states. Therefore, such measures may 
provide the necessary operationalization for most states. For states such 
as Arizona, attempts to measure precourt values, not just backgrounds, 
may be the best method. This test could entail, as done here, examining 
the behavior of the justices in other public positions before they came to 
the court. 
This study constitutes the first attempt to study conflict and con-
sensus on a state appellate court using yearly data over a relatively long 
period of time. The approach appears to justify further exploration. In 
addition to validating the findings of previous cross-sectional studies, 
by permitting the use of a quasi-experimental interrupted time-series 
design, it offers a powerful method of evaluating the impact of such 
factors as changes in court size, the introduction of an intermediate 
court of appeals, and modifications in laws and procedures. Therefore, 
as an overall research strategy, a combination of cross-sectional and 
longitudinal studies of judicial conflict and consensus seems war-
Finally, in this chapter, as well as others in this volume, a very 
limited conceptualization and operationalization of conflict and con-
sensus has been used. In each a simple index has been constructed 
which reflects the percent of cases formally decided in a year with at 
least one dissent. Such a measure is appropriate, however, only if we 
take a very limited view of conflict and consensus. It suggests that the 
only choices for a justice in a particular case are the dichotomous ones 
of conflict (dissent) or consensus (no dissent). Although these are polar 
options for a justice, there exists an important middle ground that is 
ignored: the concurring opinion. A concurrence is not conflict of the 
magnitude of a dissent, but it implies a significant difference of opinion 
among justices and as such is a dimension of conflict that should not be 
overlooked. Because previous research has not included concurring 
opinions, the level of conflict in state supreme courts and collegial 
courts more generally has probably been substantially underestimated. 
Additionally, the correlates of conflict, more broadly defined in this 
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way, may be considerably different. Therefore, further research should 
explore alternative conceptualization and operationalizations of con-
flict and consensus. 
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Coalition Building on the 
California Supreme Court: 
Votes on Access and the Merits 
ROBERT L. DUDLEY 
Despite the frequent admonition of legal scholars and the official dis-
approval expressed in Canon 19 of the Canon of Judicial Ethics, 
conflict continues to be an ever-present reality of appellate court en-
vironments. One expression of this conflict--dissent behavior-has, 
for more than three decades, provided the data bases for a wealth of 
studies that have constructed and tested increasingly more sophisti-
cated models of judicial decision making. 1 At the same time, scholars 
have demonstrated that conflict is often present even in unanimous cases. 2 
The vast majority of this work, however, has focused on what S. 
Sidney Ulmer terms Type I decisions--decisions on the merits. 3 This 
is, of course, understandable because decisions on the merits are the 
most visible actions taken by the courts and the votes are a matter of 
public record. The problem is that votes on the merits represent only a 
portion of the workload of appellate courts. As David W. Rohde points 
out, there are "at least four discrete 'decision points' ... the vote on 
whether or not to accept a case for decision, the vote on the merits, the 
assignment of the majority opinion, and the bargaining over the content 
of the majority opinion. "4 
Of these four "decision points," perhaps the least systematically 
studied has been "whether or not to accept a case for decision." This is 
so even though on appellate courts with broad discretionary powers, 
these decisions are the most numerous. Investigation in the area has 
been seriously hampered by the paucity of information-especially 
votes. Until the release of the Burton papers, for example, there had 
been no direct access to a set of voting records encompassing thousands 
of review decisions made by the United States Supreme Court. Without 
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this information, court observers were forced to make inferences about 
review decisions from votes on the merits or rely upon occasional 
dissents from denial of review5 and out-of- court remarks by justices 
and law clerks. 6 
In spite of these difficulties, several scholars have examined the 
criteria used in the case-selection process. The most often cited of these 
efforts is the cue theory of Joseph Tanenhaus and associates. 7 Believing 
that justices of the Supreme Court employed cues as a means of 
separating petitions worthy of serious consideration from frivolous 
appeals, the authors hypothesized the existence of four such signals: 
(1) the federal government as petitioner, (2) the presence of a civil 
liberties issue, (3) the existence of dissension among judges of the 
lower court or between two or more courts, and (4) the presence of an 
economic issue. All but the last appeared to improve significantly the 
likelihood of a case being granted certiorari. But when Ulmer, with the 
aid of Justice Burton's papers, reexamined the cue theory he concluded 
that the only cue significantly related to the decision to grant certiorari 
was the presence of the federal government as a petitioning party. 8 
Paralleling the work of Ulmer is Doris Marie Provine's comprehen-
sive study of the Burton papers-including the cases "special listed." 
Like Ulmer, she found the federal government more successful than 
other petitioners. Nevertheless, she rejected the argument that the 
presence of the federal government constituted a cue, suggesting in-
stead that the federal government's good fortune was the result of the 
solicitor general's careful screening of cases, thereby avoiding cases 
with obvious defects. 9 As a repeat player, the federal government was 
better situated to exploit the secret decision-making process used by the 
Court. 
Although Provine rejected the relevancy of cue theory, she did note 
that certain characteristics were associated with cases granted review. 
In fact, her work demonstrated that five categories accounted for "all 
but a handful" of the cases granted review: those involving the United 
States, civil rights and civil liberties, labor disputes, issues of feder-
alism, and criminal cases. 10 These findings suggest that the cues 
postulated by Tanenhaus and associates may be important determinants 
of case selection even if they are not cues. They may be, as Stuart H. 
Teger and Douglas Kosinski argued, merely the surrogates for salient 
issues-suggesting a policy dimension to case selection. 1 1 
Donald R. Songer, on the other hand, has argued for the validity of 
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cue theory and has suggested that the policy significance of decisions 
constitutes a fifth cue. 12 Thus access decisions are not independent of, 
but are influenced by, the same policy considerations that are charac-
teristic of justices' decisions on the merits. Justices will, according to 
Songer, vote to grant access when they feel that they can advance 
desirable policy goals by doing so. This policy theory of access was 
also articulated by Glendon Schubert in his examination of certiorari 
petitions of the Federal Employer Liability Act cases in the 1938-49 
terms. 13 Using game theory techniques and the voting patterns on the 
merits, he contended that some justices make case-selection decisions 
in ways that will maximize their power and realize their policy prefer-
ences. 
Of course, this policy theory of access contradicts the explanations 
of the screening decision criteria offered by the courts-most promi-
nently the United States Supreme Court's Rule 17. Official explana-
tions generally stress legalistic criteria such as conflict among lower 
courts or the existence of important federal questions not previously 
adjudicated by the Court. Plenary decision making is most often 
presented as a mechanical and time-consuming process that detracts 
from the real work of the Court. In language reminiscent of the attacks 
on early empirical studies of judicial decision making, access decisions 
are often portrayed as purely nondiscretionary judgments. Nev-
ertheless, either in spite of or because of these explanations, several 
political scientists have expanded on the implications of cue theory. 
The expansion has been necessary because, although cue theory 
provides valuable insights into the agenda-setting process of appellate 
courts, it does not furnish an explicit emphasis on the linkage of access 
and merit decisions. Still, the concentration on policy considerations, 
similar to those present in merit decisions, is highly suggestive of what 
such an explanation would be like. Thus with cue theory as the building 
block, recent research has begun to answer the question posed by 
Ulmer: "What are the implications of a decision to grant certiorari?" 14 
Ulmer suggested that Supreme Court justices were more likely to 
vote to grant review when the lower court outcome was contrary to their 
ideological position; in this case the issue was attitude toward institu-
tionalized government authority. 15 Additional evidence of this relation-
ship was offered by Ulmer in his study of the Supreme Court between 
1947 and 1956. By sampling the granted cases during this period and 
comparing votes on petitions for certiorari with votes on the merits in 
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the same cases, he was able to demonstrate that most of the justices 
voted to hear cases so they could reverse the lower court decision. Thus 
Ulmer hypothesized that "the relationship between two successive 
decisions in the same case is psychologically determined. " 16 
Replication by Lawrence Baum and Provine led to similar results. 
In one study Baum used proximity scales to order justices of the 
California Supreme Court on the two decision points. Based on the 
scaling analysis, he concluded that the justices responded to petitions 
for hearing on the basis of their response to the ideological content of 
the lower court decision. In a second study Baum directly replicated 
and confirmed Ulmer's work on the propensity to reverse cases the 
justices voted to hear. Provine's work also supplied at least limited 
support for Ulmer's thesis.17 
The present study explores the linkage between the plenary vote 
and the vote on the merits for the California Supreme Court. After 
documenting the extent of disagreement over which cases belong on the 
agenda, the chapter describes and tests the "error-correction" hypoth-
esis, that is, that judges vote to hear cases so they can reverse lower 
court "errors." 
THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT 
The data used in this chapter consist of all cases accepted for review by 
the California Supreme Court under its discretionary jurisdiction and 
for which decisions on the merits were rendered between January 1 , 
1973, and January 1 , 1980. During this period eleven justices served on 
the two natural courts, as defined by the tenure of the chief justice. 18 
This analysis is possible because the California court makes avail-
able to the public individual votes on petitions for review. 19 The 
availability of screening votes is probably sufficient justification for 
selecting the California Supreme Court, but this court is also attractive 
for study because it has long been thought to be the most "legally 
professional" of the state courts,20 although that reputation may be 
diminishing.21 As Glick and Pruet demonstrate in Chapter 9, the 
California court also has a high rate of dissent, providing numerous 
nonunanimous cases on which to apply the standard methods. 
California's supreme court is a seven-member tribunal composed 
of justices appointed by the governor and approved by a commission 
composed of the attorney general, one appellate judge, and the chief 
258 The State Supreme Courts 
justice ofthe supreme court. At the first general election after appoint-
ment, each justice stands before the electorate on a retention ballot. 
Thereafter the justices must seek voter approval at twelve-year intervals. 
In the past they have run little risk of defeat. Since 1978, however, the 
justices have had considerable difficulty in obtaining voter con-
firmation. For example, Chief Justice Rose Bird won confirmation in 
1978 with a mere 51.7 percent of the vote. The three most recent judges 
to seek voter approval also have won by narrow margins. 22 
The jurisdiction of the California Supreme Court includes only a 
few classes of mandated cases, such as appeals from death sentences. 
Thus most of the court's work involves discretionary jurisdiction over 
appeals brought from the five courts of appeal. The criteria for granting 
hearings are contained in the court's Rule 29, which is similar to the 
United States Supreme Court's Rule 17. In fiscal year 1977-78 just 
under three thousand petitions for hearings were filed, of which 7. 9 
percent were granted. 23 
In some ways, the California Supreme Court's treatment of peti-
tions for hearing resembles the United States Supreme Court's pro-
cedures for handling writs of certiorari. Both courts make use of the 
"rule of four," although on the seven-member California court, four 
votes constitute a majority. 24 Both courts also make use of special 
listings, which in California are referred to as the A and B lists. 
Additionally, both courts seem to make heavy use of their clerks in the 
preparation of a memorandum for each case. California, however, with 
its more professionalized staff of clerks, places a greater reliance on the 
clerks than does the United States Supreme Court. In criminal cases the 
only memorandums prepared for the justices' consideration at the 
initial stage are those of the central staff. Civil cases, on the other hand, 
are distributed to each of the six associate justices' chambers in rota-
tion. Although this procedure assures a more efficient use of staff, it 
also suggests that when they go into the conference the justices will 
know the details of only a few petitions. 25 
The United States Supreme Court and the California Supreme 
Court also differ in the opinion-assignment procedure. On the Califor-
nia court after a petition for hearing has been granted, the chief justice 
assigns one of the seven justices (in civil cases the justice who pre-
sented the original memorandum if he voted in the majority to grant), 
the task of preparing a "calendar memorandum." These memos, which 
are circulated within the court ten days before oral argument, sum-
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marize the facts of the case and highlight the legal issues at stake. 
Although not officially considered as such, calendar memos are typ-
ically first drafts of opinions. The original opinion assignment will be 
taken from the author of the calendar memorandum only if he or she 
votes with the minority on disposition. 26 
Finally, as Table 12.1 shows, the reversal rate for the California 
Supreme Court is similar to that reported by J. Woodford Howard for 
the United States Supreme Court.27 The 60.7 percent reversal rate in 
California is close to the 66 percent rate reported by Howard. There are 
differences, however, between the Wright and Bird courts. First, the 
overall reversal rate for the Wright court was only 58.7 percent, whereas 
the comparable percentage for the Bird court was 65.5. The two courts 
also differed in their treatment of criminal and civil cases. During the 
era of Donald Wright's chief justiceship, the court was more likely to 
reverse criminal than civil cases. But this pattern was reversed for the 
Bird court. Clearly, then, there are contextual differences to which the 
analysis must be sensitive. 
Taking into consideration the availability of the votes and the 
California court's similarity with the United States Supreme Court, the 
data should provide ample opportunity to test ideas developed in work 
on the United States Supreme Court. 
DISSENT IN CASE SELECTION AND ON THE MERITS 
As a first step in examining the role of policy considerations in case 
selection, we can look at the degree of unanimity achieved by the 
California court on the plenary decisions. The value of doing so was 
highlighted by Provine, who argued that "if case selection is func-
tionally equivalent to decision making on the merits, most case selec-
tion decisions should be nonunanimous, as most decisions on the 
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Table 12.2. Distribution of Votes for Review on Petitions Granted 
Combined Courts• Wright Court• Bird Court• 
Number All Civil Criminal All Civil Criminal All Civil Criminal 
of Votes Cases Cases Cases Cases Cases Cases Cases Cases Cases 
4 38.2 37.5 39.5 24.3 21.4 29.3 54.3 56.5 50.3 
5 25.5 23.7 28.2 28.2 25.0 33.1 23.1 20.9 26.6 
6 18.1 18.3 17.4 22.7 25.5 18.1 13.1 11.5 15.8 
Unanimousb 18.1 20.3 14.7 24.3 28.1 19.0 9.3 10.9 6.6 
•Columns do not add to I 00 because of rounding. 
bJncludes all 7-0, 6-0, and 5-0 voting patterns. 
merits are. "28 Since 82 percent of the access decisions during the 
Burton period were unanimously decided, Provine suggested caution in 
supposing the fungibility of the two decision points. 
The point is well taken. Political scientists studying courts need to 
be reminded from time to time that not every action taken by courts is 
nonunanimous. There is, however, a danger of making too much of 
voting unanimity. Specifically, there is no reason to assume that unan-
imity demonstrates harmony at the first stage any more than it does at 
the votes-on-the-merits phase. 29 Indeed, given the futility of voting on 
the losing side at the former decision point, unanimous decisions may 
be even less meaningful than at the latter stage. Nor does unanimity 
necessarily indicate a lack of policy commitment. This may simply be 
an example of Ronald Dworkin's distinction between hard and easy 
cases. 30 
Nevertheless, Provine provides a framework for comparison with 
the California Supreme Court since she indicated that nearly one-third 
of the cases granted review during the Burton period received unan-
imous approvaP 1 As Table 12.2 indicates, the percentage of cases 
unanimously granted review in California is considerably less than 
Provine reported for the United States Supreme Court. Unanimously 
granted hearings occurred on the California court only 18. 1 percent of 
the time. Moreover, as the table shows, the most frequent vote division 
was the one consisting of four votes for review-the minimum number. 
The next most frequent occurrence was the grant with five affirmative 
votes. Apparently, then, there is considerable disagreement over the 
proper subjects for the court's agenda. 
A closer inspection of Table 12.2, however, reveals that the break-
down for the entire period is somewhat misleading in that it disguises 
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Table 12.3. Distribution of Votes for Cases Decided on the Merits 
Combined Courts• Wright Court• Bird Court• 
Number All Civil Criminal All Civil Criminal All Civil Criminal 
of Votes Cases Cases Cases Cases Cases Cases Cases Cases Cases 
4 11.6 13.6 8.5 7.7 7.3 8.3 15.0 18.6 9.2 
5 15.5 15.3 16.0 14.4 14.6 14.1 16.3 14.5 19.3 
6 8.0 7.0 9.7 6.7 7.8 5.0 9.2 6.2 14.2 
Unanimousb 6.4 63.9 65.6 71.0 70.1 72.5 59.2 60.6 57.1 
"Columns do not add to 100 because of rounding. 
bJncludes all 7-0, 6-0, and 5-0 voting patterns. 
significant differences between the Wright and Bird courts. Voting 
divisions on the Wright court were almost equally distributed across 
categories. Roughly a quarter of the cases granted review received the 
minimum number of votes, and almost another one-fourth were unan-
imously accepted. The most frequent occurrence was the five-vote 
grant, but the difference is slight. In vivid contrast is the breakdown 
presented for the Bird court. Rather than being equally distributed, the 
results are clearly skewed in the direction of four-vote grants. Slightly 
over 50 percent of the grants fell in the four-vote category and just under 
10 percent were granted unanimously. 
Finally, Table 12.2 reports the percentages for each vote division by 
the type of case--civil or criminal. Since these cases were the object of 
dissimilar reversal rates and are handled by different procedures, with 
the central staff preparing the original memorandum on criminal cases, 
it seemed possible that they would be subject to different vote distribu-
tions. Such, however, was not the case. There were slight differences 
between civil and criminal cases, with criminal cases less likely to be 
granted unanimously, but the differences are hardly major. 
In marked contrast to the voting divisions on access decisions are 
those reported in Table 12.3 for determinations on the merits. Table 
12.3 reports a high rate of dissent for the California Supreme Court, but 
the level of dissent on the merits is considerably lower than that 
evidenced on the gatekeeping decisions. It is of particular importance 
here that by far the most frequent voting division on the mertis was the 
unanimous decision. The aggregate data for the entire period demon-
strate that 64.6 percent of the cases were decided unanimously and only 
11.6 percent received the minimum number of votes. 
Again, however, there are differences between the two courts. In the 
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Wright court, a full 71 percent of the cases were decided unanimously 
and only 7. 7 percent were supported by the minimum winning coali-
tion. During the Bird court years only 59.2 percent of the decisions 
were unanimous and 15 percent received only four votes. In both courts 
the second most frequent occurrence, after the unanimous decision, 
was the disposition with a five-vote majority. 
VOTING TO REVIEW AND VOTING TO REVERSE 
To date, the strongest evidence available to substantiate a policy or 
merits-conscious approach to case selection has been the work, pre-
viously discussed, of Ulmer, Baum, and Provine. All three authors have 
substantiated the existence of a policy approach to case selection by 
demonstrating the use of an error-correction strategy by judges. As 
Baum described the strategy, judges "might seek to 'correct errors' in 
the lower courts by voting to grant a hearing whenever a lower court 
decision departed significantly from their most preferred doctrinal 
position. "32 Such a strategy is, of course, not the only way that judges 
can pursue policy goals at the gatekeeping stage, but it is the simplest 
strategy. Any other approach requires that the judges estimate the likely 
responses of their colleagues and adjust their behavior accordingly. 33 
To test the hypothesized relationship between the two decision 
points, Ulmer, Baum, and Provine constructed tables comparing the 
percentage of times each justice voted to reverse decisions for which he 
voted to grant review with the percentages of reversals in cases he voted 
to deny review. Each of the authors then concluded that for some 
justices supporting an application for hearing was positively associated 
with sustaining the appellant's claim on full review. Ulmer reported a 
statistically significant association (using a chi-square test) for eight of 
the eleven justices, and Baum reported a significant relationship for 
four of eight judges. Provine did not report any test of significance. 34 
With these previous studies as a model, Table 12.4 was constructed 
for the California Supreme Court. As the table demonstrates, all eleven 
judges were more likely to reverse than to affirm in cases they voted to 
hear, but the differences in the percentages are far from impressive. 
They are, however, generally higher than those reported by Ulmer. 35 
Indeed, two of Ulmer's justices, Burton and Clark, were more likely to 
affirm than to reverse decisions they voted to review. Additionally, the 
lowest percentage in the first column of Table 12.4, Frank Richardson 
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Table 12.4. Votes on Petitions for Hearing and on the Merits of 
Accepted Cases, 1973-1979 
Percentage of Votes to Reverse 
When Judge Voted When Judge Voted Chi-
Justice to Grant to Deny Difference Square 
Bird• 65.6 53.3 12.3 2.34 
Wright• 61.4 50.0 11.4 .31 
Tobriner 64.3 47.3 17.0 5.72b 
Mosk 61.2 56.1 5.1 .51 
Clark 59.9 45.0 14.9 ?.JOb 
Richardson 56.8 47.2 9.6 1.90 
Newman 60.4 67.3 -6.9 .70 
Manuel 66.4 50.0 16.4 2.00 
McComb 64.4 36.5 27.9 10.72b 
Sullivan 57.9 66.7 -8.8 .50 
Burke 63.6 25.0 38.6 3.51C 
achief justice. 
bSignificant at .01 level. 
csignificant at .05 level. 
at 56.8, is higher than all but four of the analogous computations 
presented by Ulmer. 
Table 12.4 also reports a positive relationship between votes to 
grant and votes to reverse for nine of the eleven judges, with Frank 
Newman and Raymond Sullivan the exceptions. But for only four 
justices was the relationship statistically significant. It is perhaps more 
important that only two of the eleven judges were as much as 20 percent 
more likely to vote to reverse when they had voted to hear a case than 
when they had denied access. Additionally, of the 2,203 pairs of votes, 
only 61.3 percent were consistent-votes to grant and reverse or deny 
and affirm. Since the expected cell frequencies would have yielded 
55.7 percent, the actual cell frequencies are only a slight improvement. 
It would seem then that the hypothesized relationship between 
access decisions and merit decisions finds little support from this 
analysis of the California Supreme Court. There is, though, a possibil-
ity that such a judgment is premature because, as has been shown, there 
are some significant differences between the Wright and Bird courts. 
Possibly the problem with Table 12.4 is that the aggregation cloaks 
important intercourt differences. Thus Table 12.5 was constructed to 
control for natural courts. 
Table 12.5. Votes on Petitions for Hearing and on the Merits of Accepted Cases, Wright and Bird Courts 
Wright Court 
Percentage of Votes to Reverse 
When Judge 












•Significant at . 05 level. 
bSignificant at .01 level. 
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Table 12.5, which presents the results broken down by natural 
courts, does nothing to change the aggregated findings. Once again, for 
only four judges was there a statistically significant relationship. Table 
12.5 does, however, show an interesting effect of the aggregation. 
During the Bird court both Matthew Tobriner and William Clark 
exhibited a strong relationship between votes to grant and votes to 
review, yet neither demonstrated a statistically significant relationship 
in the Wright court. This is understandable regarding Tobriner because 
his increase, during the Bird court, is quite small, but Clark's behavior 
is more surprising. 
Although the findings with regard to Clark are interesting, they 
should not obscure the basic conclusion that the relationship between 
the two votes is weak. Once again, all of the justices were more likely to 
reverse decisions for which they granted hearings than to affirm them, 
but most were almost as likely to reverse in cases in which they voted 
against accepting the writ. Indeed, two justices in the Bird court, 
Stanley Mosk and Newman, and one in the Wright court, Sullivan, were 
more likely to reverse when they voted to deny review. Finally, the 
percentage of vote pairs that are consistent with the error-correction 
theory are 59.6 and 63.2 for the Wright and Bird courts, respectively. 
These are compared to the percentages derived by using the expected 
cell values, 54.9 and 55.8. Obviously, once again, the observed values 
are only slightly better than those that would be expected if there was no 
relationship. 
Given the limited relationships discussed here, it would seem that 
the error-correction strategy of gatekeeping decision making is at best 
unevenly supported by the data. After all, even with controls for natural 
courts, only four of the eleven judges demonstrated any evidence 
confirming the strategy. Moreover, in no instance did the percentage of 
consistent votes-votes to grant and reverse or deny and affirm-for 
the court as a whole significantly exceed those expected with unrelated 
variables. Perhaps, then, the official criteria for case selection provide a 
better explanation for this decision stage than merits consciousness, 
although if this is true, the pervasive disagreement evidenced in Table 
12.2 is perplexing. 
Provine, however, suggested one more possibility. It may be that the 
weak relationships discovered here are at least partly the result of 
differing conceptions of judicial role. Certainly justices differ in their 
perceptions of their task, and it may be expected that such differences 
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help to explain individual differences in the strength of the relation-
ships between the two sets of votes. 
THE COURT'S ROLE AND ERROR CORRECTION 
To explain the imperfect correlations between votes to review and votes 
to reverse that her data evidenced, Provine developed two purposive 
role types-review-prone and review-conservative justices. As con-
ceived by Provine, the two role types derived from the expectation that 
justices will differ somewhat in their perceptions of the proper work-
load of the court. Specifically, justices may disagree over the extent to 
which the court, in her case the United States Supreme Court, can and 
should serve as the court of last resort for disappointed litigants. 
Illustrative of this argument is Provine's conclusion that Justices Black 
and Douglas differed from Justices Burton and Frankfurter "less in the 
types of cases they voted to hear than in the numbers they felt competent 
to decide on the merits. "36 Justices Black and Douglas seemed to 
believe that the Court should decide numerous cases with little delay, a 
position that to some of their colleagues seemed insensitive to the 
workload of the Court. On the other hand, to review-prone justices such 
as Black and Douglas, a reluctance to vote for review demonstrated a 
callous disregard of the petitioner's plight. Thus the differing roles are a 
product of the tension between providing relief to as many appellants as 
possible and protecting the institution by reserving review for the 
important cases. 
Recognizing the existence of this tension makes it possible to argue 
that a justice's votes to reverse in cases he or she voted against reviewing 
can be explained by his or her belief that although the case was v :ongly 
decided by the lower court, it was not important enough to warrant 
review. Likewise, a justice's failure to vote for reversal in every case he 
or she voted to grant review to may mean that the justice simply 
perceived the issue as too important to ignore. Viewed from this 
perspective, conflict over case-screening may be the result of divergent 
gatekeeping norms as well as policy discordance. 
Indeed, a comparison of Tables 12.2 and 12.3 offers considerable 
support for this position. As was noted earlier, the level of conflict at the 
two stages differed considerably. During both the Wright and Bird 
courts, the justices were much more likely to disagree on case-screen-
ing than on the merits. On the Wright court 81.9 percent of the access 
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decisions were nonunanimous, but only 35.4 percent of the decisions 
on the merits evidenced dissent. Similarly, for the Bird court the 
percentages were 90.7 and 40.8, respectively. Of course, these dif-
ferences are not proof that caseload concerns motivated the justices in 
their gatekeeping decisions, but they do strongly suggest that the 
sources of conflict at the two stages differed. 
Perhaps, then, the ambiguous evidence of merits consciousness 
produced above is the result of a failure to account for this alternative 
source of conflict. To examine this possibility it is necessary to repeat 
the error-correction analysis controlling for conflict on the merits. 
Since unanimously decided cases are less likely to be the product of 
policy disputes, we should expect little evidence of merits con-
sciousness in case selection. Given unanimity on the proper disposition 
of the case, conflict at the access stage is most likely attributable to 
forces other than policy considerations-gatekeeping norms. Con-
versely, those cases decided nonunanimously obviously generated 
policy conflict, and it is here that merits consciousness in case selection 
should be most prevalent. 
Turning then to the unanimous cases (Table 12.6), it is apparent 
that merits consciousness played a minor part in the justices' access 
decisions. For example, of the eight justices who served on the Wright 
court, only four were more likely to reverse when they voted to grant 
than when they voted to deny review, and in none of these cases was the 
difference statistically significant. Moreover, of all the vote pairs cast 
during the period only 59.8 percent were consistent with the error-
correction theory-votes to grant and reverse or deny and affirm. Since 
the expected cell frequencies would have yielded 55.9 percent, the 
observed frequencies are a marginal improvement. 
Even more striking in their failure to support the error-correction 
theory are the results reported, again in Table 12.6, for the Bird court. 
As the table demonstrates, only Justice Tobriner voted to reverse when 
he granted a hearing more often than when he voted to deny review. The 
difference, however, is not statistically significant and barely exceeds 
10 percent. The other six justices all voted to reverse cases they denied 
review to more often than those they granted. Not surprisingly, the 52.8 
percent of vote pairs consistent with the error-correction theory is 
actually 2.6 percent less than would be expected if there were no 
relationship. 
Overall, then, the cases unanimously decided on the merits offer no 
Table 12.6. Votes on Petitions for Hearing and on the Merits of Cases Decided Unanimously, Wright and Bird 
Courts 
Wright Court 
Percentage of Votes to Reverse 
When Judge When Judge 
Judge Voted to Grant Voted to Deny Difference 
Wright 58.8 100.0 -41.2 
Tobriner 59.2 50.0 9.2 
Mosk 61.8 56.0 5.8 
Clark 57.1 60.5 -3.4 
Richardson 63.2 57.1 6.1 
McComb 63.0 47.1 15.9 
Sullivan 56.8 73.3 -16.5 
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support for the error-correction theory of gatekeeping. Furthermore, 
this weakness of the error-correction theory cannot be attributed to the 
influence of unanimous access decisions because cases decided unan-
imously on the merits were not necessarily consensus selections for 
review. Indeed, 78.6 percent of the unanimous cases were granted 
review by a divided court. 
Mirroring these results are those presented in Table 12.7, which 
tests the error-correction theory using only nonunanimous cases. Per-
haps the first point to notice in Table 12.7 is that, of the eleven judges 
who served on the California Supreme Court during the period under 
study, only one, Justice Newman, demonstrated a negative relationship 
between votes to grant and votes to reverse. The table also reports a 
statistically significant level of support for the error-correction theory 
in the case of five of the eight judges on the Wright court. Likewise, 
during the Bird court years, having supported an application for review 
was, for six of the seven justices, positively associated with supporting 
the grantee on full review. In the case of Chief Justice Bird and Justices 
Tobriner, Clark, Richardson, and Wiley Manuel, moreover, the asso-
ciation was statistically significant. Additionally, not one of these five 
judges was less than 30 percent more likely to reverse after having voted 
to hear a case than after having elected to deny review. 
In general, Table 12.7 provides support for the error-correction 
theory by confirming its existence for eight of the eleven judges. Of the 
three justices for whom the theory is not supported, one case-Justice 
Sullivan--could have been the result of low cell entries. The same, 
however, cannot be said of Justices Mosk and Newman or of Justice 
Richardson in the Wright court. 
The association between voting to review and voting to reverse is 
also evident when controls are added for the size of the majority. This 
pattern is indicated clearly in Table 12.8, which reports the aggregated 
results, for the entire period, by the size of the on-the-merits majority. 
The data reveal that the smaller the majority at the merits stage, the 
stronger the association between voting to review and voting to reverse. 
Thus in cases decided by the minimum winning coalition, 66.3 percent 
of the votes to grant review were followed by votes to reverse. Addition-
ally, 68.9 percent of the vote pairs were consistent with the error-
correction theory. Had there been no relationship, we would have 
expected 53.9 percent of the vote pairs to be consistent with error 
correction. Furthermore, as the size of the majority grows, so too does 
the percentage of inconsistent vote pairs. 
Table 12.7. Votes on Petitions for Hearing and on the Merits of Cases Decided Nonunanimously, Wright and 
Bird Courts 
Wright Court 
Percentage of Votes to Reverse 
When Judge 
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Table 12.8. Aggregation of Votes to Review and Votes to Reverse by 
Size of Majority on the Merits 
Number of Votes 






Votes to Reverse 
When Judges When Judges 









aJncludes all 7-0, 6-0, and 5-0 voting patterns. 
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In a political system that stresses the importance of adjudication as 
a fundamental source of justice, access to courts is of the utmost 
importance. The decision to decide is most obviously crucial on 
appellate courts that have discretionary jurisdiction because the refusal 
to grant a request to appeal is, for most petitioners, the final decision. 
Yet as John A. Stookey and William Bowen noted, "To date, little has 
been known about the factors which prompt a state supreme court to 
accept a case for review. "37 This vitally important gatekeeping process 
remains largely unexplained. 
The evidence presented here suggests that, at least with regard to 
the California Supreme Court, agenda setting is far from a consensual 
process. Fewer than 20 percent of the cases granted review between 
1973 and 1980 were unanimously accepted, and only 9. 3 percent of the 
Bird court grants were unanimous. Assuming that the existence of 
dissent serves as a measure of conflict within a court, it must be 
concluded that the case-screening process on the California Supreme 
Court was marked by extensive conflict. In fact, the level of conflict was 
notably higher on access decisions than on the merits. 
This analysis also suggests that case selection is not equivalent to 
decision making on the merits. Decisions on whether to accept cases 
for hearing in the California Supreme Court were substantially related 
to decisions on the merits, but only when the data were restricted to 
nonunanimous decisions on the merits. For this particular subset of 
cases, the proposition that judges vote to hear cases so as to reverse 
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lower court errors was strongly supported. Moreover, as the number of 
dissents on the merits increased, so too did the evidence supporting the 
error-correction theory. The voting patterns in cases decided unan-
imously on the merits did not, however, provide any support for the 
error-correction approach. Not one of the eleven justices who served on 
the California Supreme Court during the period under. study demon-
strated a statistically significant relationship between the two votes in 
the unanimous cases. 
In the final analysis, then, a great deal of conflict at the agenda-
setting stage cannot be explained by merits consciousness alone. It may 
well be that the case-screening conflict present in unanimously decided 
cases springs from the differing role conceptions suggested by Provine. 
Clearly justices can be expected to differ in their perceptions of the 
proper role for the court, and such differences may well constitute a 
distinct source of conflict. At the very best, it seems unlikely that future 
attempts to improve our understanding of the case-screening process 
can ignore such a consideration. 
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and CHARLES M. LAMB 
The purpose of this book was to explore the type, frequency, intensity, 
and especially the causes and phenomena related to conflict and 
consensus on American appellate courts. The studies in the preceding 
chapters have taken several approaches for investigating these con-
cepts. They include examining attitudes and values (or ideology-policy 
considerations), role conceptions, and small group decision making as 
well as probing the influence of a number of variables that may be 
relevant for the analysis of judicial dissent, including caseloads, the 
complexity of the issues before the court, departure from precedent and 
reversal of lower courts, and threats to courts from their political 
environments. Collectively, macro and microlevel analyses have been 
used to describe, explain, and theorize about the causes of conflict and 
consensus, in part confirming prior findings, certainly building on 
prior research, and providing new insights into judicial behavior. 
By encouraging the contributors to this volume to examine judicial 
conflict and consensus in various ways and by including studies of all 
three major levels of collegial courts, we have hoped that the signifi-
cance of this volume has gone beyond the findings presented in the 
individual chapters. Specifically, we believe that collectively the stud-
ies not only fill in gaps concerning theories of judicial behavior but also 
permit us to compare different levels of appellate courts in some useful 
ways and to suggest some paths to potentially fruitful further research. 
Let us elaborate on each of these points. 
THEORY 
Several empirical theories to explain judicial behavior have emerged 
since the pioneering work of C. Herman Pritchett.' The preceding 
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chapters focused on conflict and consensus and relied on voting data to 
explore judges' decision making. The authors analyzed judges' at-
titudes and values, selected backgrounds, role perceptions, and small 
group interactions. First used to test hypotheses involving the behavior 
of justices on the U.S. Supreme Court, these approaches, with some 
methodological modifications, are now used to study judges' behavior 
on the U.S. courts of appeals and state supreme courts. This book 
suggests that students of the courts of appeals and the state supreme 
courts have creatively responded to the "upper court myth" criticism of 
the judicial politics field. Although there is still a strong focus on the 
U.S. Supreme Court, lower-level appellate courts offer a rich opportun-
ity for testing decision-making hypotheses, as the studies reported in 
this volume show. 2 
The attitudinal approach is reflected in an impressive body of 
literature. It has provided a staple means for investigating Supreme 
Court behavior for some three decades3 and has been used to an extent 
regarding the courts of appeals4 and state supreme courts. 5 Theorizing 
about the influence of attitudes on judges' decisions is chiefly anchored 
on the fundamental assumption that empirical regularities in what can 
be interpreted as distinct patterns of judges' voting behavior can be 
taken to reflect their attitudes and values6 or at least that they behave as 
if they hold such attitudes and values. The examination of opinions may 
be added to quantitative analysis, however, so as to illuminate even 
further judicial attitudes, as this volume's study by Spaeth and Altfeld 
suggests. Bloc analysis and cumulative scaling constitute the two 
major traditional methods for probing the attitudes of judges, but 
alternative measurement procedures have been developed. 7 
Because the attitudinal approach has been so clearly and closely 
associated with research on judicial behavior, its explicit use by some 
of the contributors to this book is not surprising. Danelski 's chapter 
sheds a great deal of light on how attitudinal and other behavioral 
approaches may be combined in a multicausal model to produce a 
fruitful research strategy. 8 After content analysis, he applies scaling in 
an innovative way to examine activism and restraint role conceptions as 
they relate to judicial conflict and consensus in civil liberties decisions. 
Whereas Danelski specifically uses scaling, the chapters by Heck, 
Spaeth and Altfeld, Washy, Lamb, and Flango, Ducat, and McKnight 
rely to varying degrees on quantitative measures of judicial interagree-
ment related to the theory upon which bloc analysis is grounded. That 
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is, bloc analysis is not used in its traditional form in these chapters,9 but 
these authors provide different types of analysis demonstrating levels of 
agreement and disagreement between and among judges in non-
unanimous decisions. The studies in this book implicitly or explicitly 
suggest a crucial point-that diversity of attitudes is related to the 
dynamics of conflict and consensus on American collegial courts. This 
is true, as the chapter by Dudley demonstrates, even in a significant 
portion of access decisions as distinct from decisions on the merits. 
Data showing the extensiveness of overt dissent on appellate courts are 
presented in the contribution by Ulmer, which spans the history of the 
Supreme Court from John Marshall's chief justiceship, Green's chapter, 
which focuses on all courts of appeals, and the work by Glick and 
Pruet, who provide longitudinal data on dissent behavior for all fifty 
state supreme courts. Other chapters also contain valuable findings on 
dissent behavior as well as unanimous decisions that mask attitudinal 
conflict. 
Inasmuch as individual attitudes and values may be shaped in part 
by life experiences, a number of studies have sought to test the relation-
ship of judges' attributes or background characteristics to their be-
havior. 10 Although this empirical research has resulted in mixed 
conclusions concerning the existence and strength of the relationship, 
the backgrounds approach continues to be of interest to students of 
judicial behavior. 11 The theoretical underpinnings of this approach are 
less sophisticated than those underlying attitudinal analysis. Essen-
tially, theorizing involves the basic notion that personal background 
traits and related life experiences converge to leave an imprint on 
judges that may affect their decisions. Background variables most 
frequently given attention include political party identification, relig-
ion, socioeconomic status, and prior judicial or political experience. 
Some chapters in this book touch upon the backgrounds approach. 
Peterson's propositional inventory on dissent in American courts con-
cludes that there is "some confirmation" for the hypothesis that judicial 
disagreement increases as the diversity of judges' backgrounds in-
creases. 12 Although Glick/Pruet, Flango/Ducat/McKnight, and 
Stookey allude to the possible relationship between conflict and diverse 
backgrounds, it is directly addressed in only two chapters, one by 
Songer and the other by Lamb. Songer specifically tested the hypoth-
esis for party affiliation, as well as ideology and the presence or absence 
of a district court judge serving on a panel. Songer's data base, it will be 
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recalled, included courts of appeals decisions between 1953 and 1975 
which concerned criminal law and labor relations issues. He discovered 
strongest support for the ideology variable, mixed results for the pres-
ence or absence of a district judge, but no significant relationship 
between dissent and political party identification. Lamb, on the other 
hand, had a different finding in his study of the D.C. Circuit. Lamb 
showed that Warren Burger, a Republican Protestant, tended to be in 
very high conflict in criminal cases with colleagues who were Demo-
crats and either Catholic or Jewish. In light of the checkered findings in 
the entire body of the backgrounds-behavior literature, however, per-
haps it is no surprise that the conclusions of Songer and Lamb are not 
entirely consistent on the party variable, especially since one study is at 
the macrolevel and the other is a microanalysis. 
Judicial role analysis receives greater attention than background 
analysis from our contributors. 13 In theory, a judge's view of his or her 
role may be an important factor influencing the degree to which 
attitudes, values, and backgrounds affect decision making. The specif-
ic role conceptions most often addressed in this book are those of 
activism and restraint. In general, activist judges are more likely to 
view their proper role as intervening in the political process to promote 
policy which they believe to be advantageous to society; restraint-
oriented judges are more likely to view their proper role as deferring to 
the elected branches in making policy and resolving societal prob-
lems.14 
Of the studies in this book, some bear only indirectly on activist-
restraint role concepts, such as Dudley's, which suggests that some 
voting on access decisions may be governed by role considerations. 
Two chapters, however, both of which focus on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, directly examine activism versus restraint. 15 Danelski theorizes 
that expectations of restraint and adherence to precedent tend to limit 
dissent by avoiding attitudinal and value differences among justices 
that might otherwise cause conflict in the Court. To test this proposition 
empirically, he successfully scaled votes in civil liberties cases that, 
based on content analysis, seemed to turn on activism-restraint expec-
tations and concluded that these role concepts in fact underlay the votes 
cast in those decisions. Danelski also quantitatively investigated dis-
senting opinions in those cases, developing activism-restraint scores 
for justices who articulated those role conceptions. He then used 
Spearman rank-order correlations to demonstrate that role concepts 
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and values are significantly related, discovering that disparities in 
commitments to values and role expectations often cause conflict in the 
Supreme Court. Overall, role concepts are an important part of 
Danelski's multicausal model. The microlevel analysis of Spaeth and 
Altfeld, on the other hand, looked at activism-restraint concepts on the 
Warren Court with a specific focus on Justice Frankfurter. 16 Like 
Danelski, the authors examined voting behavior in cases amenable to 
resolution on the basis of exercising restraint but demonstrated that 
Frankfurter's voting was frequently inconsistent with the restraint role 
conception. Moreover, their in-depth analysis contains detailed in-
sights into judicial behavior that are not normally possible in macro 
studies. They probe rates of interagreement between specific justices in 
four different data sets and demonstrate that voting conflict was 
markedly less evident in some issues than in others. Spaeth and Altfeld 
are also the only contributors to this volume who combine voting and 
opinion analysis to show that although a justice's language in opinions 
often gives lip service to fundamental notions of restraint, the reasoning 
used may actually rationalize the casting of activist votes. 
Finally, the small group approach has been addressed to varying 
degrees in this book. 17 Small group theory essentially suggests that it is 
the group condition, the interactions among judges in the decision-
making process, that affects the decisions ultimately reached. As noted 
in the Prologue, we believe that it is useful for students of judicial 
behavior to develop quantitative approaches for the analysis of courts as 
small groups to complement nonquantitative analyses based solely on 
the private papers of deceased judges. Some contributors to this volume 
consider small group theory more indirectly than do others. Ulmer's 
exploratory analysis, for example, suggests that the level of conflict on 
the Supreme Court is in part a measure of the leadership abilities of 
chief justices and that their influence in the small group may decline 
when they dissent and thus relinquish the power to assign majority 
opinions. Similarly, Heck hints at small group concepts by emphasiz-
ing voting alliances and the tendency of the chief justice to remain close 
to the Court's "center of gravity" so as to exercise leadership oppor-
tunities. Washy's major finding that consensus on the Ninth Circuit is 
lowest for panels that contain a visiting judge and highest for those 
containing only Ninth Circuit judges in active service has implications 
for the dynamics of the small group. Outsiders are by definition not 
fully socialized into the group and are less subject to group norms and 
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the constraints they may place on dissent behavior. Stookey's research 
on the Arizona Supreme Court suggests that the size of the court may be 
related to dissent rate. Glick and Pruet show a positive relationship 
between size of court and dissent rate on state supreme courts, par-
ticularly those systems with intermediate-level courts. Three of this 
volume's twelve studies are even more directly relevant for small group 
theory: the chapters by Danelski, Flango/Ducat/McKnight, and G1een. 
The first two focus on the small group concept of leadership, and we 
discuss them first. 
Theory underlying the examination of collegial courts as small 
groups suggests among other things that personality may determine 
which judges are most likely to provide leadership on a court. 18 
Danelski's chapter is important to this line of inquiry because it seeks to 
examine quantitatively the Supreme Court's decisional process by 
exploring the relevance of personality in the exercise of leadership. 
Specifically, he hypothesized that the adequacy of task and social 
leadership affects conflict and its resolution and that personality is 
related to the adequacy of such leadership. After confirming that 
conflict is more likely to be resolved when task and social leadership 
are clearly evident, Danelski relies on Justice Douglas's docket books 
for the 1939, 1940, 1942, and 1943 terms to analyze empirically vote 
changes between conference and final decisions. The theory behind the 
investigation is that conflict resolution is manifest when justices ini-
tially dissent from the majority in conference but ultimately agree with 
the majority's final decision. 19 Although several variables might poten-
tially account for the resolution of such conflict, leadership in the small 
group certainly provides the basis for a partial empirical explanation. 
Danelski confirms the effective leadership abilities of Chief Justice 
Hughes and Justice Black by developing leadership scores, that is, the 
percentage of times a justice's dissenting and pass votes in conference 
subsequently became majority votes in cases assigned to him for 
opinion. Of additional theoretical interest is that when a new chief 
justice is a relatively weak leader, other justices may actively compete 
for leadership on the Court. Pursuing this hypothesis, Danelski's data 
show that leadership scores became widely dispersed among Court 
members when Stone replaced Hughes as chief justice, thereby demon-
strating the hypothesized competition. Judicial biographies and other 
nonquantitative research indicate that the personalities of Hughes, 
Stone, Black, Frankfurter, and other justices may have affected their 
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ability to provide satisfactory leadership. Danelski goes beyond this 
literature by empirically comparing justices' acquiescence in majority 
opinions on the Hughes and Stone courts after they originally cast a 
dissent in conference. This important comparison shows that acquies-
cence decreased by more than 25 percent after Stone became chief 
justice and suggests to Danelski that the personalities of the two chiefs 
probably accounts for some differences in their leadership abilities. In 
several ways, then, Danelski has contributed to theoretical approaches 
for studying leadership on collegial courts and may point toward 
additional progress in future empirical research addressing the impor-
tance of personality in resolving conflict in judicial decision making. 
A somewhat different perspective than Danelski 's is taken by 
Flango, Ducat, and McKnight, whose principal objective was to inves-
tigate leadership on state supreme courts through analysis of opinion 
assignments and coalitions in decisions with nonunanimous opin-
ions. 2o A judge, in theory, may provide leadership if he or she regularly 
attracts colleagues to join his or her opinions, and the exercise of 
leadership may affect the level of conflict and consensus on a collegial 
court. Actual or informal leadership may also be distinguished from 
formal leadership associated with being chief justice. Given this basic 
theoretical foundation, they quantitatively probe conflictual and con-
sensual voting patterns on the Michigan and Pennsylvania supreme 
courts to measure leadership via several different methods. 21 They 
show that leaders on state supreme courts may be potentially identified, 
for example, by the percentage of a judge's total opinion output that 
becomes the majority position, by the percentage of times that a judge 
writes for the court majority when he had an opportunity to do so, by the 
capacity to speak for the majority relative to the size of the dominant 
coalition, and by the percentage of colleagues an opinion-writer can 
attract to his position. In fact, however, after experimenting with these 
and other potential measures of leadership, it was concluded that some 
may not be valid indicators of leadership on collegial courts but rather 
measure other factors such as equitability of opinion assignment or 
power. The Inter-individual Solidarity Index appeared to be the best 
indicator of leadership. Finally, Flango, Ducat, and McKnight maintain 
that judges may exhibit leadership in minority coalitions. This concept 
of alternative leadership may be manifested in a judge's capacity to 
attract others to join dissenting opinions-provided, of course, that 
leadership is not defined as determining what the law will be at a 
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particular time. Indeed, the authors observed that, theoretically, the 
ability of a dissenting judge to gain the support of his colleagues may be 
a more accurate indicator of leadership under some circumstances than 
the degree of support given to the majority opinion-writer. 
Green's chapter seeks to penetrate the small group from another 
angle by updating and expanding the scope of previous empirical 
research on unanimous and nonunanimous decision making on the 
U.S. courts of appeals. 22 Because of structural changes, increases in 
the number of judges on the courts of appeals since 1978, and the 
expanded use of special judges sitting "by designation, "23 the decision-
making environment on these intermediate appellate courts has 
changed considerably in recent years. Green theorizes that these 
changes have altered the nature of the three-judge appeals court work 
group, that is, the number of possible panel combinations has grown 
geometrically and the same judges serve together in a three-judge small 
group less frequently. Comparing data on dissent rates in all three-
judge criminal law decisions by the circuits from 1966 to 1970 with the 
dissent rates for such cases in 1980, no striking changes in the level of 
appeals court dissensus was found. Dissensus did increase in 1980, 
however, when unanimous decisions were used to measure disagree-
ment. This finding suggested to Green that all appeals court decisions, 
not just those in which a dissent is officially registered, must be 
included in a data base used to examine dissensus on the courts of 
appeals, and that changes in the nature ofthe three-judge appeals court 
work group since 1978 have caused a growth in dissensus on some 
circuits. Overall, then, because of fundamental structural differences in 
how most appeals courts decide cases, as compared to the U.S. Su-
preme Court and the state courts of last resort, Green has generated 
small group theory quite unlike that developed by Danelski or by 
Flango, Ducat, and McKnight. 
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL BEHAVIOR 
It is fair to observe that students of judicial behavior have not given 
much attention to comparative institutional behavior. 24 Writing in 1983 
about the study of judicial politics, Baum pointed out that "scholars in 
the field have shown little taste for cross-institutional research even 
within the judiciary. It is notable, for instance, how little research 
compares federal and state courts. "25 
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To the extent possible, based on the studies in this book, we can 
suggest some tentative comparative conclusions concerning judicial 
conflict and consensus. The basic question is whether, if we control for 
appellate court level, there are regularities of behavioral patterns con-
cerning conflict and consensus that permit us to make generalizations 
about these phenomena. We must emphasize at the outset, however, 
that our ability to answer this question is limited because our contrib-
utors only occasionally focus on the same causes of conflict and 
consensus at different levels of appellate courts. 
Most fundamentally, all the studies in this book indicate that 
conflict and consensus in voting patterns vary on the different levels of 
American appellate courts over time. The chapters by Spaeth and 
Altfeld, Songer, Lamb, Stookey, and Dudley likewise demonstrate 
fluctuations in specific issues presented to courts for resolution. 
Beyond this, Peterson's 1981 propositional inventory on dissent in 
American courts provides a framework to improve an understanding of 
comparative institutional behavior. 26 He divides the influences on 
judicial dissent into four categories: legal culture, organizational and 
institutional factors, the sociopolitical system, and individual factors. 
The last of these categories was discussed in the preceding section on 
theory. 
Although an edited volume like this one cannot address all the 
causes of dissent such as those outlined by Peterson, several interesting 
patterns nevertheless can be noted. Under the rubric of legal culture as 
an influence on dissent, Peterson explains that judges and academics 
alike have "indirectly confirmed" the hypothesis that dissent is gener-
ated by difficult questions. 27 The chapters in this volume by Ulmer, 
Songer, and Stookey are most relevant here. Ulmer suggests that 
dissent on the U.S. Supreme Court is in part a function of the complex-
ity of issues and that the marked increase of 5-4 decisions since the Taft 
Court is consistent with the hypothesis that Supreme Court decisions 
on the merits have become more complex over time. Ulmer then 
develops a measure of case complexity to test the proposition that when 
personnel changes occur on the Court, a chief justice can more easily 
marshal his majorities when cases are less complex. He concludes that, 
although further research is needed, dissent rates by chief justices have 
been significantly influenced by case complexity, along with other 
factors such as frequency of new appointments and the presidents 
making those appointments. In contrast, Songer approaches the com-
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plexity hypothesis from different perspectives regarding the U.S. 
courts of appeals and reaches a similar tentative conclusion. He first 
selected criminal cases that would be expected to produce a higher 
percentage of difficult legal questions but discovered no significant 
differences in rates of dissent. When Songer hypothesized that the 
Supreme Court tends to grant review in cases involving more difficult 
issues and that the rate of appeals court dissent in those cases would be 
greater than in cases denied review, however, his tentative findings 
provided moderately strong support for the expectation that complex 
questions produce greater conflict on federal appeals courts. 28 Overall, 
these studies of two different levels of federal appellate courts provide 
support for a complexity-dissent relationship, but both indicate the need 
for further research. Stookey also tested the hypothesis with the Ari-
zona Supreme Court but reached more mixed conclusions than Ulmer 
and Songer. Assuming that public law questions in state supreme courts 
are likely to be more complex and controversial than others, Stookey 
found that the dissent rate on the Arizona Supreme Court was indeed 
twice as high as that in private and criminal law cases between 1913 and 
1976. When specific time periods were considered, however, he was 
forced to conclude that his docket composition theory of conflict had 
limited explanatory power in the context of state supreme court decision 
making. 
Peterson's inventory indicates that there is "some confirmation" for 
the proposition that dissent increases with the overturning of prece-
dent. 29 The studies in this book do not directly test this hypothesis, but 
they do analyze whether reversing lower courts seems to increase 
conflict. Songer proposed that one may indirectly examine appeals 
court departures from Supreme Court doctrine by determining whether 
appeals court decisional trends in criminal and labor relations cases 
were consistent with the Supreme Court's decisional tendencies during 
the same general time period. After comparing the percentage of 
prodefendant and prolabor decisions at both federal appellate levels, 
however, he discovered no support for the proposition that the rate of 
dissent in appeals courts significantly increases when decisions are 
contrary to Supreme Court trends. Songer, however, found higher 
dissent rates when the courts of appeals reversed district court decisions 
than when they affirmed them. The same result was found by Lamb, 
whose study of the D.C. Circuit showed that dissent was clearly more 
likely to emerge when three-judge panels reversed rather than affirmed 
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district court decisions (but this pattern did not hold for en bane 
reversals). Washy, relying only on three-judge panel decisions for the 
Ninth Circuit, also found that conflict usually occurred twice as often 
when the lower court was reversed than when it was affirmed. 
In considering organizational and institutional factors that influ-
ence dissent, this book's studies shed some light on the relationship 
between workload and conflict, which Peterson reports has received 
"indirect confirmation. "3° Contrary to the suggestions or findings of 
others, including the interviews reported by Washy, Songer found no 
statistically significant relationship between appeals court case load per 
judge and level of dissent. Nor did he discover a relationship between 
average case load per judge and variation in dissent rates across circuits. 
Similarly, although Green found evidence suggesting that workload 
suppressed dissents on the courts of appeals between 1966 and 19?0, 
his analysis of dissent rates during 1980 indicated that this relationship 
no longer existed. Glick and Pruet also hypothesized that less disagree-
ment will be evident on state supreme courts with larger caseloads, and 
their findings, falsifying the hypothesis, are consistent with those of 
Songer and Green. Looking at appeals court outputs, Lamb addition-
ally found no relationship between magnitude of dissent, the time taken 
for judges to reach final decisions, and the total number of decisions 
announced by the D.C. Circuit. Findings for the courts of appeals and 
the state supreme courts thus call into question the widely believed 
"common sense" proposition that the greater the caseload the less 
incentive a judge has to dissent. The U.S. Supreme Court has had a 
vastly increased workload over the past two decades compared to a half 
century ago, but this has not diminished dissent on the Court, as 
Ulmer's findings indicate. Thus the evidence in this volume can be 
taken to suggest strongly as a behavioral proposition that dissent on 
American courts is unrelated to caseload pressures. 
Some political scientists have examined the association between 
high rates of dissent and threat situations to a court, with the findings 
being mixed. 3! This relationship is analyzed by Ulmer regarding chief 
justices of the U.S. Supreme Court and by Songer regarding the courts 
of appeals. Ulmer concludes that fluctuation in dissent rates over time 
cannot be attributed to congressional pressure on the Supreme Court. 
Songer similarly finds no significant differences between rates of 
dissent on the courts of appeals during threat and nonthreat periods. 
Insofar as the influence of the sociopolitical system on dissent is 
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concerned, two studies tested whether urbanization was associated 
with increases in judicial conflict, a hypothesis that has been previously 
confirmed. 32 Regarding the courts of appeals, Songer developed an 
urbanism index for each circuit, compared it to dissent rates in each 
circuit, and found strong support for the hypothesis. Regarding state 
supreme courts, Glick and Pruet likewise found a relationship between 
urbanization and dissent, although the correlation was somewhat weak-
er in recent years than found in prior research. Glick and Pruet also 
indicated support for previous findings that states with intermediate 
appellate courts witness higher rates of dissent on their supreme courts, 
with intermediate courts apparently siphoning off less controversial 
cases. 33 
Beyond the specific propositions reported by Peterson, the studies 
in this book suggest other, at times related, causes of conflict. For 
example, several chapters note that the policy direction of a court's 
decisions may generate additional conflict among judges-a proposi-
tion that is only to be expected. Obviously, if a majority of judges 
begins to depart substantially from a court's prior policy trends, dis-
senting members are likely to express their concern. Danelski illus-
trates this in his analysis of dissenting behavior on the Supreme Court. 
Heck demonstrates that conflict accompanied policy shifts between the 
Warren and Burger courts, which was especially prominent in the 
voting behavior of Justices Brennan and Marshall. By contrast, con-
cerning the courts of appeals, one of the strongest relationships dis-
covered by Songer is that dissent is more likely to emerge in liberal 
criminal decisions or in conservative labor decisions. Lamb's study 
additionally indicates that conflict between Burger and his colleagues 
changed over time because of some policy shifts in specific criminal 
issues and perhaps because of the ideological composition of certain 
three-judge panels. 
From our brief excursion into comparative institutional behavior, 
we conclude by emphasizing two points. First, the studies in this book 
suggest more similarities than differences in the causes of conflict and 
consensus on American collegial courts. Despite significant dif-
ferences in the magnitude of dissent on the three major levels of 
American appellate courts, the degree to which certain variables seem 
to be related to conflict and consensus is perhaps greater than one 
would have anticipated. Second, the investigations in this book have 
helped to confirm some of the propositions identified by Peterson to a 
greater extent than before. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
At least two basic ways exist for suggesting future macro and micro level 
examinations of judicial conflict and consensus beyond that which has 
been alluded to thus far. An obvious way is simply to view the studies in 
this book in conjunction with Peterson's survey of the judicial dissent 
literature. From this vantage point, it becomes clear that some hypoth-
eses relating dissent to the legal culture, organizational and institu-
tional factors, the sociopolitical system, and individual factors have 
been more systematically examined than others. Still deserving greater 
attention on one or more levels of appellate courts, for example, are 
hypotheses relating dissent to court professionalism, intercourt rela-
tions, coalition formation, and controversial issues on which there is 
little agreement in society generally. 34 Operationalizing and testing 
some of these hypotheses may be difficult, which may account in part 
for the paucity of research to date relating to them. From this book, it 
also would seem that more research is needed on the courts of appeals 
and especially on the state supreme courts concerning several of 
Peterson's hypotheses. 
Another way of pointing toward future research is for students of 
judicial behavior to pursue some lines of inquiry developed by the 
contributors to this book that have received relatively little previous 
attention. Although we have mentioned in passing some fruitful lines of 
future research, several additional illustrations drawn from the studies 
in this book are appropriate: 
• Danelski correctly notes that quantitative measures of person-
ality need to be developed further so as to increase our understanding of 
the relationship between leadership and conflict, and certainly his 
conception of policy leadership deserves attention. 
• Ulmer's chapter explicitly and implicitly suggests a large number 
of hypotheses that could be profitably examined regarding dissent by 
chief justices. 
• Heck's concept of center-of-gravity justice deserves further test-
ing. 
• Spaeth and Altfeld suggest a line of research deserving attention-
whether the discrepancy between a judge's professed role orientation 
and his or her actual voting behavior affects conflict with colleagues. 
• Songer's findings suggest that more detailed analysis of circuits by 
year is warranted. 
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• Green's research again underscores the importance of probing 
conflict in unanimous as well as nonunanimous decisions. The coeffi-
cient of variation appears to be a useful methodological tool for 
accomplishing this task. Green was concerned only with criminal 
cases. Similar analyses of other issues are needed to determine whether 
some (and which) issues more readily lend themselves to conflict, overt 
or masked. 
• Washy's findings for the Ninth Circuit obviously raise the question 
whether they would hold true for the other circuits. 
• Lamb's microanalysis of one judge could serve as a model for 
examining, for example, circuit judges whose prominence might 
eventually take them to the Supreme Court. Comparisons of behavior 
of judges on the Supreme Court with their behavior when they pre-
viously served on the circuit bench might also be conducted. 
• Glick and Pruet's immensely important finding that dissent rates 
on the state supreme courts is on the increase suggests that more 
attention can and should be paid to these courts. At the very least, there 
is an urgent need to retest Nagel's classic study of the relationship of 
background characteristics to voting behavior on state supreme 
courts. 35 Glick and Pruet's finding relating the amount of state expend-
itures to dissent levels on state supreme courts deserves further exam-
ination. 
• Flango, Ducat, and McKnight's study of Michigan and Pennsyl-
vania could well be replicated with other state supreme courts, par-
ticularly in light of the relatively high dissent rates reported by Glick 
and Pruet. The use of the Inter-individual Solidarity Index might result 
in useful analytic payoffs such as were found by the authors. 
• Stookey's finding suggesting a relationship between court size and 
dissent rate deserves further investigation, especially if it can be done 
longitudinally with other courts whose number of judges has varied. 
Similarly, analysis of docket composition and dissent rates over time as 
conducted by Stookey for Arizona could well be undertaken for other 
states. 
• Dudley's analysis comparing votes on access decisions to votes on 
the merits raises the obvious question whether other state courts with 
control over their dockets display similar behavior. Dudley's finding 
that there was greater overt dissent on access decisions than on deci-
sions on the merits begs for similar study of other courts' access 
decision making. 
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There is much that we know about conflict and consensus on 
appellate courts and much that we need to know. A full research agenda 
is open to anyone who has the imagination, energy, and persistence to 
follow through. We know more about judicial conflict and consensus 
than we did twenty years ago. We should know still more twenty years 
from now if the quality and quantity of research in the field are 
maintained. 
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